**Aff**

**AT: QPQ CP**

**Deficit—Say No—Cost**

**Say no—defense spending is too costly**

**Wohlforth 16** (William C. Wohlforth, Daniel Webster Professor of Government in the Dartmouth College Department of Government, “The Right Choice for NATO,” This chapter will appear in: Sustainable Security: Rethinking American, National Security Strategy, edited by Jeremi Suri and Benjamin Valentino, <https://www.tobinproject.org/sites/tobinproject.org/files/assets/Wohlforth%20-%20The%20Right%20Choice%20for%20NATO.pdf>)

A further, critical implication of this assessment of the strategic environment is rarely noted: it is entirely **inconsistent** with **shock therapy’s assumption** about the lack of serious threats to European security to say that calling the **U**nited **S**tates’ Article 5 commitment **into question** will cause European governments **step up** and create **more military capacity** via increased **spending** or **coop**eration. On the contrary, a relatively **benign** security setting is arguably **more conducive** to allowing (p.260) narrow national perspectives to trump EU-wide initiatives and to foster the continuation of minimalist defense efforts than the status quo of US leadership. America’s NATO allies make up nearly **a fifth** of global military spending. Britain is the fourth biggest military spender in the world, with France close behind (after another US ally, Japan) as sixth. Germany, Italy, Turkey, and Canada all rank among the world’s fifteen biggest spenders.41 Very secure states like Norway and Canada purchase sophisticated weaponry from the US military-industrial complex and order their soldiers into battle in America’s wars in far off lands. **Why?** A major reason is **the alliance with the United States**—it is the existence of the **overseas hegemon** and the **perceived need** to retain access to it and **standing with it** that **drive much of** this **behavior**.42

Options 1 and 2 are based on the assumption that the international system generates strong pressures for European states to do one or all of three very costly things: **ramp up** spending on **defense**; reform entrenched domestic defense practices and institutions; and set aside national prerogatives to generate genuine supranational military defense and decision making at the EU level. Take away Uncle Sam’s “**welfare for the rich**” and the logic of anarchy will somehow force this outcome. It cannot be ruled out that there is something special about Europe that would cause it to act in this collectively martial way without the US umbrella. But that expectation is **inconsistent** with most of what we know about **international politics** and with the **lived experience** of the EU’s European Security and Defense Policy and Common Foreign and Security Policy. Governments just don’t do **extremely expensive** and **politically costly things** without a major prod of some sort. The problem is that there is neither **a compelling external security incentive** nor a **European hegemon** to help solve the **collective action** problem. Germany may play this role in economics, but it is not going to do so in **security**.43 The likelihood that **a US revocation of Article 5** would spur **France** and **Britain** to set aside **national feeling** and **unite defense efforts**—and that middle powers from **Poland** to **Turkey** would acquiesce—is exceedingly **low**. Indeed, the downward trend in European defense spending has **continued** despite the continuing **decline in American military forces in Europe** and despite increasingly **loud calls** for **retrenchment**.

Three consequences follow from this analysis. First, doubling down is unlikely—because Americans won’t pay for it—and neither form of retrenchment will work—because Europeans **won’t** pay the **political** or **economic costs** even if the **U**nited **S**tates steps aside. Second, major changes to the current benign macro-security environment are likely to occur only after substantial strategic warning, and therefore projected low costs and risks for US security provision will likely remain adequate. And third, there is **no** net **security benefit** to the **U**nited **S**tates (p.261) of **administering a shock** to NATO via even more **dramatic reductions** in presence or **commitment**. Indeed, there are serious **expected costs** in terms of **lost security cooperation** and even **less capable** and **interoperable allies**. With militarily capable allies like **NATO** and the Republic of Korea, a major benefit of presence is **security cooperation** (joint training, planning, etc.) that is **difficult** or impossible to replicate with **rotational deployments**. According to a recent comprehensive RAND study, the US presence in NATO is getting near the floor of deployed personnel needed to sustain security cooperation at current level.44

**Countries have limited budgets and can’t afford defense**

**Gilli 17** (Andrea Gilli is post-doctoral fellow at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation. “The Trump administration wants Europe to pay more to defend itself. It’s not that easy.” Washington Post. Feb. 3, 2017. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/02/03/europe-may-not-be-able-to-expand-its-defenses-like-president-trump-wants/)

The transatlantic gap in military capabilities — how much defense output the two sides of the Atlantic are able to generate, respectively — has three main causes that cannot easily be addressed:

1) European countries have **limited defense budgets** — On average, defense expenditure in Europe is just over 1 percent of GDP, while the U.S. defense budget is well above 4 percent of GDP. Would a **U.S. retrenchment push** European **allies to fix this imbalance**, and bring NATO members closer to the 2 percent threshold they pledged to move toward in 2014?

**Maybe**. But half of NATO’s members are **small countries** with **small defense budgets**, well below $2 billion per year. Thus, a **substantial bump** in their military spending **won’t bring** about a **significant increase** in Europe’s **overall military investments**. Estonia’s 2 percent GDP defense expenditure amounts to just $500 million, for instance. That might pay for the operational costs of a few of middle-sized U.S. warships, but **wouldn’t push back a Russian invasion.**

With the exception of Germany and Poland, large E.U. countries face **financial and political constraints** to **increasing military expenditure**. The U.K. is going through **Brexit**, which will also affect several countries, in particular the Netherlands and Ireland. **Italy’s bank problems** loom large, and **Spain** and **France** have **limited financial** and **political room** for additional public spending. This points to a broader problem.

In part, U.S. security assurances may have freed up state funds in Europe for other priorities, including a robust system of social services. However, cutting **welfare state provisions** in Europe **to fund defense expenditures** is going to be **extremely difficult**, if not **counterproductive**.

On the one hand, those who receive these benefits are **far more numerous**, and thus **politically more influential**, than those receiving a direct benefit from military spending. On the other, cuts in welfare spending risk actually bringing **additional support** to **anti-establishment parties** like the Five Stars Movement in Italy, Die Linke in Germany or Podemos in Spain — all of which have **strong anti-defense stances.**

2) European countries pay **more in defense overhead** — All armed forces require **military bases**, **training facilities**, and **administrative support**. So in a continent with several small, national armed forces, overhead necessarily absorbs a higher fraction of resources than in the United States.

A solution for Europe would be to share some military assets and functions. In recent years, there have been important bilateral and multilateral initiatives in this respect — but there are strong political limits as well.

Countries have **no guarantees** their **partners** ultimately will **support them** in a military crisis. Thus, if sharing turns into a lock-in, countries run the risk of having access to fewer military capabilities than they might need. This explains why the width and depth of past initiatives have been generally limited.

However, this comes at the cost of intra-alliance inefficiency and thus an inferior capacity to generate military capabilities. An E.U. Defense Union could address these problems, but efforts to set this up face many of the same challenges: Why should a country tie its destiny to others? How can it ensure that its interests will be respected? And what tangible benefits would it observe in the short term, beside loss of jobs and income, following base closures and defense industry consolidation?

3) Implementing **defense cooperation** in Europe **won’t be easy** — Some analysts think that by promoting cooperation among NATO allies, any U.S. retrenchment from Europe would help address existing problems, but there are strong reasons to be skeptical.

With Europe’s **limited funds** to spend on defense, large **cooperative projects** will be **difficult to launch**. In the past, countries in Europe abandoned cooperative projects because of **their negative domestic implications** for **jobs**, **technological know-how** or **military exports**. In **an age of austerity**, amid **a refugee crisis** and **high youth unemployment**, this mind-set is **unlikely to change** anytime soon.

And some countries may have **little interest** in cooperation. They may operate in **completely different environments** — Mediterranean vs. North Sea, for example. Or they perceive a **different strategic threat** at home — think Russia vs. the Islamic State. Some countries may even have a **strategic interest** in leaving unaddressed some **capability gaps** — to compel proximate allies to come to their defense. This was Finland’s military strategy during the Cold War.

**Deficit—Say No—Domestic Politics**

**Say No—Domestic politics and faith in US security guarantee**

**Zannella, 20** [Anthony Zannella Seton Hall University, majored in Political Science and Philosophy, 4-7-2020 "An Analysis of Burden Sharing in NATO and the Problem of Free Riding," Political Analysis: Vol. 21 , Article 5, [https://scholarship.shu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1058&context=pa#](https://scholarship.shu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1058&context=pa) /alundy]

The literature on burden sharing has shown great development over the years moving from a more pecuniary focus, to a focus that incorporates a variety of inconspicuous factors. From a deterrence and pure public goods standpoint, the United States is bearing an unfair share of the burden. The simple fact that it is leading the way economically (and in turn with the efficiency and effectiveness of its forces) shows that non-U.S. NATO allies are indeed benefitting unfairly from its ally’s efforts. The decline in NATO allied defense spending indicates the acceptance of relying on U.S. capabilities and letting their own forces bear less of the financial responsibility associated with collective defense. However, the simplicity of this model does not consider other factors that can be just as important to burden sharing. The joint product model would seem to take better account of factors that do not seem immediately pertinent to burden sharing but are without a doubt just as important. The dedication of alliance forces can produce strain in a **political** manner due to the potential loss of life and the ramifications such losses can have back home. Furthermore, the introduction of excludable goods levels the playing field in different ways. The massive output of defense provided by the U.S., incurs significant benefits that are only a positive for the U.S. alone**.** The expansion of the defense industry, for example, can provide jobs and further stimulate the U.S. economy; however, this is a good that other nations cannot benefit from directly. This same idea can be redirected back to non-U.S. NATO allies. Many of them intend to focus more on domestic issues at home while letting their forces **weaken** under the greater protection of the **U**nited **S**tates. With new threats on the rise and a turn to out-of-area operations, it becomes apparent that if the U.S. “is able to provide politically or physically sufficient levels of security for the rest of NATO’s members in response… then other members can free ride and will provide little additional assistance. Therefore, we should expect even more free riding than in the past,” (Siegel 2009).

**Deficit—Say No—Nationalism**

**Nationalism breeds distrust—prevents support for burden sharing**

**Kluth 19** [Andreas Kluth is a columnist for Bloomberg Opinion, was previously editor in chief of Handelsblatt Global and a writer for the Economist, “A European Army? It’ll Never Happen,” Dec 2, 2019, https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-12-02/a-european-army-will-never-happen-nato-remains-essential]

The complications that caused that stillbirth linger. The nations in what is now the **E**uropean **U**nion **still care** about **their sovereignty**, which is expressed above all in the decision to send young soldiers into harm’s way. They also have **different interests**. The French are busy in their former African colonies. The Poles and Balts feel most threatened by Russia. Germany, caring not a whit about all that, is merrily building itself **a second gas pipeline** to Russia, circumventing **the eastern EU**.

**Member states** also have **dissonant historical traditions**, which make **integration into one command hierarchy** almost impossible. Postcolonial France considers military action a legitimate tool of foreign policy, and its president has ample powers to direct its army. Germany, still atoning for World War II, **disavows** military interventionism. Unlike France, it has a “parliamentary army,” which must get explicit approval from the Bundestag to do anything. Would a French president patiently wait for the German legislature before deciding whether to shoot at little green men speaking Russian in an Estonian forest? Would 27 states cede that decision to Brussels?

**The fundamental problem**, as Jan Techau of the German Marshall Fund puts it, is **distrust**: The French and Germans don’t **fully trust** each other, the Italians trust **neither of them**, the Germans don’t **even trust themselves**, Warsaw distrusts Berlin, Bucharest and Budapest distrust each other, people in the Balkans **don’t trust anybody**, and so forth.

That’s why Macron is seen in central Europe as a neo-Gaullist. When he talks about “strategic autonomy” or “European sovereignty,” he seems mainly to be eager for France, the EU’s only nuclear power after Brexit, to lead Europe, snubbing its nose at the U.S. and accommodating Russia. To advance that vision, he’s sponsored a fledgling alliance called the “European Intervention Initiative,” which is part of neither NATO nor the EU. Needless to say, **the EU’s eastern members** would much prefer to keep relying on the U.S.

**Deficit—Say No—AT: Pressure Solves**

**Say no and the cp collapses NATO**

**Wohlforth 16** (William C. Wohlforth, Daniel Webster Professor of Government in the Dartmouth College Department of Government, “The Right Choice for NATO,” This chapter will appear in: Sustainable Security: Rethinking American, National Security Strategy, edited by Jeremi Suri and Benjamin Valentino, <https://www.tobinproject.org/sites/tobinproject.org/files/assets/Wohlforth%20-%20The%20Right%20Choice%20for%20NATO.pdf>)

A further, critical implication of this assessment of the strategic environment is rarely noted: it is entirely **inconsistent** with **shock therapy’s assumption** about the lack of serious threats to European security to say that calling the **U**nited **S**tates’ Article 5 commitment **into question** will cause European governments **step up** and create **more military capacity** via increased **spending** or **coop**eration. On the contrary, a relatively **benign** security setting is arguably **more conducive** to allowing (p.260) narrow national perspectives to trump EU-wide initiatives and to foster the continuation of minimalist defense efforts than the status quo of US leadership. America’s NATO allies make up nearly **a fifth** of global military spending. Britain is the fourth biggest military spender in the world, with France close behind (after another US ally, Japan) as sixth. Germany, Italy, Turkey, and Canada all rank among the world’s fifteen biggest spenders.41 Very secure states like Norway and Canada purchase sophisticated weaponry from the US military-industrial complex and order their soldiers into battle in America’s wars in far off lands. **Why?** A major reason is **the alliance with the United States**—it is the existence of the **overseas hegemon** and the **perceived need** to retain access to it and **standing with it** that **drive much of** this **behavior**.42

Options 1 and 2 are based on the assumption that the international system generates strong pressures for European states to do one or all of three very costly things: **ramp up** spending on **defense**; reform entrenched domestic defense practices and institutions; and set aside national prerogatives to generate genuine supranational military defense and decision making at the EU level. Take away Uncle Sam’s “**welfare for the rich**” and the logic of anarchy will somehow force this outcome. It cannot be ruled out that there is something special about Europe that would cause it to act in this collectively martial way without the US umbrella. But that expectation is **inconsistent** with most of what we know about **international politics** and with the **lived experience** of the EU’s European Security and Defense Policy and Common Foreign and Security Policy. Governments just don’t do **extremely expensive** and **politically costly things** without a major prod of some sort. The problem is that there is neither **a compelling external security incentive** nor a **European hegemon** to help solve the **collective action** problem. Germany may play this role in economics, but it is not going to do so in **security**.43 The likelihood that **a US revocation of Article 5** would spur **France** and **Britain** to set aside **national feeling** and **unite defense efforts**—and that middle powers from **Poland** to **Turkey** would acquiesce—is exceedingly **low**. Indeed, the downward trend in European defense spending has **continued** despite the continuing **decline in American military forces in Europe** and despite increasingly **loud calls** for **retrenchment**.

Three consequences follow from this analysis. First, doubling down is unlikely—because Americans won’t pay for it—and neither form of retrenchment will work—because Europeans **won’t** pay the **political** or **economic costs** even if the **U**nited **S**tates steps aside. Second, major changes to the current benign macro-security environment are likely to occur only after substantial strategic warning, and therefore projected low costs and risks for US security provision will likely remain adequate. And third, there is **no** net **security benefit** to the **U**nited **S**tates (p.261) of **administering a shock** to NATO via even more **dramatic reductions** in presence or **commitment**. Indeed, there are serious **expected costs** in terms of **lost security cooperation** and even **less capable** and **interoperable allies**. With militarily capable allies like **NATO** and the Republic of Korea, a major benefit of presence is **security cooperation** (joint training, planning, etc.) that is **difficult** or impossible to replicate with **rotational deployments**. According to a recent comprehensive RAND study, the US presence in NATO is getting near the floor of deployed personnel needed to sustain security cooperation at current level.44

Now let’s consider how this vision of NATO aligns with American grand strategy. The US grand strategy of deep engagement is essentially about three objectives: managing the external environment to reduce near- and long-term threats to US national security; promoting a liberal economic order to expand the global economy and maximize domestic prosperity; and creating, sustaining, and revising the global institutional order to secure necessary interstate cooperation on terms favorable to US interests.45

NATO’s declining capability for large-scale optional expeditionary operations to address conjectural security threats or humanitarian ideals does little to impede this grand strategy. The Obama administration’s policy pronouncements and military deployments do not in any way represent a change away from deep engagement. They reflect a refocus on the strategy’s core. For that core, NATO retains value as an institutional framework for:

• Coordinating transatlantic security cooperation;

• Maintaining key infrastructure and lines of communications to sustain a US-led containment strategy in the greater Middle East;

• Reducing inefficient duplication of defense efforts among allies, preventing full renationalization of security;

• Hedging against the emergence of a more threatening Russia or the appearance of a new, serious security threat.

The retrenchment options (One and Two) put these benefits at risk. Full retrenchment does so because it is obviously inconsistent with deep engagement. “NATO-friendly” **retrenchment** does so because it confuses secondary aims with the grand strategy’s core aims. It is **willing** to trade US leadership of the alliance for **ephemeral** and likely **unattainable gains** in indigenous European capability. Doubling down on NATO makes the same mistake of viewing optional capacities as essential, and magnifies it by ultimately imposing its costs on the US taxpayer, as it has no answer to the “free rider” problem aside from exhortation.

If the **U**nited **S**tates engineers **a dramatic shift** in its grand strategy to a strong version of **restraint** that devalues **the capacity** to mount light footprint military operations around Eurasia as well as the incipient “coalition in waiting” represented (p.262) by NATO, then the **alliance would cease to make sense**. But if, as is likely, it pares the deep engagement strategy to its core objectives, then muddling though, with no new grand bargains, no grand “rebooting” of the alliance, no sudden new infusion of defense dollars and euros, and no “post-American” NATO emerges as the optimal choice. In other words, the transatlantic bargain should contain three parts: NATO should continue to guarantee territorial defense; external operations in Europe’s neighborhood where the United States has no interest should fall under the EU or individual European allies (e.g., France in Mali, Central African Republic); and NATO should only engage beyond Europe’s borders when the United States wishes to be involved.

**NATO says no to pressure**

**Becker 20**, was Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the Institute for European Studies at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel during this research. He is currently the U.S. Liaison to the French Joint Staff, and an associate researcher at the Institut de Recherche Stratégique de l’Ecole Militaire (IRSEM) and Sciences Po’s Center for International Studies (CERI). He completed his PhD at King’s College London in 2017, and he is a lieutenant colonel in the United States Army (Jordan and Robert Bell, “PREPARING FOR WAR IN THE FOG OF PEACE: THE TRANSATLANTIC CASE,” War on the Rocks, <https://warontherocks.com/2020/04/preparing-for-war-in-the-fog-of-peace-the-transatlantic-case/>)

Yet there inevitably are areas of national strategy that a process alone cannot shape. We maintain that national strategic cultures, **national political economies**, and E.U. macroeconomic and fiscal policy **decisively influence** how countries allocate resources to defense – before NATO and E.U. planning processes take place. Specifically, the more Atlanticist (a preference for a transatlantic approach to European security, in which the United States’ role is central) a country’s national security strategy was, the more it contributed to shared operational priorities during NATO’s “out of area” period (from 2000 to 2012). As European states experience increased unemployment, they “slightly decrease top-line defense spending in response to unemployment, while shifting much more substantial amounts within defense budgets out of equipment and into personnel.” E.U. members respond similarly to supranational (E.U.) fiscal constraints agreed to by heads of state and government as part of the Maastricht Treaty on European Union, and “monitored” (enforced) by the European Commission. Processes cannot address these tough choices, which amount to rival claims on strategic resources, but politico-strategic dialogue may. For example, when NATO allies agreed to a “pledge on defense investment” at their 2014 Wales Summit, their heads of state and government gave broad but clear guidance not only to defense ministries to “meet[] capability priorities,” but also to finance ministries to “reverse the trend of declining defense budgets.” Two years later, E.U. heads of state and government formally adopted the NATO goals of moving toward spending two percent of GDP on defense and 20 percent of defense spending on equipment modernization. Early indications are that these political agreements are having some effect on resource allocation, as Figure 3 shows. European allies’ defense spending increased by $87 billion from 2014 to 2018. That this would occur in spite of disagreements regarding threats, economic fragmentation within Europe and the broader transatlantic community, and fiscal austerity in the European Union, points to the importance of cultural factors like Atlanticism. However, as Figure 3 also shows, increases may be stalling – a transatlantic divide may harm burden-sharing and, perhaps paradoxically, weaken Europe as a strategic actor. Figure 3: Annual Real Change in Defense Spending, NATO Europe and Canada Source: NATO, Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2013-2019), 2020. NATO and European Union agreement on exigent defense investment guidelines, as well as the downstream effects on coordinated capability development, point toward other opportunities for the two organizations to cooperate strategically. This is especially true given the tight interconnection between the economic strength of the transatlantic community and its military strength. For example, NATO and the European Union could build on current cooperation proposals to include the grand strategic area of resource allocation, ensuring that NATO and E.U. defense spending goals are not in competition with E.U. fiscal rules for scarce resources. Italy’s 2015 defense White Paper, for example, suggests the possibility that some defense spending “could be excluded from the thresholds of the Stability and Growth Pact.” Trouble Behind, Trouble Ahead At some level, all states must prepare for war. Robert Osgood called alliances “latent war communities” – they are designed for that purpose. Indeed, Bear Braumoeller’s recent work extends Charles Tilly’s insight that “war made the state and the state made war” to international orders, which he argues prevent war among their members but are dangerous to non-members. Processes like those that NATO and the European Union have developed during the last eight decades of relative calm and prosperity are central to the transatlantic community’s ability to prepare for, and perhaps forestall, future wars. They are the best tools its members have to convert political will into capabilities that they believe will have strategic effects, like deterring adversaries or, if necessary, defending national territory and shared interests. Processes are, however, no substitute for grand strategic vision. Such vision animated the creation of both NATO and the European Union. There is now a strong case for a bolder vision of transatlantic cooperation in defense planning and grand strategy to keep the “fog of peace” from turning into the “fog of war.” What might such a vision look like? Some scholars have proposed to address the fog of peace by “rediscovering geography” to regionalize NATO defense planning, enabling allies to focus on capabilities that are most directly relevant to their own strategic priorities. Others have argued that it is time for Europe to seek – and achieve – true strategic autonomy, either by “Europeanizing” NATO (whereby the United States would reduce its footprint in the alliance and concentrate on its strategic challenges elsewhere), or by subsuming NATO into a broader European political-security framework. Even the possibility of extending France’s nuclear deterrent to its European allies has been raised, first by French scholars discussing “nuclear solidarity,” and then by President Emmanuel Macron, who invited European partners to “be associated with the exercises of French deterrence forces” in the interest of a “true strategic culture among Europeans.” Macron further clarified his intent in an interview with Wolfgang Ischinger at the 2020 Munich Security Conference, pointing to an “unprecedented dialogue” on nuclear deterrence among Europeans. Challenges abound. First, transatlantic discord creates challenges for European Atlanticists, making it more difficult to align national strategies, and may even incentivize countries to **curb defense spending to appeal to domestic electorates that bristle at external pressure**. Second, the combination of economic recession and fiscal austerity that plagued Europe during the 2008 crisis appears likely to return in a more virulent form, which is almost certain to dampen defense investment. Taking Europe’s “destiny in its own hands” is easier said than done. Years of low defense investment, the complicating effects of Brexit, the rise of populist politics across Europe, and uncertainties about Turkey, among other issues, cloud prospects for greater European defense autonomy. While retaining the transatlantic bond, in an era of great-power competition when conflict would almost certainly not be confined to one operational theater, it may be wise to encourage allies to “concentrate on those tasks for which they are most geographically suited.” For example, Baltic Sea states could focus on defending their territory from Russian aggression, while states along the Mediterranean could focus on combatting terrorism and building partner capacity – each without fear of being criticized for inadequately supporting allies. Doing so would help link operational and strategic planning to threat assessments, while also helping to blunt conflict among allies about defining the array of threats, risks, and challenges that characterize the emerging security environment. It would enable the transatlantic security community to incentivize and leverage the national defense planning efforts of its members. Specializing like this would enable institutional work to focus on harmonizing, which encourages burden-sharing, as opposed to dominating, which incentivizes free-riding. But such specialization demands trust, which is **currently in short supply** in the transatlantic community and beyond.

**Deficit—Say No—vs 2% of GDP**

**The 2% standard is not an accurate representation of contribution--- destabilizes the alliance by calling out competent countries.**

**Kivimaki, 19** [Timo Kivimaki, 2-13-2019, professor of International Relations and Director of Research at University of Bath, European Security, Volume 28, ‘Power, Contribution, and Dependence in NATO Burden Sharing’, <https://researchportal.bath.ac.uk/en/publications/power-contribution-and-dependence-in-nato-burden-sharing> /alundy]

The national GDP share of defence spending is often used as an easy, parsimonious, quantitative measure of contribution in some of the formative studies in the field and in most studies that aim at complete mathematical models of burden sharing in military alliances (Olson and Zeckhauser [1966](https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/09662839.2019.1578750), Boyer [1989](https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/09662839.2019.1578750), Oneal [1990](https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/09662839.2019.1578750), Sandler and Hartley [2001](https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/09662839.2019.1578750)). The use of national defence spending is justified by the fact that much of NATO’s operations and activities are funded by national defence spending, while only some funding is channelled through the NATO budget. Thus, the idea of measuring contribution to NATO by considering GDP shares of national military spending makes some sense, but it is **neither an accurate**, nor a necessarily **useful**, indicator of contributions (Zyla [2009](https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/09662839.2019.1578750), Techau [2015](https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/09662839.2019.1578750), Kunertova [2017b](https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/09662839.2019.1578750)).

US military spending in 2017 was at a level of 610 billion USD, thus representing not only a majority of NATO spending, but 35% of the military spending of the entire globe; 9.2 times that of Russia and 2.7 times that of China (These calculations are based on data by SIPRI [2018](https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/09662839.2019.1578750)).[3](https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/09662839.2019.1578750) Thus, if we use the GDP share of national military expenditure as an indicator, it seems clear that the US, with about a 45% share of the NATO GDP , (GDP data is calculated from “The World Factbook — Central Intelligence Agency” n.d.) has a too high a national expenditure, as it add up to more than 50% of the sum of national defence expenditures of all NATO countries.

If we look at the funding of NATO itself and of such functions and operations that are under the direct control of the alliance rather than member countries, **the picture changes dramatically**. If security is a public good and there is an agreement on how best to protect it, one could assume that NATO countries should have no difficulties in channelling their military spending through a common, rather than a national, decision-making structure. The fact that this is not the case already challenges the credibility of seeing security as a public good for NATO countries.

Direct NATO funding is proportional to each member country’s GDP, with the exception of the US, which is compensated in its NATO shares for its superior national spending. According to NATO statistics on defence spending (NATO 2018) from 2016 and the CIA World Factbook (“The World Factbook — Central Intelligence Agency” n.d., NATO [2018](https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/09662839.2019.1578750)) data on GDPs, all NATO **countries contribute more to NATO’s budget than** their **GDP** share (the GDP share equals the GDP of the country divided by the GDP sum of all NATO countries), excepting Luxembourg and the United States. While NATO’s budget share from Luxembourg is likely to be a result of fluctuation in GDPs and a specific year’s (2016) contribution, and while the share of Luxembourg’s contribution to the NATO budget is still very close to its share of GDP, the case of the US is different. US funding for NATO is **systematically lower** than its GDP share, less than half of it. Obviously, this relates to US superior national military spending, but again, it highlights problems with the assumption that the security needs of NATO countries are identical. If the US actually contributes 22% of the NATO budget while its GDP share would be 45%, then we either have to believe that US national defence spending serves NATO’s security needs or relinquish the conclusion that the US is such a disproportionate contributor to NATO**.** However, the question of burden sharing is much more complicated than the debate on defence expenditures may suggest.

**Allies are unwilling to meet 2% burdens---it’s not realistic**

**Techau 15** [Jan Techau; director of Carnegie Europe, a part of Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; 9/2/15; THE POLITICS OF 2 PERCENT; [https://carnegieendowment.org/files/CP\_252\_Techau\_NATO\_Final.pdf]](https://carnegieendowment.org/files/CP_252_Techau_NATO_Final.pdf%5d)

If **2 percent has become the gold standard for defense spending** in the debate on NATO’s future, then how realistic is it that the goal will ever be reached? Pessimism prevails on this issue. “The guideline . . . **if taken literally, would create an impossible situation for some allies**,” writes Ian Anthony of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. A country like Germany would have to absorb €74 billion ($82 billion) of defense spending instead of its current €37 billion ($41 billion), something it **would be unable (and unwilling)** to do and that would in turn lead to “inefficiency and waste, rather than an increase in useful capability.”20 Germany is also the focus of another argument that aims at making 2 percent look unrealistic. The enormous increase in absolute defense spending in Germany, with its large economy, that would result from 2 percent could also lead to a degree of nervousness among some of the country’s allies. As Karl-Heinz Kamp of the German Federal Academy for Security Policy argues, “If Germany spent 2 percent of its huge GDP, it would produce a defense budget overshadowing those of France and the UK, arguably causing more concern than reassurance among its neighbors.”21 This is a weak argument, as it essentially questions the political reliability of a key NATO partner that is most under pressure to spend more The strength of the 2 percent metric is its triumph of simplicity over complexity. 12 | The Politics of 2 Percent: NATO and the Security Vacuum in Europe on defense. For the most part, it is a self-serving defensive argument against higher defense spending that has been used primarily by Germans themselves, not so much by other NATO allies. **But the lack of capacity among member states to absorb significantly increased defense budgets is not the only factor that leads to doubt about hitting the 2 percent target. The biggest concern comes from the fact that many NATO countries agreed to the 2 percent pledge in Wales but have no real intention to make good on the promise.** “The problem is not that most NATO allies will fail to reach the 2 percent bar. The trouble comes with those that don’t even try,” as Kamp puts it.22 Initial budget decisions made around or after the Wales summit and even public announcements by many member states seem to indicate that the **political will to really reach 2 percent is indeed underdeveloped across NATO**. Overriding economic concerns are also reasons for skepticism that the 2 percent pledge can be fulfilled. “As long as austerity remains the eurozone’s economic mantra, it is unlikely that European allies will meet the target,” one researcher argues.23 Under the prevailing economic circumstances, it is often claimed that a reversal of the downward trend in defense spending would already be a success, but that an **increase to 2 percent would be too much to realistically expect.** The Wales summit declaration itself makes **2 percent dependent on** positive **economic development, stipulating that allies “aim to increase defence expenditure in real terms as GDP grows.”**24 This conditionality is meant to generate more defense spending from the moment economic recovery sets in. The volume of growth that would be needed to increase defense spending is not specified, nor is a time reference for growth given. Should spending be measured against absolute GDP growth on an annual basis, or should the growth rate be the metric? Or should GDP growth be measured against a fixed point in time—for instance, GDP before the financial crisis?

**Deficit—Credibility**

**Conditional leadership in NATO can’t solve—creates a power vacuum and unconditional leadership is empirically better.**

**Lagon & Moreland ’19** [Mark Lagon and Will Moreland; Chief Policy Officer at Friends of the Global Fight Against AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, as well as Distinguished Senior Scholar in the Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, and associate fellow with the Brookings Institution's Project on International Order and Strategy; 2-14-2019; "Burden-Sharing Doesn’t Need to Be Burdensome"; National Interest; https://nationalinterest.org/feature/burden-sharing-doesn%E2%80%99t-need-be-burdensome-44572; Accessed 7-9-2022; AW]

The president’s critique is not unfounded. American power today differs from its heights in 1945, or even 1990. The United States will need help shouldering the maintenance of a liberal international order that has increased global security, prosperity and freedom these past seven decades. Nevertheless, the **manner in which an American administration approaches the burden-sharing issue matters**. Trump has pointedly called for NATO allies to pay more for defense and his team at the United Nations has circulated a potential policy to make foreign aid contingent on alignment with U.S. positions, so that aid dollars “only go to America’s friends.” Though increased action among allies and partners is necessary, **to simply demand greater burden-sharing is insufficient. Policymakers confront two central questions if they are to promote effective burden-sharing**: first, **how to ensure other stakeholders do step forward, rather than leave a vacuum around an issue**; and, second, **how to protect and advance U.S. interests if burden-sharing cedes the initiative** to others. Demands for increased activities from partners **must be coupled with coordination and a measure of U.S. leadership for an effective burden-sharing campaign**. A **number of cases, therefore, reveal bases for eliciting burden-sharing of the quality and variety the United States should want—as well as the risks of forcing burden-sharing via disengagement**. The notion of **compelling other nations i**nto taking actions—**particularly by arousing skepticism around U.S. credibility**—is a **recipe for shortchanging American interests.** Consideration of both **UN peacekeeping operations** and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria **illustrate how effective burden-sharing requires continued U.S. commitments** in order **to spur burden-sharing over inaction**. Furthermore, the success of the Global Fund, the **worsening of some crises in** the Middle East, such as in **Yemen, and the mixed record of the U.S. withdrawal from** the Trans-Pacific Partnership (**TPP**), similarly **demonstrate that leadership creates the leverage necessary for Washington** to advance U.S. interests **when others do step up to act.** Americans may legitimately want others to do more, but how that aim is pursued matters. **Nowhere is this more evident than the debate over NATO.** Even before the signing of the Washington Treaty, concerns around NATO burden-sharing arose. U.S. military planners worried that an American security guarantee would perpetually deter defense spending by the new European allies. This concern dogged the allies throughout the Cold War. Disagreements flared almost immediately in the Senate’s “great debate” over deploying troops to Europe without additional European support in the Korean War, a peripheral interest to many European leaders. **Disagreements resurfaced in the 1960s as Western European economies recovered from their postwar devastation**. The Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon administrations repeatedly sought to navigate clashes between security interests in Europe and trade or balance of payments deficits. Compounded by the strains of Vietnam, both the **security and economic arrangements boiled over in the Nixon administration with the resulting shifts of the Nixon Doctrine** and the shocks to the Bretton Woods system. Though the transatlantic partners were in sync on détente and then counterbalancing in face of the Soviet Union in the 1970s and early 1980s, disagreements surrounding approaches to European security, particularly around the deployment of intermediate-range nuclear missiles, maintained a measure of tension between the Euro-Atlantic allies. The subsequent Soviet collapse transformed the global security environment; yet, it **did not take long for a new generation of burden-sharing issues to emerge. The Clinton administration at first evidenced ambivalence on respective roles and responses on Balkans crises. Others, like then-French foreign minister Hubert Vedrine, derided the U.S. “hyperpower**.” During this period even Paul Wolfowitz admitted a “need to believe that others are doing their share.” Frustrations persisted in the George W. Bush and Barack Obama administrations. Under both presidents, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates forewarned of a potential “two-tiered alliance” at the 2008 Munich Security Conference and the “the growing difficulty for the United States to sustain current support for NATO if the American taxpayer continues to carry most of the burden in the Alliance” in his 2011 farewell address at NATO. Jeffrey Goldberg further captured this sentiment in President Obama’s derision of “free-riders” in his revealing 2016 article “The Obama Doctrine” in The Atlantic. **Surviving these crises, NATO’s story reminds that the organization has been and remains, like many of America’s global partnerships, inherently reformable**—**provided the United States engages with tangible and realistic ambitions**. **Without** initial U.S**. involvement, no effective collective defense organization would have developed in Europe** sufficient to manage the Soviet threat. **Without continued engagement** that same **organization would not have changed as needed, for instance, to be a stalwart partner in Afghanistan. NATO** and the broader transatlantic partnership certainly **require further shifts to manage today’s era of resurgent great power competition; however, this past precedent emphasizes the need for active U.S. leadership and reasonable agenda-setting**. Pragmatic engagement will yield practical results. Peacekeeping by the United Nations offers an important example of what burden-sharing means and what elicits it. During the Cold War, UN peace operations were confined to interposing a deployment between formerly warring parties. The clash of the Cold War superpowers as veto-wielding United Nations Security Council (UNSC) members meant that was all the traffic would bear. In settings like Cyprus and Lebanon, long-standing deployments kept additional military duties off the U.S. plate through decades of the Cold War. **The Cold War’s end ushered in more numerous and ambitious UNSC mandates—as the United States and Russia were more often willing to align on authorizing peace operations**. In the 1990s, along with a couple of dramatic failures marred by murky mandates (in Bosnia and Rwanda, where excessive impartiality left atrocities to occur on peacekeepers’ watch), an **array of peace operations took hold with a variety of governance** and post-conflict goals beyond the traditional interpositional model.

**Deficit—Delay**

**Delay and say no—adequate burden sharing takes years**

**Hoffman & Dinneen 18** [Frank G. Hoffman, board of advisors at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, serving the National Defense University as a Research Fellow; Molly Dinneen, Research Intern at the National Defense University, 7-6-2018, Foreign Policy Research Institute, ‘Examining NATO’s Progress: Common Goals, Shared Burdens’, <https://www.fpri.org/article/2018/07/examining-natos-progress-common-goals-shared-burdens/> /alundy]

In anticipation of the 2018 NATO Summit, analysts have commented on [several positive regional security enhancements](http://www.atahq.org/2018/02/projecting-stability-adapting-nato-readiness-action-plan/): command and control structure changes, new headquarters for maritime forces, and higher defense spending levels. European scholars and policy experts would like to see the Summit move past the issue of burden sharing**.** Certainly, there is much more than burden sharing to discuss. Yet, a **lack of consensus** about Russia and threats from terrorism have limited the progress the Alliance should have gained since Wales in 2014. Coercive tactics with tariffs and trade imbalances will only increase resistance and weaken consensus on a way ahead with regard to security arguments.

At the Summit, the attendees will be able to see a clear reversal of declining defense spending as several NATO members are expanding their defense budgets. Despite President Trump’s desires for rapid achievement of the 2% threshold, European disarmament occurred over a long period of time, and given **economic realities** in Europe, **it will not be overcome in a matter of one or two years**, as Frank Hoffman noted [last year](https://www.fpri.org/article/2017/03/making-nato-less-obsolete/) on this topic. However, as shown in Figure 2, European and Canadian defense expenditures are on a clear upward trend. Given U.S. persistence, and a bit of patience from U.S. leaders, these positive improvements should continue.

**Deficit—Cohesion/Relations—2AC**

**Threats of abandonment cause allied backlash and destroy cohesion**

**Blankenship 18**, Brian Dylan Blankenship is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami and a researcher with a focus on international security and international cooperation, “Promises under Pressure: Reassurance and Burden-Sharing in Asymmetric Alliances,” 2018, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Columbia University, p. 28-29

2.5.1 The Reassurance Dilemma. One might thus conclude that reassurance is suboptimal, and that patrons are best served by casting their protection into doubt. The reality is **not so simple**, however. Because the patron’s side of the bargain entails providing protection to its allies, if that **protection comes into doubt** then **allies have less reason to honor their end of the bargain**: namely, to **remain loyal** to the patron by siding with it against its adversaries, providing basing access, and supporting its other foreign policy priorities (Morrow, 1991; Lake, 2009). The patron thus faces a dilemma. It must **choose between withholding reassurance to maximize burden-sharing**, on the one hand, and **providing reassurance to ensure that allies have incentives to remain loyal to it**, on the other. Directly studying the relationship between reassurance and burden-sharing is difficult, however. The first two problems are methodological. Any relationship that exists between patron reassurance and allied burden-sharing may be **spurious**. For example, U.S. troop presence is likely to be correlated with threat, which may have an independent effect on allied military spending. Second, the relationship between reassurance and burden-sharing may be endogenous; patrons may withhold reassurance from allies which are under-contributing and then reward them with assurances of protection once they have increased their efforts. The third problem is theoretical – even if troops are present, allies may fear (and, indeed, the patron may threaten) that they will be withdrawn. It is difficult to know, for example, whether a large U.S. troop presence in a country indicates that the host is highly dependent on the United States, or whether it is instead the United States that is dependent upon the host. Indeed, while Lake (2007, 2009) and Machain and Morgan (2013) find that states which host U.S. troops have lower defense contributions, Allen, VanDusky-Allen, and Flynn (2016) show that NATO allies’ defense efforts are positively related to U.S. military presence. Moreover, Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger (1994) find that states with a large U.S. military presence – which they treat as a proxy for partners’ dependence on the United States – were more likely to contribute to the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War.

**Deficit—Cohesion/Relations—Abandonment Fears**

**CP causes allies to perceive lack of US commitment**

**Benitez 19**, Jorge Benitez is a senior fellow in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council, specializing in NATO, transatlantic relations, European politics, and U.S. national security, “U.S. NATO Policy in the Age of Trump: Controversy and Consistency,” Winter 2019, The Fletcher forum of world affairs, vol. 43

Since its creation in response to Soviet aggression after World War II, the majority of the U.S. public has consistently held favorable views of NATO. But Trump’s repeated public **criticism of NATO may be having an effect on** popular **support for the Alliance**. Support for NATO by Republicans decreased from 52 percent in 2016 to 47 percent in 2017, during the first year of the Trump administration.81 Nevertheless, a strong majority of Americans polled have a favorable view of NATO. While Republican support for NATO may have gone down slightly, support for NATO by Democrats and Independents has increased significantly. As a result, overall public support for NATO has grown, from 53 percent in 2016 to 62 percent in 2017. 82 Still, Trump’s tough NATO policy is putting **great strain on the Alliance**. It will not convince the majority of U.S. allies to meet NATO’s 2-percent defense-spending pledge by 2024. Moreover, **reducing U.S. commitments to NATO** and cutting contributions to the Alliance will only **make the problem worse** and may make hostile powers **more willing to test the Alliance by using force or engaging in a hybrid attack** against a NATO member. Instead of focusing on threats, Trump’s NATO policy should propose feasible burden-sharing ideas that can be implemented quickly.83 But the key to a successful NATO policy from the Trump administration must be a more accurate perspective on the central role of NATO in U.S. national security. Trump needs to **stop overestimating the harm from burden-sharing** and underestimating the value of NATO to U.S. national interests. The security that **NATO** provides Europe, the North Atlantic, and the Mediterranean **is worth much more to the United States** than the 5 percent of the Department of Defense budget allocated to U.S. forces in Europe. It is critical that Trump appreciate the unique value that previous presidents saw in NATO. As George W. Bush described it,“These trans-Atlantic ties could not be severed by U-boats. They could not be cut by checkpoints and barbed wire. They were not ended by SS-20s and nuclear blackmail. And they certainly will not be broken by commercial quarrels and political debates.”84 NATO must not be evaluated simply as a transactional cost. It is a unique asset for the United States that protects American citizens, interests, and values. As Barack Obama explained,“Our nations are stronger and more prosperous when we stand together. In good times and in bad, our alliance has endured; in fact, it has thrived—because we share an unbreakable commitment to the freedom and security of our citizens. NATO is a force multiplier…. There is nothing else like it on Earth.”85 Notably, on July 6, 2017, Trump gave one of his most powerful foreign policy speeches in Warsaw. In the speech, he made two strong statements. “Americans know that a strong alliance of free, sovereign and independent nations is the best defense for our freedoms and for our interests. That is why my administration has demanded that all members of NATO finally meet their full and fair financial obligation,” he said.86 It is important that Trump recognize how his threats and **demands are jeopardizing the significant value that NATO offers**. If Trump leaves NATO or unintentionally breaks up the Alliance, the United States will not be able to replace it. Rather, the Trump administration should pursue alternative options to produce more responsible and fair behavior from NATO allies. As President, it is in Trump’s interest to strengthen NATO and find more positive and feasible policies to resolve the burden-sharing problem. NATO is the most powerful alliance in history and a key asset in U.S. national security. None of our competitors have anything like it. The loss of NATO would be a **major victory for U.S. adversaries**. As former Secretary of Defense Mattis has explained to the Senate Armed Services Committee, “history is clear: nations with strong allies thrive, and those without them wither.”87

**Using the threat of abandonment to induce burden sharing causes allied distancing and wrecks assurance.**

**Rapp-Hooper 20**,Political Science PhD at Columbia University, Senior Research Scholar in Law at Yale Law School, Senior Fellow at Yale's Paul Tsai China Center, Senior Fellow at Yale's Paul Tsai China Center. (Mira, Shields of the Republic: The Triumph and Peril of America’s Alliances, Harvard University Press, ProQuest Ebook Central)

If the benefits of coercion—especially **the capricious sort** in which Trump specializes—are **small**, the costs may be **sizable**. As we have seen, postwar American leaders saw value in asymmetric alliances in part because, by taking on the burden of defending others, they gained control over allies whose territory replaced the homeland as America’s front line. Washington spent **more on defense** than its allies, but got **far more** out of its alliances than **any one of them** did. If the United States continues to emphasize cost-sharing above **all other strategic priorities**, it will reduce its ability to **assure and control allies**, which may in turn weaken **the defense and deterrence benefits** those allies provide. America may pay less, but it will also get **far less in return**.

**A loss of allied control** may take **the form of political distance**, as allies look for other relationships to replace **their faltering partner**. German Chancellor Angela Merkel has already declared that Europe can no longer depend on the United States, and French President Emmanuel Macron has lamented that, amid US neglect and browbeating, NATO is “experiencing brain death.” South Korean President Moon Jae-In has prioritized his ongoing negotiations with Kim Jong Un, distancing himself from the United States. Both South Korea and Japan have improved their relations with China.16 Distance undermines **policy coordination** and can **seriously diminish** a guarantor’s **political influence**. It may even foster conditions in which allies to **tilt toward rivals**.

**CP kills assurances – freeriding accusations and contested metrics**

**Foucalt and Mérand 12**, Martial Foucault is a professor of political science at Sciences Pro Paris and a researches of political economy and political behavior, Frédéric Mérand is a profession of political science and the Scientific Director of the Centre for International Studies at the University of Montreal and a researcher in international relations and global security, “The Challenge of Burden Sharing,” Spring 2012, *International Journal*, Vol. 67, No. 2, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/23266017>

Accusations of free-riding have marred transatlantic relations ever since the creation of the Atlantic alliance in 1949. Then as now, the rhetoric of burden-sharing has served as a useful **rhetorical weapon to blame** those who were seen as **not contributing enough** to the cause. Each time, however, Washington's call has fallen on deaf ears, at least in public. In private, European and Canadian officials highlight other contributions they think they are making to NATO operations, for example in the shape of development aid or considerable troop casualties in Afghanistan. They mention UN peacekeeping missions, such as in Lebanon, where the US is not involved. Cynics admit that they never really bought much into the military adventures into which the US threw them, and that the US itself did not seem to believe much in the Libya mission. The reality, French foreign minister Alain Juppe retorted to Gates, is that it is the Europeans who "think the Americans aren't doing enough."3 The evolution of the transatlantic debate suggests two things. First, burden-sharing is about **more than NATO**. One cannot just look at defence spending at a time when humanitarian aid, diplomatic mediation, and the fight against climate change can all be considered contributions of a sort to collective security.4 **Disentangling what counts as a contribution** to which public good **is no easy thing**. Second, burden-sharing is a **contested political concept**. Statesmen and diplomats do not speak the abstract language of public choice, with its "non-excludable" and "non-rival" goods. Rather, they talk about "being fair," "doing what you can," and **"making a real contribution."** In other words, they speak the normative language of justice rather than the utilitarian language of economics.

**Deficit—Cohesion/Relations—Trump Proves**

**Conditional U.S. aid undermines allied cohesion – Trump’s public views on NATO prove**

**Benitez 19**, Jorge Benitez is a senior fellow in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council, specializing in NATO, transatlantic relations, European politics, and U.S. national security, “U.S. NATO Policy in the Age of Trump: Controversy and Consistency,” Winter 2019, The Fletcher forum of world affairs, vol. 43

These statements echo some of Trump’s remarks about NATO. They demonstrate that American leaders are becoming more impatient with the persistent burden-sharing imbalance with European allies, marking a frequently overlooked yet nevertheless dangerous **decline in the U.S. attitude toward** the behavior of **its allies**. They are proof that Europe has underestimated the corrosive effect of its attitude toward fulfilling the NATO defense commitment. These comments demonstrate that the problem of burden-sharing is serious and will continue to jeopardize transatlantic relations after Trump, unless significant progress is made. Trump no doubt feels validated by these criticisms from previous presidents. But Trump also feels that previous presidents were unsuccessful because they did not make sufficient effort to pressure NATO allies to fulfill their defense commitments. As a result, Trump appears willing to take greater risks than any of his predecessors. Trump summed this up after his last NATO summit in 2018: Now, what has happened is, presidents over many years, from Ronald Reagan to Barack Obama, they came in, they said, “Okay, hey, do the best you can,” and they left. Nobody did anything about it. And it got to a point where the United States was paying for 90 percent of NATO. And that’s not fair. So it’s changed.13 To properly understand this widening gap between the United States and NATO allies, it is essential to recall the timely warning from Secretary of Defense Robert Gates. In 2011, Gates spoke in very direct language to emphasize to Europe the gravity of the problem, stating, “I am the latest in a string of U.S. defense secretaries who have urged allies privately and publicly, often with exasperation, to meet agreed-upon NATO benchmarks for defense spending.”14 He then made one of the starkest warnings about the health of the Alliance, stating, “[I]f current trends in the decline of European defense capabilities are not halted and reversed, future U.S. political leaders— those for whom the Cold War was not the formative experience that it was for me—may not consider the return on America’s investment in NATO worth the cost.”15 Gates did not advocate for such a change in U.S. NATO policy, but he feared that if allies did not make a significant change, future U.S. leaders would lose faith in the most powerful alliance in U.S. history. This warning may now seem prophetic with the rise of Trump, but even Gates must have been surprised at how quickly his warning proved true. TRUMP BREAKS FROM HISTORICAL PRESIDENTIAL SUPPORT FOR NATO As we have seen, Trump is not the first president to complain that NATO allies are not contributing their fair share of defense spending to the Alliance. But **Trump has done two things his predecessors avoided.** First, he has **publicly questioned the value of NATO to U.S. national security**. Second, Trump has **publicly questioned the validity of U.S. defense commitments to NATO allies**. These two deviations from decades of bipartisan presidential support for NATO have **weakened the cohesion of the** transatlantic **alliance and caused fears** in allied capitals that under the Trump administration, the **U.S. may not help defend them** should they face a foreign attack. Trump’s views on NATO should be understood and examined in two phases: his statements about NATO as a candidate during the 2016 presidential campaign and his statements about NATO since he became president.

**Deficit—Deterrence**

**The CP’s pressure undermines deterrence**

**Schnaufer 21**, Tad A. Schnaufer II is a Ph.D. candidate in Security Studies at the School for Politics, Security, and International Affairs at the University of Central Florida and is a captain in the Florida Army National Guard, “The US-NATO Relationship: The Cost of Maintaining Political Pressure on Allies,” January 15th 2021, Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, Conflict & Security, https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2021/01/15/the-us-nato-relationship-the-cost-of-maintaining-political-pressure-on-allies/

These responses from European leaders show that startling allies into thinking the United States will abandon them has influenced allies to increase defense spending in line with the [2014 Wales Pledge](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm). However, in the **long term**, NATO policymaking should employ a balanced approach. If the United States brings its security guarantee of the alliance too much into question, **Russia or other states may take action to test the United States’ resolve**. During the Cold War, US leaders continually reaffirmed their commitment to allies, effectively deterring a Soviet invasion**. Deterrence works best** when allies **clearly express their mutual obligations** to all actors on the international stage.

The experience of the United Kingdom and Germany leading up to World War I provides an example of how the United Kingdom’s lack of a solid commitment to its allies allowed German leaders to think the British would stand aside in the war. [Barbara Tuchman](https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=92J9wTgKBOMC&oi=fnd&pg=PR7&dq=Guns+of+August&ots=mOLWViY-lK&sig=TOaFasP065_hkRLQIjryq6MJ6PI%23v=onepage&q=Guns%25252520of%25252520August&f=false) details this situation in her book The Guns of August. The failure of King George V and the UK Foreign Secretary to give a definite guarantee of joining the war should Germany invade allowed the Kaiser to think that he could attack without a British intervention. If the British had made a direct declaration of support for its allies, German leadership might have **decided against escalating the war**. This case gives policymakers an idea of what could happen if the United States does not maintain a firm commitment to its NATO allies. US leaders must watch how far they allow the US commitment to NATO wane in competitors’ eyes or **risk possible adventurism on the eastern flank of NATO**.

What do these two conflicting options mean for US policymakers? If the United States wants allies to meet the defense spending requirements, it needs them to fear the possibility that the United States may abandon them because their interests no longer align. The allies will only fear abandonment if the United States sends costly signals to them, such as troop withdrawals. As of 2020, the [majority of allies](https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2020/10/pdf/pr-2020-104-en.pdf) that meet the elusive two percent spending goal sit on NATO’s eastern flank, fearing Russia and desiring US protection. Nevertheless, [spending across the alliance](https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2020/10/pdf/pr-2020-104-en.pdf) has increased since 2014, in part, due to the Trump administration’s application of political pressure calling into doubt US interests in Europe. However, in the medium- and long-term, threatening to abandon **allies will decrease the appearance of US security** guarantees and **invite competitors to push boundaries**.

**Deficit—Conditions Fail**

**Conditional SC fails—it doesn’t induce behavioral change**

**Munson 13** (Peter J. Munson is senior vice president for preventive services and global crisis management for a private sector corporation and a retired U.S. Marine Corps officer. “THE LIMITS OF SECURITY COOPERATION” 9/10/13 <https://warontherocks.com/2013/09/the-limits-of-security-cooperation/>)

Planners should go to great lengths to ensure that SC is seen as a tool for a specific purpose, **not a reward to condition behaviors**. SC-as-a-conditioning-tool becomes bribery with **diminishing returns**. If policymakers want a quid pro quo, they need to admit as much and use much more precisely targeted incentives: paying a fee for access or head-of-the-line transit privileges for example. This becomes a much more predictable business transaction than trying to use SC funds, winks, and nudges to get one’s way. Finally, in the land of perverse incentives, SC is often seen as a means to drive defense business to U.S. contractors. This is true. By creating arms races and supplying prestige weapons, however useless, to unstable areas of the world, they are creating U.S. jobs. But wouldn’t taxpayer money and efforts be better spent if officials more precisely targeted domestic concerns with taxpayer funds rather than hoping that efforts trickle down predictably from collaboration with corpulent and unsavory foreign generals? In the land of perverse incentives, SC funding is one of the most egregious—and in the post-9/11 era, many officials see SC as a critical tool of strategic positioning. However, the premises of SC must be reconsidered before the U.S. military squanders more resources on white elephant projects.

**Deficit—AI—Say No**

**Despite talks and rhetoric, there’s no way that NATO cooperations on AI and Tech.**

**Franke ’21** (Ulrike Esther Franke, Senior policy fellow at the European council on Foreign Relations, “ARTIFICIAL DIVIDE: HOW EUROPE AND AMERICA COULD CLASH OVER AI”, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep29123>) //sethlee

Both sides of the Atlantic are already motivated to cooperate with each other on AI. But, despite these shared interests, transatlantic cooperation on AI may **not be straightforward**. Four trends, in particular, could pose problems: **transatlantic estrangement; European digital autonomy efforts; differing views on China;** and, potentially, Brexit. The transatlantic alliance has had a bad four years. The Trump administration’s criticism of the United Nations and the World Trade Organization, the president’s threats to leave NATO, and his active criticism of the EU all made Europeans wonder whether they had lost their most important partner. Moreover, in light of the conflict over 5G, in the minds of many Europeans, technology in particular has become an area that creates conflict in the transatlantic relationship rather than fostering cooperation. Although transatlantic relations are likely to improve under Biden, substantial damage has been done, and it will take some time to mend these ties. But, even if relations improve, it is becoming increasingly obvious that US has a diminishing interest in Europe as a geopolitically important part of the world. This trend was already visible under Trump’s predecessor, Barack Obama. It is, therefore, unsurprising that, on technology cooperation, both sides emphasise the importance of working with other actors as well as each other. The US National Security Commission on AI, for example, recommends that the US Departments of State and Defense “should negotiate formal AI cooperation agreements with Australia, India, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, and Vietnam”. Its March 2020 report emphasises on several occasions the importance of the Five Eyes intelligence alliance. Meanwhile, Europeans are pursuing the idea of an alliance for multilateralism. And, on technology and AI more specifically, they have also begun to reach out to other democratic allies. The most important aspect of transatlantic estrangement, however, is not the loss of trust between the US and Europe – which they will eventually reverse. Rather, during the four years of the Trump administration, and partly in response to isolationist tendencies in the US, Europeans have become much more comfortable talking about European strategic autonomy or sovereignty. Without encouraging the narrative that these efforts are directed against the US, or were primarily an answer to Trump, **Europeans aim to empower Europe as an actor in its own right.** In the technological realm, this led to the idea of European digital sovereignty, the aim of which is to build up European technological capabilities. Although European digital sovereignty is not specifically targeted at the US, it has led, among other things, to efforts such as the possible regulation of American technology companies and concerns over American firms acquiring European start-ups. European campaigners and some policymakers believe US tech giants such as Google, Apple, Facebook, and Amazon are forces to protect against. European thinking on technology partly developed in opposition to the US and US companies. Thus, European efforts to build up digital sovereignty may **impede transatlantic cooperation.** The EU’s effort to strengthen ethical AI, and to make ‘trustworthy AI’ a unique selling point for Europe, might also end up creating problems for transatlantic cooperation. Many EU policymakers believe that the EU’s insistence on ethical AI will eventually become a location advantage for Europe (much like data privacy): as more people become concerned about unethical AI and data security, they will prefer to use or buy AI ‘made in Europe’ rather than elsewhere. In this respect, two European aims are at odds with each other: on the one hand, Europeans want to ensure that AI is developed and used in an ethical way. Partnering with a powerful player such as the US on this matter should be an obvious way to help them achieve this goal. However, if the EU considers ethical AI not just a goal for humanity but a development that may also create commercial advantages for Europe, then transatlantic cooperation on this issue is counterproductive, as it would undermine Europe’s uniqueness. Finally, **many Europeans have expressed scepticism** about the extent to which Europe and the US are indeed aligned on ethical AI principles. For example, the Danish national AI strategy argues for a common ethical and human-centred basis for AI. It describes ethical AI as a particularly European approach: “Europe and Denmark should not copy the US or China. Both countries are investing heavily in artificial intelligence, but with little regard for responsibility, ethical principles and privacy.” **Many Europeans feel that the US “has no idea how to regulate” cyberspace** and continues to show little enthusiasm for doing so. The EU, however, likes to think of itself as a trailblazer when it comes to digital rights, such as the 2014 “right to be forgotten” or the 2018 General Data Protection Regulation.

**AT: Blankenship**

**Their “threats key” evidence is a mis-reading of Blankenship. They think the latent and implicit threat of abandonment is preferable to overt QPQs.**

**Blankenship – 1NC solvency advocate - 18** (Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami in Coral Gables, PhD political science at Columba, MPhil & MA political science at Columbia “Promises under Pressure: Reassurance and Burden-Sharing in Asymmetric Alliances,” Columbia University PhD dissertation)

The credibility of a patron’s threat of abandonment is shaped by far more than just the level of reassurance it provides. As a result, the extent to which reassurance and burden-sharing are positively or negatively correlated depends in large part on whether the patron can couple its assurances with threats. When a patron’s threat to abandon allies is credible ex ante, it can afford to reassure its allies without worrying as much about free-riding. Indeed, the literature on coercion shows that reassurance is **equally as important** as threats in making for effective coercion, although it is much less studied (Davis, 2000; Sechser, 2007; Carnegie, 2015; Gerzhoy, 2015). The target of coercive bargaining needs to know that if it gives in, its partner will simply punish it anyway (Schelling, 1966). Thus, reassurance can actually be a positive tool that is used to increase burden-sharing, though only if it is backed up by threats. These threats **do not** necessarily **need to be explicit**, and indeed may be **most effective if they are not**. Allies are likely to consider how likely patron abandonment is, and thus their **burden-sharing efforts will** in no small part be a reaction to the patron’s **latent threat** of abandonment.

3.2.1 What is Exit? By exit, I refer to attempts by states in an alliance to loosen themselves from the partnership and reduce the benefits they provide to their partners. For allies, exit takes the form of efforts to reclaim their autonomy and pursue a foreign policy more independent of the patron, while for patrons exit takes the form of efforts to reduce the security it provides. Exiting the alliance is more credible to the extent that a state has attractive outside options for meeting their security and/or autonomy needs. Violation or abrogation of the alliance treaty are only the most extreme forms of exit; a party to an alliance need not expect that its partner will outright terminate the partnership. Rather, **exit** is a spectrum, and states may fear the consequences of the more moderate step of their partners “distancing” themselves from the alliance. Distancing **is undesirable for two reasons**. The first is that the perception of disunity may weaken deterrence by tempting adversaries to drive a wedge between the allies or by emboldening them to behave more aggressively (Weitsman, 2004; Crawford, 2011). Second, distancing raises questions about the amount of support that the partner will 35 furnish. Allies may fear that the patron will give only minimal support if they are attacked, while the patron may anticipate that more autonomous allies will be less likely to provide basing rights, less likely to support its foreign policy initiatives, and more likely to come to a separate understanding with adversaries (Lake, 2009). In early 2018, for example, steps toward détente between North and South Korea – including North Korea’s participation in the Winter Olympics and discussions of potential bilateral talks – worried many in the United States, who feared that such a rapprochement might undermine South Korea’s support for the United States’ preferred policy of putting military and economic pressure on the North.3 Two general forms of outside options are available to alliance partners: self-sufficiency and search. In the case of the former, states reduce their need for partners. Allies, for example, can attempt to increase their own military capabilities such that they no longer need protection. Patrons, for their part, can reduce their need for loyal allies by pursuing a more unilateral or isolationist foreign policy, and by striking a deal with adversaries. In terms of search, patrons and allies can seek alternative partners. While the types of outside options weaker allies can pursue – ranging from nuclearization, to neutrality, to finding other countries to rely on for support – are diverse, and in many cases will not be the precursor to actual alliance termination, their causes are fundamentally similar, and they share common features that will make them worrisome to the patron. First, all of the forms of exit I discuss reduce allies’ dependence on the patron. This, in turn, **makes them less likely to cave into its pressure** in the future, and **gives them less incentive to be** automatically **loyal**. As a result, a patron has good reason to discourage allies from pursuing any of these options. Second, allies will be most prone to consider all of these forms of exit when relying on the patron’s protection becomes less attractive – whether because the patron seems unreliable, because the severity of the threat environment makes trusting the patron risky, or because the barriers to exit decrease. I am ultimately agnostic as to which form of exit allies will be most likely to pursue in a given situation. Indeed, in many cases, allies can pursue multiple options in tandem, such as unilateral military arming coupled with efforts at rapprochement with adversaries. Nevertheless, I treat the threat of all forms of exit as a key driver of patron reassurance.

**Perm Do the CP Definitions**

**“Resolved” doesn’t require certainty**

**Webster’s 9** – Merriam Webster 2009

(http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/resolved)

# Main Entry: 1re·solve # Pronunciation: \ri-ˈzälv, -ˈzȯlv also -ˈzäv or -ˈzȯv\ # Function: verb # Inflected Form(s): re·solved; re·solv·ing 1 : to become separated into component parts; also : to become reduced by dissolving or analysis 2 : to form a resolution : determine 3 : consult, deliberate

**Or immediacy**

**PTE 9** – Online Plain Text English Dictionary 2009

(http://www.onelook.com/?other=web1913&w=Resolve)

Resolve: “To form a purpose; to make a decision; especially, to determine after reflection; as, to resolve on a better course of life.”

**“Should” is advisory, not certain. It also equals “ought.”**

**Richman ’16** [James; August 17; Judge on the Second Circuit, California’s Court of Appeals; Westlaw, “Marin Assn. of Pub. Emps. v. Marin Cty. Employees' Ret. Assn.,” 2 Cal. App. 5th 674]

There is, of course, no bar to the Supreme Court adopting a Court of Appeal's reasoning as its own. Yet there is legitimate reason to question whether that was what the Supreme Court intended in 1983. First, as just shown, **only the least authoritative** of the three sources cited \*\*385 **actually supports** the word “must,” while the two Supreme Court decisions employ “**should**.” Second, barely a month later, the Supreme Court—speaking though the same justice—filed another decision which used the “should” formulation from the 1955 Allen decision as quoted in Abbott.20 Third, the 1983 Allen decision involved retirees (and Flournoy the widow of a retiree), who historically receive a heightened degree of judicial protection. (See fn. 19, ante.) Fourth, and most significantly, the “must” formulation has never been reiterated by the Supreme Court, which has **instead uniformly employed** the “should” \*699 language from the 1955 Allen decision. (Olson v. Cory, supra, 27 Cal.3d 532, 541, 178 Cal.Rptr. 568, 636 P.2d 532 [“Although an employee does not obtain any ‘absolute right to fixed or specific benefits ... there [are] strict limitation[s] on the conditions which may modify the pension system in effect during employment.’ [Citation.] Such modifications must be reasonable and any ‘ “changes in a pension plan which result in disadvantage to employees should be accompanied by comparable new advantages” ’ ”]; Legislature v. Eu (1991) 54 Cal.3d 492, 529–530, 286 Cal.Rptr. 283, 816 P.2d 1309 [quoting Olson]; City of Huntington Beach v. Board of Administration (1992) 4 Cal.4th 462, 472, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 514, 841 P.2d 1034 [“changes in a pension plan which result in disadvantage to employees should be accompanied by comparable new advantages,” citing Allen v. City of Long Beach, supra, 45 Cal.2d 128, 131, 287 P.2d 765].)

It thus appears unlikely that the Supreme Court's use of “must” in the 1983 Allen decision was intended to herald a fundamental doctrinal shift. “Should,” not “must,” remains the **court's preferred expression**. And “should” does not convey **imperative obligation**, **no more compulsion** than “ought.” (Lashley v. Koerber (1945) 26 Cal.2d 83, 90, 156 P.2d 441; see People v. Webb (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 401, 409, fn. 2, 230 Cal.Rptr. 755 [“the word ‘should’ is **advisory only** and not mandatory”].) In **plain effect**, “should” is “**a recommendation**, not ... **a mandate**.” (Cuevas v. Superior Court (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 406, 409, 130 Cal.Rptr. 238.)

**“Should” refers to the future.**

**Brown ’8** [Mary Ann Brown; May 14; Judge on the Court of Appeals of Iowa; Westlaw, “In re Est. of Guthrie,” 752 N.W.2d 452]

Brock and Kaitlyn look to the **word** “should” in the phrase “in the event any of my children should predecease me” and claim the district court improperly found the word looked to the **future**. They claim the word should be interpreted as the **past tense** of “shall” to imply a duty or obligation. See Black's Law Dictionary 1379 (6th ed.1990). Looking at **the phrase as a whole, however**, rather than at a **single word**, we determine the phrase is considering **possible future events**. See In re Estate of Grulke, 546 N.W.2d 626, 627 (Iowa Ct.App.1996) (noting we must ascertain a testator's intent from the entire will).

**“Security cooperation” is defined in government documents to require the DOD.**

**JCS ’17** [Joint Chiefs of Staff; May 23; publishing with the Army, Marine Corp, Air Force, Navy, and Coast Guard; Security Cooperation, Joint Publication 3-20, “Glossary,” https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3\_20\_20172305.pdf]

PART II—TERMS AND **DEFINITIONS**

defense institution building. Security cooperation conducted to establish or reform the capacity and capabilities of a partner nation’s defense institutions at the ministerial/department, military staff, and service headquarters levels. Also called DIB. (Approved for inclusion in the DOD Dictionary.)

foreign military sales. That portion of United States security assistance for sales programs that require agreements/contracts between the United States Government and an authorized recipient government or international organization for defense articles and services to be provided to the recipient for current stocks or new procurements under Department of Defense-managed contracts, regardless of the source of financing. Also called FMS. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

international military education and training. Formal or informal instruction provided to foreign military students, units, and forces on a non-reimbursable (grant) basis by offices or employees of the United States, contract technicians, and contractors, and the instruction may include correspondence courses; technical, educational, or informational publications; and media of all kinds. Also called IMET. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

partner nation. 1. A nation that the United States works with in a specific situation or operation. (JP 1) 2. In security cooperation, a nation with which the Department of Defense conducts security cooperation activities. (JP 3-20) Also called PN. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

security assistance. Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended; the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended; or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, lease, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives, and those that are funded and authorized through the Department of State to be administered by Department of Defense/Defense Security Cooperation Agency are considered part of security cooperation. Also called SA. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

security cooperation. **All Department of Defense interactions** with **foreign security establishments** to build security relationships that promote **specific United States security interests**, develop allied and partner nation **military and security capabilities** for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide United States forces with peacetime and contingency access to allied and partner nations. Also called SC. (Approved for **incorporation** into the **DOD Dictionary**.)

**AT: INB—European Defense High**

**European Defense spending is high and increasing rapidly**

**Rolander ’22** (Niclas Rolander, Reporter, “Global Military Spending Tops $2 Trillion for First Time as Europe Boosts Defenses”, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-04-24/military-spending-passes-2-trillion-as-europe-boosts-defenses>) //sethlee

Global military expenditure has surpassed $2 trillion per year for the first time, and looks set to rise further **as European countries beef up their armed forces** in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

In 2021, countries spent a total of $2,113 billion on their militaries, up 0.7% in real terms from the year before, according to a report released Monday by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, or SIPRI.

After a brief period of declining military spending between 2011 and 2014, outlays have increased for 7 consecutive years, according to SIPRI data. In the wake of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, several European governments have pledged a spending overhaul **to boost their forces’ capabilities.**

**“Europe was already on an increasing trend, and this trend will accelerate and intensify,**” Lucie Beraud-Sudreau, director of SIPRI’s military expenditure and arms production program, said in a phone interview. “Usually change happens slowly, until you are in a crisis and then change really happens. I think that’s where we are now.”

The upturn since 2015 has partly been fueled by higher spending in Europe, after Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea raised the perceived threat level at the same time as the U.S. administration under Donald Trump increased pressure on NATO allies to spend more on their armed forces, Beraud-Sudreau said.

European spending in 2021 **accounted for 20%** of the global total, and China’s defense budget, the world’s second largest, is estimated to make up 14%.

The U.S. remains by far the biggest spender, with $801 billion allocated to the armed forces in 2021, according to SIPRI. In the last decade, U.S. military spending has made up as much as 39% of global expenditures. While the country’s arms purchases have declined, more funds have been devoted to military research and development, suggesting that the U.S. is focusing more on next-generation technologies, according to SIPRI researcher Alexandra Marksteiner.

As European nations from Sweden to Spain have pledged to increase defense budgets, early indications are that modernizing and **upgrading weapons systems will be a key priority,** Beraud-Sudreau said. In doing so, they are facing a choice of whether to prioritize a quick buildup by buying equipment off-the-shelf from arms manufacturers in other parts of the world, or taking a more long-term approach by increasing funding for domestic industry.

**Burden Sharing increasing now – data proves**

**Hazen ’20** (Bradley Hazen, intern in the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative, “NATO’s progress on burden sharing remains strong” <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/commentary/infographic/natos-progress-on-burden-sharing-remains-strong/>) //sethlee

When NATO leaders met in Wales in 2014, strengthening allied burden sharing and reversing a downward trend in national defense spending were high on the agenda. In response to Russia’s comprehensive military modernization efforts and territorial aggression against Ukraine, member states [pledged](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm) to increase their national defense spending to at least 2 percent of real gross domestic product (GDP) by no later than 2024.

European allies and Canada **have now contributed five consecutive years of growth in defense investment**, adding a cumulative total of[**$130 billion**](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_174406.htm#sg4)**in new spending** since 2016. In 2019, all but three NATO allies increased their defense spending in real terms, **with nine allies reaching or surpassing the 2 percent goal** (up from seven in 2018).

But progress has not been confined just to the realm of investment. Since 2014, the Alliance has stepped up [military exercises](https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2019_02/1902-factsheet_exercises_en.pdf) across Europe, strengthened multinational missions in the [air](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_132685.htm) and at  [sea](https://mc.nato.int/media-centre/news/2020/focused-nato-patrols-back-in-the-mediterranean), and reinforced its eastern flank with new enhanced Forward Presence missions in the Baltic States and Poland.

Looking ahead, the COVID-19 pandemic has left much regarding the [future](https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/coronavirus-and-transatlantic-security-implications-for-defense-planning/) of allied defense planning and investment uncertain, and it is likely that many allied governments will feel pressured to limit or cut defense spending as the pandemic’s economic toll continues to mount. That said, it is clear from the data that the Alliance-wide drive towards 2 percent, though uneven at times, continued apace through 2019, signaling NATO members’ commitment to strengthening and more evenly distributing their contributions to the common defense.

**AT: INB—European Defense High—Ukraine**

**NATO members have increased their defense budget after Ukraine War**

**Mackenzie ’22** (Christina Mackenzie, “[Seven European nations have increased defense budgets in one month. Who will be next?](https://breakingdefense.com/2022/03/seven-european-nations-have-increased-defense-budgets-in-one-month-who-will-be-next/)“ <https://breakingdefense.com/2022/03/seven-european-nations-have-increased-defense-budgets-in-one-month-who-will-be-next/>) //sethlee

PARIS: The war in Ukraine has been a **strong wake-up call** for a number of European countries who’d been basking in post-Cold War comfort thinking that armed conflict was relegated to history and that spending on defense could be minimal.

The turnaround since [Russia’s Feb. 24 invasion of Ukraine](https://breakingdefense.com/2022/02/russia-aiming-to-decapitate-ukrainian-government-us-official/) has been nothing less than stunning, to the point that **six NATO members have now pledged defense increases of $133 billion so far**; militarily neutral Sweden has also pledged an increase. And more nations seem poised to follow suit in the days and weeks to come.

The first to make a 180° turnaround was Germany. Just four days after Russia’s invasion began, Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced his government would ramp up its defense spending in 2022 alone by €100 billion ($112 billion) taking defense spending from 1.53% of GDP to above 2%.


That is the figure recommended by NATO estimated to have been [only met in 2021](https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2021/6/pdf/210611-pr-2021-094-en.pdf) by the US, Greece (3.82%), Croatia (2.79%), the United Kingdom (2.29%), Estonia (2.28%), Latvia (2.27%), Poland (2.10%), Lithuania, (2.03%), Romania (2.02%) and France (2.01%), according to NATO statistics. (That Germany had not met that threshold was a major political sticking point during the Trump administration, leading to tensions between Washington and Berlin.)

Scholz said in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine it had become clear “we need to invest significantly more in the **security** of our country, in order to protect our freedom and our democracy.” If the money Scholz has requested comes through, it will mark a dramatic moment for Germany, with Berlin becoming the largest overall defense spender in Europe. How that money will be spent will be important to watch for industry; currently,[only four European NATO member states](https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2021/6/pdf/210611-pr-2021-094-en.pdf) (Iceland, Slovenia, Portugal and Belgium) spend a lower percentage of their overall defense spending on procurement and defense-related R&D than Germany’s 18.6%.

NATO’s geographic home of Belgium followed suit days later, announcing on Feb. 25 it would raise its defense budget from the current €4.2 billion (0.9% of GDP) to €6.9 billion (1.54% of GDP) by 2030. But on March 16 Prime Minister Alexander De Croo told parliamentarians this was not enough, indicating **more may come.**

Romania announced on March 1 it will up its defense budget from 2.02% to 2.5% of GDP starting in 2023. The 2022 defense budget of RON25.9bn ($5.8bn) is already 14% higher than 2021. Florin Cîțu, president of the Romanian Senate, suggested a day later that a large proportion of the new funds should be used for capital investments, but gave no precise figures. A forecast released in December 2021 suggested investment would account for 40% of the total defense budget by 2025. **That will likely increase further** in light of the new 2.5% goal.

**Ukraine has prompted NATO countries to massively increase spending--- CP does nothing.**

**Dowd, 22** [Alan W. Dowd, contributing editor with *The American Legion Magazine*, writes in U.S. foreign policy, national defense and international security, 5-12-2022, "No more free-riders in the free world," American Legion, <https://www.legion.org/landingzone/255773/no-more-free-riders-free-world> /alundy]

In the wake of Vladimir Putin’s beastly assault on Ukraine, multiple NATO nations have announced immediate plans to increase defense spending**.** This reawakening is **long overdue**. In this post-post-Cold War era, there’s no room in the free world for free-riders.

Rearming What Winston Churchill said of Josef Stalin and his commissars remains true of Putin and his henchmen: “There is nothing they admire so much as strength, and there is nothing for which they have less respect than for weakness, especially military weakness.”

Before hurling his army into Ukraine, Putin not only sensed weakness in NATO but saw it in a range of policies: evaporating defense budgets, lack of cohesion and commitment in Afghanistan, doubts about NATO sown by NATO leaders, the chaotic pullout from Kabul, the feckless response to his invasion of Georgia (2008) and annexation of Crimea (2014), flatfooted confusion over his misinformation campaigns and cyberattacks, a shortsighted dependency on his regime for energy supplies, the straitjacket self-restraint in NATO capitals.

Yet what Putin has seen in the months since he launched his catastrophic and criminal invasion of Ukraine is something he never anticipated.

For individuals and nations alike, danger on the doorstep has a way of rearranging priorities and refocusing the mind. That's what has happened among NATO's European leaders.

In a stunning 180-degree turn just 72 hours after Putin’s attack on Ukraine, **German** Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced that his government would increase defense spending to 2% of GDP – something NATO has been begging Berlin to do since 2006. That amounts to a near-doubling of Germany’s defense budget -- by next year. Scholz also unveiled a massive $112.7 billion modernization and rearmament fund and announced plans to replace Germany's aging fighter-bomber fleet with F-35s. And since energy security is inextricably tied to national security, it’s worth noting that he unveiled detailed plans to create a strategic LNG reserve and build new LNG terminals.

“The world,” Scholz explained as Putin began his siege to Ukraine, “will no longer be the same as the world before**.”**

Berlin’s extraordinary about-face was an early indication that other NATO nations would begin to lift their defense budgets – and finally see Putin for what he is, not what they hoped him to be.

Defense spending was inching upward in Europe even before Putin’s war, but Germany’s transformation that fateful last week of February heralds a far more dramatic and rapid return to deterrence across the 30-member alliance.

**Poland** – thrust to the frontlines of Cold War 2.0 by Putin’s invasion – announced that its defense budget will jump to 3% of GDP next year. Before the invasion, Poland had planned to invest 2.5% of GDP into defense. That’s a 20% spike in just one year. Mariusz Blaszczak, Poland’s defense minister, says Warsaw is committed to fielding “one of the strongest armies in NATO."

Just days after the invasion, **French** President Emmanuel Macron revealed that his government would increase defense spending, calling it “the price for peace, freedom and democracy.” To his credit, Macron has increased defense spending every year since 2017.

**Italian** Prime Minister Mario Draghi unveiled plans to “invest more in defense than we have ever done before” and to lift Italy's defense budget to the NATO standard of 2% of GDP.

Immediately after Putin launched his war, **Latvia** approved measures pushing its defense budget to 2.5% of GDP (up from 2.2%). That represents a one-year increase of 13%. **Lithuania** is increasing defense spending. And Estonia’s defense minister says the country will increase defense spending to accelerate equipment acquisitions.

Even before Russia’s February invasion, the **Netherlands** had increased defense spending. The Dutch government is working on an even bigger defense budget now, with Prime Minister Mark Rutte declaring, “The Netherlands will spend a lot of extra money on defense.”

Norway, which shares land and maritime borders with Russia, is making immediate emergency investments to- increase the number and tempo of naval deployments, increase the number of combat exercises, increase ammunition and fuel stocks, enhance its "ability to receive allied reinforcements," and "strengthen the armed forces' ability to prevent and stop digital threats."

**Romania** is increasing defense spending by 23.7% for fiscal 2023.

Thanks to major investments in defense announced in 2020, **Britain** is already riding its largest wave of defense spending since the Cold War’s end.

Sweden -- not yet a NATO member -- has unveiled a plan to rapidly increase defense spending from 1.3% of GDP to 2% of GDP.

As of this moment 10 members of the alliance meet NATO’sstandard 2%-of-GDP standard. But NATO is headed in the right direction. In 2016, just five members met that standard. And several allies are pouring significant sums into the common defense. Belgium’s defense budget is 10.9% larger than a year ago, Croatia’s is up 62.5% and the Greek defense budget is 49.6% larger. Italy’s is up 6%, Spain’s 7.7%, Britain’s 7.5% and France’s 5%.

**AT: INB—Burden Sharing Fails**

**No deterrence impact—burden sharing fails and gets circumvented.**

**Zannella, 20** [Anthony Zannella Seton Hall University, majored in Political Science and Philosophy, 4-7-2020 "An Analysis of Burden Sharing in NATO and the Problem of Free Riding," Political Analysis: Vol. 21 , Article 5, [https://scholarship.shu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1058&context=pa#](https://scholarship.shu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1058&context=pa) /alundy]

Regarding Libya and Afghanistan, it would appear as though NATO allies were contributing to a more balanced and fair system of burden sharing, but this is in fact not the case. In Afghanistan, alliance cooperation and burden sharing were on more equal footing with the initial invocation of Article 5. Countries were attempting to provide military assistance to the operations **despite the limitations** their economies and populations imposed upon them. However, there were only a few countries that provided enough force in any truly effective sense. While major allies such as Canada did indeed provide a great deal for the alliance in the beginning, support tapered off overtime. Several other capable countries did not dedicate as much as they could have, and even when they did, their support provided **little strategic significance.** Instead, U.S. forces were providing for the **bulk of the operation** while its allies were hampered by **inefficient forces** and a reluctance to give in to U.S. unilateralism. In addition, the restraints placed on rules of engagement and other factors significantly reduced the effectiveness of their combat roles. This forced the U.S. to pick up the slack, as it had done during the Cold War, with its deterrence abilities. The eventual decline in alliance involvement also indicates support for collective action theory as allies began to outweigh the costs to the benefits of participating in combat operations with the U.S. In Libya, on the other hand, the U.S. attempted to reduce its role in combat operations while NATO allies shouldered the burden of putting their forces in potential danger. While the U.S. was dedicating its budget to strategic command, its allies were making up for their lack of defense spending by taking more responsibility through both material and non-material variables. The involvement of more subtle factors completely changes the implications of collective action. However, the statistics indicated that the U.S. was still **forced to engage** in taking on a larger share of the burden than it had anticipated or even wanted. The other allies did in fact break through **domestic constraints** by putting their forces in harm’s way. But Hasebrouck’s work showed that such constraints were not as prominent because Libya was considered an easier operation, and the U.S. still took on a greater role. Furthermore, the implications of increased U.S. involvement show in a concrete way that free riding is occurring. The inability of European forces to deal with the realities of modern combat forced them to rely on the U.S. even though they were trying to take more of a leadership role in the operation.

**European burden sharing fails**

**Economist 19** – (“**What would happen if America left Europe to fend for itself**?” March 14, 2019. <https://amp.economist.com/special-report/2019/03/14/what-would-happen-if-america-left-europe-to-fend-for-itself)//Wompus> =)

A pale shadow Yet the **Europeans would immediately face institutional hurdles.** Compared with Russia’s top-down system, command and control is hard enough in consensus-bound nato. **It would be a bigger challenge for Europeans alone, especially if they did not inherit nato’s command structure. The eu may want to take the lead, but military thinking is not in its dna.** Besides, an eu-only alliance would be a pale shadow of nato: after Brexit, non-eu countries will account for fully 80% of nato defence spending. **There would be gaps in capabilities, too. How bad these were would depend on the mission**, and how many operations were under way at the same time. The **European-led interventions in Libya and Mali exposed dependence on America in vital areas such as air-to-air refuelling and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.** A detailed look at the sort of scenarios Europe might face would help to identify other gaps, and what it would take to fill them. Bastian Giegerich of the iiss, who is starting to work on such assessments, reckons that realistically the **gap-filling could take 15 years** or so. **That is a long time for places like Poland and the Baltic countries that feel under threat. Fear and mistrust could quickly conspire to make narrow national interests trump efforts to maintain European unity. Hence a second, perhaps likelier, version of what might follow an American withdrawal: Europe Divided.** Jonathan **Eyal** of the Royal United Services Institute in London **imagines a frenzy of activity, a cacophony of summits—and a renationalisation of defence strategies.** Lots of countries would seek bilateral deals. In central Europe he would expect an alliance between Poland and Romania to guarantee the eastern border. The **Russians and Chinese** would not sit idly by, he says, but **would play their own games with the Greeks, Hungarians and others. It is these games of mistrust that the American security guarantee has largely helped to avoid. They could all too easily resurface.** “**Establishing a purely European defence**”, warns Michael Rühle, a long-time nato official, “**would overwhelm the Europeans politically, financially and militarily**.”

**AT: INB—Burden Sharing Fails—European Disfunction**

**Increased defense spending fails—European disfunction thumps burden sharing effectiveness**

**Bergmann 21** -- Max Bergmann, a senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress, official at the U.S. State Department from 2011 to 2017. [The EU Is the Military Ally the United States Needs: Take the Pressure Off of NATO States and Embrace the Union’s Defense, 1-6-21, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2021-01-06/eu-military-ally-united-states-needs]

**Insisting** that European states hit **two percent by 2024** is setting up the alliance to **fail**. Not only are these states **unlikely** to hit the target, but **even if** they did, the results would likely be **underwhelming**. The two percent metric is, after all, arbitrary, as it is not tied to specific defense requirements, and is moreover subject to broader economic fluctuations. Greece, for instance, hit two percent only because its GDP contracted so dramatically, increasing its military’s share of the shrinking budget. Indeed, **marginal increases** in **any single country’s defense spending** won’t **automatically help improve** the European pillar of NATO, which is **plagued with inefficiencies**. EU member states in total spend roughly **$200 billion annually** on defense, on a par with China. But Europe struggles to **deploy forces**; it runs **out of munitions** when it fights; and its forces are **seldom prepared to fight**.

The problem, then, is **not really low spending** but that European defense spending is **fragmented**, **wasteful**, and **redundant**. For instance, although Germany is the strongest economic power in Europe, few of Germany’s attack helicopters are ready for combat. France, by contrast, has a very capable military engaged in active combat operations in the Sahel. But French forces depend on U.S. support for those operations. When **European states** spend on defense, most of them allocate **too little of their budgets** to **research and development** and face **stark tradeoffs** between acquiring **expensive new technologies** and simply maintaining the forces they have. As the European defense analyst Sven Biscop of the Egmont Institute assesses, “The status of Europe’s armed forces and their dependence on the US will basically remain unaltered, **even if** they **all** spend 2 percent of their GDP.”

A Collective Concern

U.S. leaders have long viewed the EU as just another complicated, multilateral bureaucracy. To the extent that it got involved in defense, Washington imagined, the EU would duplicate and undermine NATO’s function. But the EU has transformed since its founding in 1993, becoming something much more like a state than a multilateral organization. Europeans in the EU are EU citizens, subject to EU law, free to live and work where they please in the union. They have their own currency, a de facto national language (English), and a federal government in Brussels.

As the union has drawn together, Europeans have come to perceive **defense and foreign policy** as more of **a collective concern** than **a national one**. Support across Europe for EU defense is extremely high, consistently polling above 70 percent. Within **European states**, however, there is **considerably less support** for diverting **national resources** away from **domestic priorities**, such as health and education, and toward **the high-end weapons systems** that are required to **marginally improve** NATO’s collective defense capacity. **The lack of national interest** in **defense spending** is therefore not **a short-term problem** for NATO; it is **structural**.

**AT: INB—No Impact—US increase spending**

**Independent of what Europe does, the US will just increase spending for strategic and nuclear dominance.**

**Thimm, 18** [Johannes Thimm, Head of Research Division “The Americas” at Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, 4-09-2018, ‘NATO: US Strategic Dominance and Unequal Burden-Sharing Are Two Sides of the Same Coin’, <https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/nato-us-strategic-dominance-and-unequal-burden-sharing-are-two-sides-of-the-same-coin> /alundy]

US defense policy is made strictly on US terms.

Second, the US defense budget does not depend on **Europe’s military spending**. It is misleading to argue that Europe must spend more so that the United States can spend less. The Pentagon’s budget is determined by Washington’s assessment of the capabilities necessary to maintain US **strategic dominance** – on its own, not through any alliance. When Congress adopts the annual defense budget, European expenditures play a **marginal role.** In 2017, President Trump increased the US defense budget, despite the fact that European states also spent more (and Russia’s spending decreased by 20 percent). According to calculations by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, US spending on NATO and the defense of Europe amounts to $30 billion, or just over 5 percent of its defense budget. Comparing that figure to the roughly $240 billion of European spending for NATO, the imbalance no longer seems so great. Given these numbers, it is also hard to argue that Europe is principally to blame for a US defense budget of around $600 billion.

Looking specifically at the cost of the US nuclear arsenal, it becomes even clearer how detached the US budget is from burden-sharing in NATO. Washington defines the US nuclear strategy with **little regard for Europe**’s policy priorities. Over the next thirty years (calculated from 2017), Washington plans a massive qualitative nuclear build-up, spending $400 billion on modernizing its nuclear arsenal – in addition to the costs of maintaining existing systems. This move was partly a reaction to Russian aggression in Ukraine, but above all a concession by President Obama to the Republican Congress in exchange for its approval of the 2014 New START treaty, in which the **U**nited **S**tates and Russia pledged to limit numbers of strategic nuclear warheads. If Trump were really interested in reducing costs, he would make serious efforts on arms control. Instead, he refused Russia’s offer to extend the New START treaty beyond its 2021 expiration date and increased spending on nuclear weapons by almost 20 percent. So, yes, to some extent Europe is free-riding on US security guarantees. But the reasons include the US desire for unrivalled military and nuclear capabilities, and **not simply European reluctance** to spend money on defense.

**No impact---defense spending is irrelevant.**

Mira **Rapp-Hooper 20,** Political Science PhD at Columbia University, Senior Research Scholar in Law at Yale Law School, Senior Fellow at Yale's Paul Tsai China Center, Senior Fellow at Yale's Paul Tsai China Center., “Shields of the Republic: The Triumph and Peril of America’s Alliances,” Harvard University Press//Wompus =)

But it is also reasonable to argue that these **spending gaps** are of **little consequence**. The important question is whether it is cheaper to have a foreign policy that relies on sustained cooperation with allies afflicted by moral hazard than to have a unilateral policy with no burden-sharing at all. On this view, as long as US defense spending does not exceed **national means**, it is **hardly tragic** if allies spend **a bit less** as a proportion of GDP. There is **no evidence** that American defense spending hampers growth or makes the country less competitive. And while the defense budget makes up **a sizable chunk of federal spending**, **a relatively small portion** of that money goes to forward basing. To those who bemoan burden-sharing gaps, **a reasonable rejoinder** is that Washington should ensure that **its own budget commitments** are sound in **national terms**, rather than preoccupy itself with false equivalence abroad.7

Finally, when we think about the costs of alliances, we should be mindful that **alliance agreements themselves** impose **no financial burdens** on the **US Treasury**. What costs money—and potentially lives—is the associated **force posture**. Proposals for cutting US alliance spending are usually suggestions about curtailing **overseas defense presence**. This is **not a semantic difference**. It points to an important reality that many miss when they refer to alliances as extravagant: in order to generate substantial savings in its own defense budget—that is, to close the gap between its “allied contribution” ratio and those of its thriftier partners—the United States would have to close overseas bases and return the personnel and materiel to the continental United States. Simply consolidating bases and relying more on rotational deployments would not generate substantial cost savings.8 Leading scholars have argued for just this kind of move—ending alliances and shuttering related bases to curb commitments and spending. **Such dramatic changes** would require not just a transformed alliance policy but **a completely different grand strategy**— one that does not seek to secure the balance of power in Eurasia through forward defense, deterrence, and allied assurance and control.

**AT: INB—China—Asia Pivot Fails**

**Asia Pivot Fails - NATO and U.S pivot against China is both unnecessary and causes conflict**

**Shankar ’22** (Priyanka Shankar, Independent Journalist based in the Brussels, “Nato leaders say China is a ‘systemic challenge to Euro-Atlantic security” <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/3183564/nato-leaders-say-china-systemic-challenge-euro-atlantic-security>) //sethlee

It accused Beijing of employing “a broad range of political, economic and military tools to increase its global footprint and project power, while remaining opaque about its strategy, intentions and military build-up”.

The policy document said **China’s** “malicious hybrid and **cyber operations** and its confrontational rhetoric and disinformation target allies and harm alliance **security”**.

It said that China sought to “control key technological and industrial sectors, critical infrastructure, and strategic materials and supply chains. It uses its economic leverage to create strategic dependencies”.

After the strategy was adopted at the Nato Summit in Madrid, Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg told reporters: “**China does not share our values,** and like Russia is working on undermining our values.”

“China was not mentioned in our previous strategic concept,” he said. “In this year’s strategic concept, allies have stated that the People’s Republic of **China’s ambitions** and coercive policies **challenge our interests, security and values.”**

Chinese officials reacted almost immediately **in refuting the claims.**

“How can an Asia-Pacific China pose any challenge to the security of a North Atlantic military alliance? In fact, **it’s the other way round**. It’s Nato that dropped bombs on a Chinese embassy,” Wang Lutong the Chinese foreign ministry’s top official for Europe, wrote on Twitter.

He was referring to the strike that hit Beijing’s embassy in Belgrade in 1999 during the war in then Yugoslavia, killing three Chinese journalists.

“China is never engaged in exporting values. We don’t impose our ideas on anyone. Nato should not allow itself to be used by some superpower to maintain hegemony and suppress other countries,” Wang said.

Before the summit, China’s envoy to the United Nations, Zhang Jun said: “Nato’s five eastward expansions after the Cold War have not only failed to make Europe securer, but also **sowed the seed of conflict**.”

“We firmly oppose certain elements clamouring for Nato’s involvement in the Asia-Pacific, or an Asia-Pacific version of Nato on the back of military alliances,” he said.

The sentiment [was echoed](https://twitter.com/AmbLiuXiaoMing/status/1541999187394535424?s=20&t=wForbHRzAsuw0jrYfKVKKQ&module=inline&pgtype=article) by other Chinese diplomats on Twitter, in what appeared to be a coordinated response.

**Pivot fails—no planning**

**Jackson 22**, Van Jackson is a senior lecturer in international relations at Victoria University of Wellington, “America’s Asia Strategy Has Reached a Dead End,” January 9th 2022, *Foreign Policy*, Argument, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/01/09/us-southeast-asia-china-biden-economic-strategy-geopolitics/

In December 2021, the Biden administration’s Indo-Pacific coordinator, Kurt Campbell, [detailed](https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/conversation-white-house-indo-pacific-coordinator-kurt-campbell) the shape of U.S. thinking about China and Asia during a conference on Indo-Pacific security. He hit all the familiar notes: the importance of alliances, weapons sales to counter China, the centrality of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the optimistic view that Sino-U.S. relations could be at once competitive and stable. In any other era, such talk might have been comfort food for regional experts and policymakers. But **absent** from Campbell’s remarks at the conference, which was organized by Australia’s Lowy Institute, was **any meaningful statement about political economy**—the single aspect of statecraft most crucial to the Indo-Pacific region’s stability. It is in this arena of policy that China has done more to displace the United States than in any other, and it **remains the glaring hole in Washington’s attempts to craft an Indo-Pacific policy**. When pressed on this by his host, Campbell acknowledged that defense initiatives were not enough. But he could mention no concept, policy, or action to suggest economics was anything more than a throwaway gesture in a speech. Grand references to a forthcoming “economic framework” that would be “cutting-edge” lacked all specifics and stated no purpose other than wanting the United States to “design” the region’s standards. To the extent Campbell’s remarks reflect Washington’s view of Asia, they are at once modestly reassuring and highly troubling. Reassuring because Campbell’s bland rhetorical restraint is a refreshing departure from the volatility and pugnaciousness of the Trump administration. Troubling, however, because the ideas powering U.S. President Joe Biden’s Asia policy are **as bland as the rhetoric itself**. U.S. policy toward the world’s most important region is no more than a mashup of the residual inertia from Trump’s [military-first](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-10-19/sleepwalking-world-war-iii) Asia policy with a revival of then-U.S. President Barack Obama’s well-intentioned but ill-fated “pivot to Asia,” which also had a [heavily militarized](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2021-03-12/americas-indo-pacific-folly) agenda. Consequently, the United States is **misallocating its attention and influence** relative to what would actually benefit the region most. **Economic policy, not defense policy**, is the **only way to address** the interrelated problems of development, pandemic recovery, and adaptation to climate change—issues that plague policymakers throughout Asia and threaten to derail the region’s peace and prosperity. Washington must also stop conflating economic strategy with stale tropes on free trade and coercive sanctions. This is precisely the trouble with U.S. engagement in Asia to date: **The United States has no economic strategy** for the region—at least not since Obama’s ill-fated attempt to negotiate a new U.S.-Asia trade agreement, the Trans-Pacific Partnership. And it **is unrealistic to expect any economic strategy** beyond the free-trade pabulum so sharply at odds with U.S. domestic political constraints.

**AT: INB—China—Asia Pivot Fails—Econ**

**Lack of U.S. economy strategy and diverted defense resources prevent success in the Asia pivot**

**Green & Medeiros 22**, Michael J. Green is the Director of the Asian Studies Program at the Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, the Senior Vice President for Asia at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and served as the Special Assistant to President Biden for National Security Affairs; Evan S. Medeiros is the Penner Family Chair in Asian Studies at the Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, served as the Special Assistant to President Biden, and was the Senior Director for Asian Affairs at the National Security Council under the Obama administration, “Can America Rebuild Its Power in Asia?: Biden Started Strong, But Progress Is Halting,” January 31st 2022, *Foreign Affairs*, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2022-01-31/can-america-rebuild-its-power-asia#author-info

MIXED MESSAGES But these same polls illustrate that Biden’s gains are limited, if not tenuous. The 2021 ISEAS survey showed respondents believe **U.S. economic influence in Southeast Asia has decreased** since Biden took office. The survey also found almost half of respondents think China has greater regional political sway than the United States. The Lowy Asia Power Index may have found that the Biden administration restored the United States’ diplomatic influence, but it docked Washington more than ten points (from 61.7 to 51.1) on economic sway. The index also found the **U.S. military’s relative lead over China shrank in 2021**—and that was before Beijing conducted its alarming hypersonic missile tests. For the United States, both these challenges will intensify. On the economic front, China is expanding its financial footprint across the Indo-Pacific. U.S. allies such as Australia and Japan have privately pledged to help keep Beijing out of the CPTPP and to hold a place in the trade agreement for Washington. But the Biden administration has said it has no plan to return to the CPTPP, and officials in Canberra and Tokyo warn they cannot hold off China for more than a few years without some positive signals from the United States. Meanwhile, in addition to trying to join the CPTPP, China has also asked to join the Digital Economy Partnership Agreement (DEPA) with Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore—yet another economic group with no U.S. seat at the table. The Biden administration has promised “the development of an Indo-Pacific economic framework” focused on a patchwork of issues—trade facilitation, digital trade, supply chain resiliency, clean energy, infrastructure, and worker standards. But at best, the United States’ closest Asian partners see the framework as a save-the-date card for what they hope will be the day when Washington decides to join the CPTPP or a comparable agreement. The announcement on January 21 of a new U.S.-Japanese economic dialogue helps, but most Asian policymakers and business leaders view the vagueness of the Indo-Pacific economic framework as **indicative of a lack of focus and commitment to deep economic engagement**. The relative strength of the U.S. economy continues to drive the region’s investment and trade with the United States, but as things stand, **Washington is losing influence** over the rules that will govern trade, investment, supply chains, and ultimately, geopolitics in Asia. The administration **has no long-term economic strategy toward Beijing**. The United States’ vague economic policies extend to its goals with Beijing. The Biden administration has rightly sought to limit sensitive technology transfers—particularly of semiconductor- and [artificial intelligence](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2017-12-05/artificial-intelligence-and-chinese-power)-related technology—to China. But the administration has no long-term economic strategy toward Beijing beyond seeking more Chinese agricultural and energy exports under the 2020 Phase One trade deal negotiated by the Trump administration to end the trade war the White House started in 2018. U.S. businesses cannot get a clear answer about whether the administration will promote trade and investment with China in non-sensitive sectors, such as retail and automobiles. (Washington originally championed the TPP to gain leverage in economic negotiations with China, but this tool is now missing.) U.S. defense policy faces different but equally formidable challenges. The Biden administration has clearly made gains at [deterring China](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-02-05/kevin-rudd-usa-chinese-confrontation-short-of-war) by strengthening its alliances, but it has been less purposeful about the types of military capabilities it deploys in Asia—and where it puts them. The Defense Department’s signature Global Posture Review resulted in **almost no significant additions to U.S. military forces in the Indo-Pacific** beyond what the Trump White House already had planned. The administration and Congress have **failed to properly fund the new Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI)**, legislation that was **designed to improve the composition of the military’s funding** for much needed capabilities in the Indo-Pacific theater. Although many experts expect Congress to increase defense spending next year, the crisis in **Ukraine could drain resources** to the continuing detriment of the Indo-Pacific theater.

**AT: INB—China—Asia Pivot Fails—ASEAN Solves**

**Asia pivot fails – ASEAN is handling China’s conduct and is excluding the U.S.**

**Tuazon 21**, Bobby M. Tuazon is the Director for Policy Studies and an analyst at the Center for People Empowerment in Governance and former head of the Political Science Committee at the University of the Philippines, “Biden’s ‘Pivot to Asia’ at a dead end,” September 28th 2021, *ChinaDaily*, From the Press, https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202109/28/WS6152da6aa310cdd39bc6c2cf.html

Biden's attempt to win over ASEAN to its side against China is **doomed to fail**. Not only is China the region's major trading partner, but the **economic future of the US is tied to** a **harmonious relationship** with the Asian giant. For years, ASEAN countries have **refused to be dragged into any feud between the two major powers** as they pin their **future on an environment of peace and neutrality**. To emphasize this point, ASEAN in 1995 signed the Treaty of Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, where the member countries committed to keeping nuclear weapons out of the region. The treaty has been supported by China. In effect, the regional organization, not the US, provides the stability in this part of the world, parrying any destabilizing pressure from the current superpower, which is not part of Asia. Pursuing this role, **ASEAN is in continuing talks with China for the Code of Conduct** for the SCS. Both parties have agreed that the talks should continue **without any interference by a non-ASEAN country**. Nowhere is ASEAN's rejection of the US's gambit diplomacy more revealing than in their reactions to the recent formation of the new trilateral military alliance AUKUS (Australia, the UK and the US) and the reactivation of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) of the US, Australia, India and Japan. This month, the Indo-Pacific AUKUS pact forged an arms deal to equip the Royal Australian Navy with multibillion-dollar worth nuclear-powered submarines. Majority of ASEAN countries, led by Indonesia and Malaysia, warned about the destabilizing effect of AUKUS and the threat of an arms race. Influential former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad rebuked Australia: "You have escalated the threat. This will elicit a response from China.″ Kuala Lumpur immediately announced that it will send a ministerial-level delegation to China to discuss the issue. In the QUAD summit he hosted, Biden argued for a "free and open Indo-Pacific," open navigation and an end to "Chinese military expansion" in the SCS. For years, the US has been cajoling India into playing an active role in the Indo-Pacific but New Delhi officials are reminded of their neutral foreign policy lest India slides into the dangerous orbit of the US As a key member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICS, India is engaged in active talks with Russia and Iran and is expected to receive $5.4 billion worth of Russian surface-to-air missiles in the coming months, which could anger the US With all these misfortunes, Biden's "Pivot to Asia" and containment strategy against China **appear to be at a dead end**.

**AT: INB—Asia Pivot Bad—Russia**

**U.S Asia Pivot Signals European Weakness**

**Erlanger ’21** (Steven Erlanger, Chief Diplomat correspondent in Europe for the NY Times, “The Sharp U.S. Pivot to Asia Is Throwing Europe Off Balance” <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/17/world/europe/biden-china-europe-submarine-deal.html>) //sethlee

BRUSSELS — Until this week, the so-called “pivot to Asia” by the United States had been more of a threat than a reality **for Europe.** But that changed when the Biden administration announced a new defense alliance against China that has left Europe facing an implicit question:

Which side are you on? It is a question that European leaders have studiously sought to avoid since [former President Barack Obama](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/28/us/obama-presidential-center-chicago.html) first articulated that America should [“pivot” resources and attention to Asia](https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/09/world/asia/obama-laos-asia-asean-tour.html) as part of its rivalry with China. European leaders hoped that the relationship between the two superpowers could remain stable and that Europe could balance its interests between the two. Then the Trump administration **sharply raised the temperature with China with tariffs** and other trade barriers. And now the Biden administration on Wednesday announced an alliance between the United States, Britain and Australia that would help [Australia](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/17/us/politics/us-france-australia-betrayal.html) deploy nuclear-powered submarines in the Pacific — and, in doing so, also tore up [a $66 billion deal](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/16/world/europe/france-australia-uk-us-submarines.html) for Australia to buy a French fleet of diesel-powered subs. “Europeans want to defer the moment of truth, to not make a choice between the two,” said Thomas Gomart, director of the French Institute of International Relations, or IFRI. “The Biden administration, like the Trump one, is provoking the moment of choice.” [France was enraged](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/16/world/europe/france-australia-uk-us-submarines.html). Yet if it was a humiliation — as well as the cancellation of a lucrative defense deal — it possibly did have a silver lining for [France](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/17/us/politics/us-france-australia-betrayal.html)’s broader goals. President Emmanuel Macron of France has been Europe’s loudest proponent of “strategic autonomy,” the idea that Europe needs to retain a balanced approach to the United States and China. “We must survive on our own, as others do,” said Josep Borrell Fontelles, the European Union’s foreign policy chief, echoing the French line. The French embarrassment — the Americans also announced the submarine deal [with little if any warning](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/16/us/politics/france-us-biden-australia-submarine.html) — came after the disastrous fall of Afghanistan. European allies were furious with the Biden administration, blaming the Americans for acting with little or no consultation and feeding Mr. Macron’s argument that the United States is no longer an entirely reliable security partner. “The submarines and Afghanistan, it reinforces the French narrative that you can’t trust the Americans,” said Ulrich Speck of the German Marshall Fund in Berlin. But whether France will succeed in turning this bilateral defeat into a way to promote strategic autonomy is doubtful, analysts suggest. “Many Europeans will see this as a transparent way for the French to leverage their own interests,” said Robin Niblett, director of Chatham House, the London-based research institution. **Even so, there seems little doubt that Europe’s balancing act is becoming trickier to maintain.** “Europe needs to think hard about where it sits and what it does,” said Rosa Balfour, director of Carnegie Europe. A Europe that spends more on defense is to be desired, but **it also needs allies** — including Britain and the United States, she said. And a Europe that does more to build its own security capacity “is the best way to be listened to more by its partners,” she added. The new alliance, known as AUKUS, is an effort to integrate Australia and Britain into the broader American effort to create a security deterrent to China. For Australia, which has seen its once-strong relations with Beijing deteriorate, America and Britain provide a much stouter deterrent to China in the Indo-Pacific, analysts agree, than could the deal with France. “It’s sending a very big signal to Beijing, which is useful for the U.S., but especially useful to Australia,” said Ian Lesser, acting director of the German Marshall Fund and head of its Brussels office. “And the weight of that signal is important because of who the partners are.” Mr. Lesser also questioned why the American moves in the Pacific have to be interpreted as a zero-sum equation in which Europe’s importance is diminished. “I don’t see any diminution of American interest and commitment to European security in the wake of Afghanistan or the moves in Asia,” he said. The biggest issue for the European Union may be finding the political will for strategic autonomy, a point made by the president of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, in her [state of the European Union address](https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/strategic-planning/state-union-addresses/state-union-2021_en) earlier on the day the new Asian alliance was announced. France may be pushing autonomy, but whether the rest of the European bloc has an appetite for it — and for creating greater distance from Washington — is uncertain. “France could end up isolating itself,” said Mr. Speck of the German Marshall Fund, noting that in nearly every region where France has security concerns — including Russia, the Sahel and even the Indo-Pacific — the United States continues to be a critical partner. There are **deeper questions about America’s future reliability as a security partner,** especially if the conflict with China turns kinetic, which is part of Mr. Macron’s argument, Mr. Lesser acknowledged. “For all the U.S. commitment to Europe, if things go wrong in the Indo-Pacific, that would change the force structure in Europe **pretty fast.”** In Poland, a strong American ally in the European Union and NATO, the reaction to the new alliance was more positive, focusing not on a pivot away from Europe “but on the U.S., with the British and the Australians, getting serious about China and also defending the free world,” said Michal Baranowski, who heads the German Marshall Fund office in Poland. At the same time, he said, Poles see another case where the supposedly professional, pro-European Biden administration “again doesn’t consult and shoves European allies under the bus,” he said. “This time the French, but for us, it was Nord Stream 2, when we were thrown under the bus for Germany,” he said. That was a reference to Mr. Biden’s decision to allow the completion of a natural gas pipeline from Russia to Germany, bypassing Ukraine and Poland, that was a priority for European powerhouse Berlin. “The U.S. will say again that ‘We’re building strong alliances, with Germany and Australia,’” Mr. Baranowski said. **“But who suffers? Other allies.”**

**AT: INB—Populism Turn—2AC**

**European Defense spending causes populism spread**

**Fay 17**, Director of Defense and Foreign Policy Studies @ Niskan (Matthew, also cites Andrea Gilli, a postdoctoral fellow at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation, “THE PROBLEM WITH EUROPE PAYING ITS DEFENSE BILLS,” *Niskan Center*, <https://niskanencenter.org/blog/problem-europe-paying-defense-bills/>)

The European Union is also unlikely to force member states into a cooperation arrangement, according to Gilli. Given the rise of nationalist populist parties across Europe, any such assertion of power from Brussels will likely create a greater backlash. The two reasons Gilli notes for the inability of European states to increase defense spending also raise another question: should the United States want European states to do so? Writing at the end of the Cold War, political scientist John Mearsheimer warned that a Europe free from superpower domination would return to its **recurrent patterns of interstate warfare.** Europe’s major states would be forced to **pay for their own defense** absent American and Soviet security guarantees. To convince domestic populations to support investment in military capabilities—likely at the expense of welfare spending—state leaders would likely **lean on nationalist rhetoric** and policies. According to Mearsheimer, the reason they have not had to do so was because the American “pacifier” has remained in place even after the superpower standoff in Europe ended. An American withdrawal as an effort to induce greater defense spending in Europe might lead to the empowerment of the very **nationalist populist parties** that would like to see the European Union **dismantled**. The disintegration of Europe—coupled with increased spending on military capabilities by its largest states—could lead to the return of security competition and the dilemmas inherent in it. Meanwhile, smaller states—Estonia just being one example—unable to invest sufficiently in their own defense will be subject to manipulation and domination by the continent’s major powers. So the question of whether the Trump administration should consider withholding defense of America’s European to encourage them to “pay their bills” hinges on two things: whether they can, and if so, whether doing so is worth potentially undermining the peaceful integration of Europe.

**Populism structurally guarantees more conflict and heightens escalation risks**

**Drezner 17**, PhD, Professor of Int’l Politics (Dan, “The Angry Populist as Foreign Policy Leader: Real Change or Just Hot Air?, *41 Fletcher F. World Aff. 23*, Lexis)

‘

Leaders who rise to power in lower-probability scenarios are also likely to have a greater appetite for risk in foreign affairs. This matters, as Jeff Colgan notes: "risk tolerance leads to aggression in international affairs because it increases the perceived payoff of risky gambles." 17 Populist leaders more closely resemble revolutionaries than more established politicians. And as Colgan warns, "the ambition of revolutionary leaders also **contributes to aggression**. Ambition makes it more likely that a leader will reject the status quo internationally as well as domestically." 18 We can see this kind of ambition on display among elected populists. Hugo Chávez [\*30] persistently proposed radical alternatives to the Washington Consensus. One longtime friend of Viktor Orbán noted, "he has always wanted to upset the status quo, to become a change-maker." 19 Orbán himself, in a meeting with Polish Law and Justice Party head Jaroslaw Kaczynski, proposed a "cultural counter-revolution" in Europe. 20 Donald Trump's inaugural address categorically rejected the postwar liberal order, arguing in favor of an "America First" approach to international relations. Populists are therefore more likely to pursue high-risk, revisionist foreign policies. Populist leaders also care about recognition by others, and will be quick to anger if that recognition is not forthcoming. Populists build their legitimacy on their support from "their" people, but part of that support comes from displays of dominance over others. Russian president Vladimir Putin is well-known for his over-the-top efforts to look strong and powerful. These range from his shirtless photos to videos of him weightlifting to scoring eight goals in an exhibition game with former NHL All-Stars. 21 In Erdogan's first two years as Turkey's president, the government has prosecuted more than 1,800 cases of Turkish citizens insulting him--including a former Miss Turkey. 22 Donald Trump has insulted anyone who has criticized him since he started running for president, ranging from erstwhile GOP rivals to federal judges to media outlets to a former Miss Universe to Meryl Streep. When dealing with domestic rivals and critics, such displays of dominance are an easy strategy for elected leaders to pursue. Populist leaders engage in such behavior to project their strength and mastery over the political fates. It is tricky to do this on the international stage, however. Populist leaders will therefore be more concerned than most politicians about the personal respect afforded to them by others. At the international level, this leads to one of two outcomes: recognition by other heads of state, or a denunciation of leaders who fail to confer such recognition. If populists cannot exploit the respect conferred by others, they will be quick to reject and delegitimize the leaders who spurn them. We can see this kind of pattern at work in how populist leaders have reacted to setbacks on the global stage. Vladimir Putin began his tenure in office with a much warmer attitude towards the West. During the first decade of this century, however, Putin lost an ally during Ukraine's Orange Revolution, and witnessed NATO expanding to Russia's borders. It was at this point that Putin began adopting a more hostile attitude towards the West. After President Obama cancelled a meeting with Duterte, the Filipino president responded with a series of tirades insulting the American president. 23 In Trump's first week as president, he faced pushback from the [\*31] Mexican president Enrique Peña Nieto on his policies for the southern border. In response, Trump tweeted that Peña Nieto should not bother coming to Washington. The Mexican president responded by canceling his visit. Populists do not possess a monopoly on anger in politics, but most populists tend to project anger as part of their leadership style. Based on their pathway to power and their philosophy of governance, it should not be surprising that they are commonly associated with that emotion. As previously noted, populist parties do particularly well after financial crises. They are adept at exploiting the (often justified) anger that voters possess towards authorities that were in charge when the crisis happened. Former UKIP leader Nigel Farage warned of "political anger" if the United Kingdom did not follow through on Brexit. In a press conference blasting the United States, Duterte said, "If you Americans are angry with me, then I am also angry with you." 24 During one of the GOP primary debates, Donald Trump explicitly stated, "I will gladly accept the mantle of anger." Trump famously refuses to apologize when he makes controversial or problematic statements. 25 Numerous press reports suggest that Trump lost his temper with the Australian prime minister in their first phone conversation. This wave of populist anger reverses a centuries-long western effort to contain that emotion in international relations. 26 Recent scholarship on emotions in world politics suggest that sustained levels of anger carry risks in world politics. Anger was valorized in societies with strong honor cultures and warrior castes, biologically conditioning citizens towards that feeling. Furthermore, as Neta Crawford notes, "threats that evoke anger (if they are associated with perceived insults) tend to **decrease** the perception of a threat and simultaneously **heighten risk-taking** behaviors on the part of those who feel angry." 27 This is particularly true if populist leaders find ways to institutionalize anger and resentment through new laws, executive orders, or bureaucratic structures. This tendency towards angry rhetoric can be exaggerated through misperception and mistranslation. Conventional foreign policy leaders are prepped to stay within the lanes of "accepted" diplomatic discourse, so that observers can detect subtle shifts in phrasing as a foreign policy signal. In contrast, populists scorn diplomatic language as exercises in sophistry and hypocrisy. They rely on language designed to appeal to their base, which increases the likelihood that outside observers misconstrue their words. Angry tirades from leaders like Trump, Duterte, or Iran's Mahmoud Ahmadinejad have been mistranslated--and usually in a direction that [\*32] paints the leader as more bellicose than intended. 28 Populist leaders will be reluctant to correct such misperceptions, because that would require them to engage in the diplomatic discourse they have derided. Displays of righteous indignation might play well with a populist leader's domestic base. The international effect of angry outbursts, however, is to narrow the zone of cooperation between countries. If a leader unleashes an angry tirade against another country, that is sure to gain considerable public attention in both nations. This automatically raises the "audience costs" for both leaders. The larger the audience that is paying attention to any dispute, the greater the political costs a leader can suffer if they back down in that dispute. 29 Displays of temper make it harder for the populist to compromise, but it will also make it more politically difficult for the object of the tirade to make any concessions. Through effects on leaders and populations, provocations make negotiations more costly and conflict escalation more likely. 30 Perhaps the most important intellectual trait that populist leaders share is their tendency to think like hedgehogs. According to the classical Greek poet Archilochus, "a fox knows many things, but a hedgehog one important thing." Isaiah Berlin popularized that quote, arguing that intellectuals could be divided into foxes and hedgehogs. This works for decision-makers as well. Foxes will possess the necessary metacognition to adapt to new facts and new circumstances; hedgehogs will rely on their core beliefs, fitting the world into their preexisting worldview. 31 Populists are hedgehogs: the one big thing that they know is to reject the elites and technocrats who heretofore governed their country. As Philip Tetlock observed more than a decade ago, foxes and hedgehogs have different strengths when it comes to thinking about the world. 32 Foxes are much better than hedgehogs in their predictive accuracy about world events; simply put, foxes are better at incorporating new information and updating how they think about the world. Hedgehogs are better than foxes at anticipating big and unexpected events happening in the world, such as the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and the 2008 financial crisis. Anticipating those events requires an assuredness about the way the world works that hedgehogs are more likely to possess. The effects of these different intellectual styles on foreign policy are straightforward. As hedgehogs, populists are more likely to have their expectations confounded in world politics. At the same time, populist foreign policy leaders will face psychological and domestic political barriers to admitting error or reversing a failing policy. Any public recognition of a misstep demonstrates a leader's fallibility--which is problematic for leaders [\*33] who claim that they can divine the general will of the people. At the same time, as hedgehogs, populists will be reluctant to take any action that deviates from the way that they think the world works. Stepping back, we can proffer some tentative predictions of how populist foreign policy leaders will behave in the coming years. Populist foreign policy leaders are likely to reject the pre-existing liberal international order and espouse a strong form of ethnic nationalism. They might try to create alternative international arrangements to the status quo, but these efforts are likely to be Potemkin efforts, with more pomp and circumstance than substance. Populist leaders will have greater appetites for risk and ambition on the global stage. These heads of state will crave recognition from their fellow world leaders, and be quick to anger if they are spurned in this area. These displays of anger could become institutionalized and will increase the audience costs of all the involved actors, making cooperation less likely. And populists are less likely to correctly perceive how the world works, and more likely to hold firm with policies that are not viewed as working terribly well. One disturbing conclusion to draw from this particular constellation of traits is that populist leaders are more likely to foment international crises. Breaking with pre-existing global governance structures can **guarantee a crisis escalation**. An international crisis can trigger **rally-round-the flag** effects within the domestic population and make it easier for a leader to suppress domestic dissent. At the extreme, one could envision populists threatening or launching diversionary wars to appeal to a nationalist base in times of trouble. Vladimir Putin employed this tactic. In early 2014, he was still reeling from protests over his return to the Russian presidency, and a slowdown in the Russian economy. He responded by annexing the Crimea after the fall of his ally in Ukraine, and bankrolling a secessionist conflict in Eastern Ukraine. These efforts caused his public support to skyrocket even though the Russian economy contracted in 2014 and 2015. It should be stressed that these are all probabilistic statements. Many of these traits are hardly unique to populists; other heads of state are likely to display some subset of these leadership traits. Still, this combination of [\*34] attributes suggest that the world is **experiencing an increase in the number of revisionist, risky, and violent actions in world politics.**

**AT: INB—Populism Turn—Burden Sharing Causes Populsim**

**More military spending directly contributes to populism across Europe by undermining the political power of centrist and establishment parties**

Edoardo **Saravalle 17**, a Researcher at the Center for a New American Security, “NATO Funding Frustration Could Cause Friction in Europe”, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/nato-funding-frustration-could-cause-friction-europe-20216

Second, increased burden sharing may actively hurt the cause of EU stability. **Military buildup in Europe** would **sap the political capital** and **limit the nondefense spending options** of **establishment** pro-American **leaders** confronting the **gravest threat** to the EU and U.S. power on the continent, **the insurgent populist movement.**

Many EU countries are in a **cycle of elections** that could be **decisive** for the future of Europe and the West. Dissatisfaction over lackluster economic prospects and opposition to immigration have powered anti-EU and anti-NATO parties like Marine Le Pen’s National Front and placed electoral victories within their grasp. Brexit proved that EU integration is neither inevitable nor irreversible. Now, **populist parties are trying to follow the example** and **reshape Europe in a more nationalistic vision.**

The example of **Italy** shows the potential **dangers of prioritizing military spending.** The country currently spends [1.1. percent of its GDP](http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2017_03/20170313_170313-pr2017-045.pdf) on military capabilities. It also boasts [an 11.5 percent unemployment rate](https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2017-04-03/italian-unemployment-rate-decreases-as-fewer-sought-jobs), (35.2 percent for youth), [1 percent GDP growth](http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-italy-economy-oecd-idUKKBN15U1GY) and a caretaker government following Matteo Renzi’s resignation. Spending toward the **NATO target** would **divert resources** and **embolden the populist parties** opposing the government. This **budgetary trade-off** suggests the fundamental calculation of burden sharing. Between a reliable partner or a 2 percent contribution, the United States will choose the former. The 1.1 percent of GDP military spending under Italian prime minister Paolo Gentiloni of the Democratic Party will always be preferable to 2 percent under Beppe Grillo’s Five Star Movement.

**Some examples of specific parties**

**Fay 17** - Director of Defense and Foreign Policy Studies @ Niskan (Matthew, “THE PROBLEM WITH EUROPE PAYING ITS DEFENSE BILLS,” *Niskan Center*, <https://niskanencenter.org/blog/problem-europe-paying-defense-bills/>)

Writing at the Washington Post’s “Monkey Cage” blog, Andrea Gilli—a postdoctoral fellow at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation—identifies some of the domestic barriers to European states investing in their militaries. Gilli names three main constraints on the ability of European states to balance, but two of them are particularly important. The first is the inability of many European states to contribute financially to their own defense. Some European states simply do not have large enough economies to adequately invest in military capabilities. Gilli notes that Estonia is one of the few European countries to meet the minimum standard of defense spending for NATO member states—two percent of gross domestic product—but that still only amounts to $500 million in defense expenditure. Larger states have greater financial resources to invest, but they are tied up in welfare programs. As Gilli writes, [C]utting welfare state provisions in Europe to fund defense expenditures is going to be extremely difficult, if not counterproductive. On the one hand, those who receive these benefits are far more numerous, and thus politically more influential, than those receiving a direct benefit from military spending. On the other, **cuts in welfare spending risk actually bringing additional support to anti-establishment parties** like the Five Stars Movement in Italy, Die Linke in Germany or Podemos in Spain — all of which have strong anti-defense stances. It is possible European states could combine their military capabilities, but as Gilli argues, that option is also problematic. He notes, With Europe’s limited funds to spend on defense, large cooperative projects will be difficult to launch. In the past, countries in Europe abandoned cooperative projects because of their negative domestic implications for jobs, technological know-how or military exports. In an age of austerity, amid a refugee crisis and high youth unemployment, this mind-set is unlikely to change anytime soon. And some countries may have little interest in cooperation. They may operate in completely different environments — Mediterranean vs. North Sea, for example. Or they perceive a different strategic threat at home — think Russia vs. the Islamic State. Some countries may even have a strategic interest in leaving unaddressed some capability gaps — to compel proximate allies to come to their defense. This was Finland’s military strategy during the Cold War.

**Increased defense spending mobilizes populist voters**

**Henke 21** [Marina Henke; 17/2/21; Professor of International Relations at the Hertie School and Northwestern University, focuses on military interventions, peacekeeping, and European security and defense policy; “The populist challenge to European defense”; <https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/13501763.2021.1881587>]

**Right-wing populist parties in the EU are broadly nationalist**, sovereignist, and Euroskeptic (Mudde, 2007; Vasilopoulou, 2018). But while these **parties sharply oppose supranationalism and the EU's broader integrative trajectory,** it is less clear whether their anti-EU sentiment extends to other forms of institutionalized cooperation, and in particular to coordination or collaboration with other EU member states on defense.12 We argue that **populist parties are likely to constrain European defense cooperation** under the following two conditions: First, **populist parties hold strong anti-EU, anti-globalization, and anti-establishment sentiment and a more general skepticism over the merits of international cooperation.** If these preferences are given clear precedence over national security interests or concerns, **we are unlikely to see these parties engage in defense cooperation**. This form of **populist challenge to European defense cooperation may come from either right-wing or left-wing parties.** While left-wing populist parties highlight economic anxieties and grievances, right-wing populist parties **emphasize threats to national identity, culture, and sovereignty** (De Vries & Edwards, 2009). They also often mix populism with nationalism (Camus & Lebourg, 2017). These nationalist sentiments are likely to stoke intra-EU divisions and constrain defense cooperation. Second, European defense is presented as an issue that populist parties may use to mobilize the mass public**, polarize the electorate, and win votes.** In other words, populist parties **politicize European defense issues for electoral purposes.** According to De Vries et al. (2021), **two key elements lead to the politicization of international cooperation: public discontent about existing forms of international cooperation and the mobilization of this discontent by political entrepreneurs.** Since most mainstream parties have not politicized European defense cooperation, **populist parties may perceive an incentive and opportunity to mobilize opposition on this issue to attract new voters,** and often in tandem with anti-immigrant and nationalist messages (Hobolt & De Vries, 2015).

**AT: INB—Populism Turn—Populism Low**

**Opposition parties are uniting to remove populist leaders.**

**Meyer ’22** [Brett; 6 Jan; Research Fellow; Tony Blair Institute for Global Change, “A Playbook Against Populism? Populist Leadership in Decline in 2021,” https://institute.global/policy/playbook-against-populism-populist-leadership-decline-2021]

In our annual update to our Populists in Power database, **we find that the number of populist leaders in power at the beginning of 2022 is down from 17 at the beginning of 2021 to 13 – the lowest since 2004**. Three of the four populist leaders who lost power were less ideological anti-establishment populists, meaning that the remaining populists are almost all culturally right wing.

**Two common factors appear to have contributed to this significant fall** in the number of populist leaders. First, **the pandemic may have reminded the public of the importance of seriousness and expertise in policymaking**. **Countries with populist leaders around the world had higher Covid-19 case and death rates than those without populist leaders, and populist leaders in Europe have seen a sustained dip in their polling popularity relative to more conventional parties** throughout the pandemic.

Second, **unusually broad opposition coalitions have emerged to depose populist incumbents. Historically divided opposition parties adopted a narrow focus in their election campaigns to remove the populist leader**. This happened in three out of four populist losses in 2021. **We also see evidence of opposition parties following this “playbook” in countries where populist leaders are facing elections in 2022.**

The danger posed by populism lies in the damage leaders can do to the norms and institutions of liberal democracy. However, we find that, **in most of the cases where populist leaders lost power last year, there is limited evidence that key norms such as a free press, an independent judiciary and the peaceful transfer of power have been obviously weakened**. That said, elections in the coming years in countries where populist governments have invoked more radical reform to entrench their positions give less cause for optimism.

Finally, if the formation of broad coalitions provides an emerging playbook for fighting populism, it’s important to examine how stable these coalitions are once in power. The danger is that, because the opposition parties have such substantive policy disagreements, they will prove unable to hold power for long, potentially threatening a reversal. To avoid instability, these coalitions should focus on a limited programme of reforms targeted at shoring up institutions against future populist threats.

The experience of the past four years shows that **countries with populist leaders aren’t sentenced to autocracy**. But while **the wave of early 21st-century populism appears to have peaked**, it will be some time before we can conclude that liberal democracy is no longer under threat.

**AT: INB—Econ Turn—Kills Growth**

**Military spending decks economic growth.**

Muhammad **Azam 20**, Department of Economics, Faculty of Business & Economics, Abdul Wali Khan University Mardan, 12/28/2020, “Does military spending stifle economic growth? The empirical evidence from non-OECD countries,” *Heliyon*, 6(12), <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.heliyon.2020.e05853>, RH

Undeniably, **peace and long-term sustainable economic development are the prime agenda of all countries.** This study aims to empirically evaluate the impact of military spending on economic growth for a panel of 35 non-OECD countries over 1988–2019. A multivariate regression model based on the augmented production function is used to achieve the objective of the study. The panel autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL)/pooled mean group (PMG) technique is employed, while, in addition the robust least squares and fixed-effect estimators are implemented for the robustness of the results. **This study found a clear negative effect of military spending on economic growth.** The pairwise Dumitrescu Hurlin panel causality test results exhibit bi-directional causality between military expenses and economic growth. Overall, these **estimates provide strong support that military expenditure is not beneficial rather detrimental to economic growth.** **The empirical findings of this study suggest that policymakers need to redesign the military budget to stimulate economic growth and improve social welfare.**

The assessment of the economic and social effects of military expenditure remains an interesting desirable area of research. The ultimate objectives of underdeveloped and developed countries are to achieve sustainable economic growth and prosperity in the long-run. There is a substantial volume of literature about the economic consequences of military expenditure; however, no consensus has been developed, whether military spending is beneficial or detrimental to economic growth. Military spending according to the Keynesian approach is a component of government consumption, which stimulates economic growth by expanding demand for goods and services. Military spending affects economic growth through many channels. When aggregate demand is lower relative to prospective supply, rises in military spending tend to enlarge capacity utilization, raise profits, and consequently, enhance investment and aggregate output ([Faini et al., 1984](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7779781/#bib33)). Several prior studies have drawn findings that support the Keynesian military view of the positive influence of military expenditure on national output ([Benoit, 1978](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7779781/#bib17); [Khalid and Noor, 2018](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7779781/#bib45); [Raju and Ahmed, 2019](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7779781/#bib63)). In a study conducted by [Lobont et al. (2019)](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7779781/#bib51), it is ascertained that military spending has several positive effects on capital, labor, growth, and the effectual use of available resources in the economy as a whole.

The focus of academicians, researchers, and developmental economists for peace economics are useable as military spending is one of the main concerns of countries, regardless of their development status. According to conventional logic, **the military formulation is an economic encumbrance**. **While comparatively more resources are devoted to military formulations, and lesser proportion is left for investment in the education and technology sectors, which play a vital role in the economic growth process and provide a broader base for socio-economic development**. Generally, it is believed that in the insecure region, **each country deliberately allocates an uneven share of its meager economic resources to “unproductive” military expenditure**. In the absenteeism of international collaboration to minimize political pressure, military expenditures can be driven more and more across a region as each country goes beyond its neighbors to safeguard its security, raise the level of regional military expenditure and bring little rise or even a decline in the security of all. However**, there are two direct and interconnected ways by which higher military expenditure may unfavorably affect long-run economic growth**. First, **military spending upsurge may diminish the total accumulation of existing resources available for other domestic usages such as investment in prolific capital, education, and market-oriented technological enhancement**. Second, **high military expenditure can intensify misrepresentations that condense the efficiency of resource distribution**, thereby **diminishing the total yield factor**2.

Military expenditure tends to attenuate productivity because more funds diversion to **military expenditure causes the government to either increase taxes or get loans from the foreign capital market to balance its budget**. The second alternative **is therefore primarily harmful to economic prosperity**, since **it escalates the rate of interest, decreases investment and consumer demand, and drives economic growth sluggish** (Russett, 1969; Borch and Wallace, 2010). In a similar vein, some other studies including Lim (1983) noted that **military expenses are harmful to the growth of any economy.** Even, a study by Dunne (2000) focusing on the Keynesian framework reveals that military spending has no influence on growth at best, but most **probably has an inverse effect**; obviously, **there is no indication of a positive influence of military burden on economic growth**. This implies that disarmament certainly offers a prospect for augmented economic performance.

Despite the voluminous empirical studies on the military-growth connection, the empirical findings are still inconclusive6. The discussion in the present literature on the influence of military spending opened with the seminal work of Benoit (1978) which opined that military spending and growth have a positive correlation. Afterward, many studies are continuously performed to empirically verify the relationship between these variables by using different models, estimation techniques, set of countries, and data period. Several other studies support the positive effect of defense spending including Atesoglu (2002), who observed that there exists a significantly positive association in military outlays and aggregate output in the case of the United States from 1947:2–2000:2. The empirical analysis of the study by Yildirim et al. (2005) found that military spending boosts national income in the Middle Eastern countries and Turkey over 1989–99. Narayan and Singh (2007) empirically verified that defense expenses Granger causes exports, and exports Granger causes national income (GDP), indicating that defense spending indirectly Granger causes national income in the short-run for Fiji over 1970–01. According to Borch and Wallace (2010), higher levels of military expenditure are better prepared to stave off the harmful influences of an economic slump than states with lower levels of military spending in the 49 U.S. states during 1977–04. Malizard (2010) observed two-way causality between military spending and growth in France during 1960–08. Findings of Farzanegan (2014) study supported the positive impact of the military outlay on growth in Iran during 1959–07. Khalid and Noor (2018) concluded that military spending has a positive relationship with growth in sixty-seven developing economies during 2002–10.

On the other hand, some **prior studies**, for example, [Faini et al. (1984)](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7779781/#bib33) **detected that a greater military burden is related to sluggish growth** for 69 countries during 1952–70, whereas **a rise of 10% military spending leads to a decrease of annual economic growth by 0.13%**. [Deger (1986)](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7779781/#bib23) revealed that overall the direct and indirect effects of military expenditure will dampen growth rate and impede development in a panel of 50 developing economies during 1965–73. The author suggested that empirical indication goes against the conclusions of Benoit and others about the positive impact of military outlay on growth in less-developed economies. [Abu-Bader and Abu-Qarm (2003)](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7779781/#bib2)**found that military expenditure hampers economic growth, but civilian expenses have a positive impact on growth for Egypt, Israel, and Syria** (1975–98), (1967–98), and (1973–98) respectively. **The empirical findings** of [Klein (2004)](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7779781/#bib46) **reveal** that overall **the military outlay has a negative influence on the growth** rate of Peru over 1970–96. [Chang et al. (2011)](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7779781/#bib20) found that **military expenditure leads to deleterious growth for low-income countries** in the whole sample of 90 countries during 1992–06. [D'Agostino et al. (2017)](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7779781/#bib32) observed a significantly negative effect of military spending on growth in 83 countries from OECD over 1970–14. [Saba and Ngepah (2019)](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7779781/#bib65) examined the causal link between military spending and economic growth for 35 African countries over 1990–15. The authors found that (i) no causal link in seven countries; (ii) one-way causality from military spending to growth in two countries; (iii) one-way link from growth one-way in 14 countries; and (iv) two-ways link in 12 countries. Overall, the GMM estimates reveal that **military spending has a significant negative effect on economic growth**in Africa.

Similarly, other studies provide evidence of mixed results on the economic effects of military expenses on growth, for example, the study of [Frederiksen and Looney (1982)](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7779781/#bib37) divided the economies into financial resource restrained and unrestrained groups over 1960–78. The findings revealed that enhanced military expenditures promoted growth in the unrestrained group, but a small visible impact was found in resource-constrained countries. In a study on three North American countries namely Canada, Mexico, and the U.S. during 1963–05, [Bremmer and Kesselring (2007)](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7779781/#bib19) found that enhanced military expenditure promotes nominal GDP in Canada and Mexico, while it declines the growth in nominal GDP in the U.S. [Aye et al. (2014)](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7779781/#bib8) observed no Granger causal association between military outlay and growth for South Africa during 1951–10. However, by using the bootstrap rolling window estimation approach, the study finds two ways Granger causality in different subsamples. The results of [Chang et al. (2014)](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7779781/#bib21) supported the neutrality hypothesis for France, Germany, and Italy, while, the military expenditure–growth hampering hypothesis for Canada and the UK, and unidirectional Granger causality running from national income to military outlay for China. Moreover, the results supported the feedback[7](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7779781/#fn7) between military spending and national income in the case of Japan and the U.S. over 1988–10. Using the “Hendry General-to-Specific modeling” methodology, the study of [Abdel-Khalek et al. (2019)](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7779781/#bib1) fails to find any causal linkages between military spending and economic growth in India over 1980–16. Some more related empirical studies are given in [Table 1](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7779781/table/tbl1/).

Several empirical studies are available on the relationship between military spending and economic growth, but their empirical findings are yet inconclusive. Undeniably, the economic effect of military expenditure is an essential issue for the developing world. Therefore, this research work aims to determine empirically the impact of military expenditure along with some other control variables on the growth, for a set of thirty-five countries from non-OECD over 1988–19. According to the nature of the data, the widely used panel unit tests are employed to check the order of integration of each variable. The results are found mixed (i.e., I(0), and I(1)) based on stationarity, and thus, the panel ARDL/PMG approach is applied. Afterward, the panel robust least squares and fixed-effect estimators are also employed as analytical techniques for parameters’ estimation to affirm the results, and the Dumitrescu –Hurlin Granger causality test is employed to find the direction of causality between the variables.

**The empirical results of all the methods suggest that military spending and economic growth have a strong inverse relationship**, suggesting that **encouraging military expenditure is not a good option because it discourages economic growth.** Moreover, the Dumitrescu–Hurlin Granger causality test exposes bidirectional causal nexus between military expenses and economic growth in the sample countries. The bidirectional causal linkage between military spending and growth though exhibits a degree of interdependence between military spending and economic growth policy objectives. Thus, **the execution of economic growth policies should not be given more primacy over the military burden while other than military expenditure factors shall be considered.**

Overall, **the empirical results validated that military spending is undesirable for national economic development. The results of the significantly negative effect of military spending on national income go against the results obtained by**[Benoit (1978)](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7779781/#bib17), and others who claim that military expenditure positively contributes to the aggregate output, while, consistent with the findings by [Dunne and Tian (2015)](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7779781/#bib29) for 106 countries over 1988–10, Dunne and Tian concluded that “These results do seem to provide valuable robustness checks and support strongly the view that military spending hurts growth” (p.29). The findings of the present study are technically and statistically acceptable and plausible for frontwards policy recommendation purposes.

From these findings, **the unequivocal negative effect of military spending on economic growth** indicates that non-OECD countries are developing countries with scarce resources, and these **economies can't afford military spending**, while when these economies grow, governments can contemplate rising its military spending to strengthen its military power. **Enlarged military spending can't be used to boost economic growth** in the non-OECD countries, since any positive impacts it would have on the economic growth through augmented demand, modernization, and resource outset, would have overwhelmed by the damaging effects on economic growth through reduced investment. **Policymakers should thus leave military spending for security objectives only and restructuring public resources from the military sector toward civilian objectives**[11](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7779781/#fn8). Likewise, policymakers should focus on rationalizing their budget spending more on improving social welfare. Furthermore, incremental efforts are required to adopt an effective and prudent policy to further encourage growth, while shrinkage in military spending can largely benefit the economies. Therefore, **military expenditures need to be reduced** while expenditures on other developmental sectors including health and education sectors to be increased.

**AT: INB—Econ Turn—Europe K2 Global Econ**

**Yes collapse—small crises easily snowball into global economic crisis because of fundamental problems in European economics.**

**Collignon, 12** [Stefan Collignon, professor of political economy at Sant’Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa, founder of the Asia Forum, and the London School of Economics, UK, taught at Harvard University and Hamburg University, Deputy Director General for Europe in the German Federal Ministry for Finance, 7-2012, ‘Europe’s Debt Crisis, Coordination Failure, and International Effects’, ADBI Institute, <https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/156225/adbi-wp370.pdf> /alundy]

The European debt crisis started as a small local policy shock in Greece, but it has come to threaten the survival of the euro with potentially far reaching consequences for the world economy. Since December 2011 financial markets have stabilized somewhat, but **fundamental issues** remain **unsolved**. This crisis is due partly to fundamental economic developments, such as growth and competitiveness, and partly to uncooperative behavior between the main policy makers in Europe. One of the paradoxes of this crisis is that, despite all its problems, the euro has remained relatively firm in its internal (inflation) and external value (exchange rate). Financial markets may be concerned with some parts of the euro area, mainly in the south, but they still see the euro as a major currency in the world. However, the euro will only maintain this role if European governments can get the sovereign debt crisis under control. Whatever the ultimate conclusion of the drama, the experience has shown that Europe needs a much tighter form of economic governance if it wants to live up to the ambition of providing the world's alternative reserve currency. While a series of events has progressively deepened the European debt crisis, it is important to distinguish between sudden shocks and underlying **fundamental problems** in Europe’s economic governance. Their interaction has been the specific flavor of this crisis. There are two views to the European debt crisis. For the “fundamentalists”, the debt crisis is caused by the lack of discipline in sticking to the principles of “a sound and competitive macroeconomic base and solid public finance” (Weidmann 2001). Hence, the remedy is to implement “painful reforms” and consolidate budgets, which would rebuild trust and confidence in financial markets (Issing 2009). For the “monetarists”, the European debt crisis is a liquidity crisis. A small local liquidity shock causes a sudden deterioration in a specific class of asset values, can cause a **global** systemic **financial crisis** when the need for liquidity spills over to banks that then get distressed because the deteriorating asset prices put their balance sheets into difficulties and reduce bank capital (Chacko et al. 2011). In this case, a crisis can be stopped by a lender of last resort that provides the necessary liquidity and stops the crisis from turning into a default avalanche.

**If anything, it’ll substantially affect the US economy.**

**Dadush, 10** [Uri Dadush, PhD, Business Economics, Harvard University, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, focuses on trends in the global economy and is currently tracking developments in the eurozone crisis, 6-2-2010, ‘The Euro Crisis: A Threat to the US Economy’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, https://carnegieendowment.org/2010/06/02/euro-crisis-threat-to-u.s.-economy-pub-40887]

The trade and investment links between the **U**nited **S**tates and the European Union (EU) are significant. Europe consumes twenty percent of U.S. exports and holds more than 50 percent of U.S. overseas assets, while the United States holds close to 40 percent of Europe’s foreign assets. Lower growth and higher volatility in Europe could therefore have serious consequences for the United States, hindering export growth and endangering assets. Europe has already shown itself to be the laggard in the global recovery—in the first quarter, European GDP was up only 0.3 percent (y/y), compared to 2.5 percent in the United States and 11.9 percent in China—and the situation may well get worse before it gets better.

IMGXYZ5032IMGZYXThe crisis will likely lead the euro to depreciate further in the coming months. The euro has already fallen more than 20 percent against the dollar since late November—two months before Obama unveiled his goal of doubling exports in the next five years—and it may fall to parity. In sectors where U.S. and European exports overlap (e.g., aircraft, machinery, professional services), a lower euro will hinder the competitiveness of U.S. goods on the global market. The depreciation will also reduce the purchasing power of European tourists traveling to the United States and make European goods relatively cheaper in U.S. markets at a time when policy makers are hoping to avoid a return to high current account deficits. With imports likely to rise and exports likely to fall, the U.S. bilateral trade balance with Europe will likely deteriorate. By definition, the profitability of U.S. companies operating in Europe will be affected by the Euro crisis when profits and assets on the balance sheets are expressed in dollars. U.S. companies selling in Europe and sourcing in dollars will see even sharper profit declines, though U.S. companies selling into the dollar area and sourcing in Europe will benefit.

Despite the negative effects a weaker euro would have on U.S. job creation, the most important consequences of the Euro crisis in the United States will operate through financial and, more specifically, banking channels. Though the exposure of [U.S. banks](http://carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=40707) to the most vulnerable countries in Europe is limited to $176 billion, or 5 percent of their total foreign exposure, their indirect linkages to these countries, which operate through all of the international banks, are much larger. Not surprisingly, European banks hold large amounts of their own countries’ bonds and, according to a recent World Bank report, these holdings exceed reserves in some instances. A string of bank failures in Europe could well **trigger** another global credit crunch.

**AT: INB—LIO Turn**

**Burden-sharing wrecks the LIO and decenters US dominance**

**McTague, 22** [Tom McTague, staff writer at the Atlantic, 3-24-2022, The Atlantic, ‘Biden Can’t Paper Over the West’s Disunity’, <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2022/03/biden-nato-summit-russia-invasion-ukraine/627598/> /alundy]

Ideological incoherence is the main threat to the Western alliance, but a close second can be found in the West’s imperial center—the U.S. And here, again, we return to Trump. The essence of his complaint about Europe was not simply that it was not contributing enough; it was that he didn’t really believe in the U.S.-led order itself. Trump believed the whole structure was unfair to the U.S.: Why should it shoulder most of the burden of policing the world? But the thing with orders—liberal, “rules-based,” or any other—is that they need ordering, and this is the job of the hegemon. Burdens can be better shared, and Europe can do more to free America for its contest with China, but ultimately the U.S. either **guarantees** European security or **it doesn’t.**

Biden will undoubtedly speak a familiar language to European leaders—one of liberal values and the defense of democracy, and that will be comforting to them. But the question that nevertheless troubles European politicians, diplomats, and officials is whether instead of Trump being an eccentric one-off, his instinctive antagonism to the obligations of global leadership represents a trend in American public opinion more generally. The question that follows is whether the U.S. has the political will to be the hegemonic power it has been since the end of the Second World War, **the basis on which the Western world functions.**

As one former NATO insider put it to me, the alliance’s strength is its strategic capability, and this is possible only because **the U.S. dominates it**. An alliance of lots of similar-size states would not be the same: It would be the European Union—a worthwhile political and trade bloc, but not a capable military grouping. What happens if Washington decides it no longer wants the role of leader?

One somewhat counterintuitive conclusion from the past 20 years is that, if anything, America’s relative dominance over Europe has grown, not declined. After the financial crash, it was the Federal Reserve that stepped in to become the global lender of last resort, while Europe descended into a set of rolling crises. The fundamentals of U.S. economic strength remain **extraordinary**: the dollar, Silicon Valley, America’s universities, Wall Street. Europe lags behind on all of these, and Germany’s sudden commitment to additional defense spending will do little to bridge the yawning security gap.

The reality is that the West functions as an American-led alliance, but it is not clear that Europe entirely agrees on America’s principal strategic threats. Whether Trump returns to the White House or Biden is the one who returns to some future NATO summit, there will come a point when Europe and the U.S. must decide whether and how to renew their alliance for the next challenge—be that Russia, or China, or something else entirely. And if they do, it will take far more than a small uptick in defense spending and a change in energy policy to keep them **united.**

**Links to Entrapment**

**CP links to entrapment or the da is terminally non-unique—ideological prejudices, lobbying, and issue spillage drive commitments.**

**Lanoszka ’17** [Alexander Lanoszka; Assistant Professor of International Relations at the University of Waterloo; 12-18-2017; "Tangled up in rose? Theories of alliance entrapment and the 2008 Russo-Georgian War"; Taylor & Francis; https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13523260.2017.1392102; Accessed 7-11-2022; AW]

**Entrapment** could also **result from transnational ideological factors**. Driscoll and Maliniak (2016) suggest that defenders like the **United States get ensnared in conflicts “where their national interests are not implicated” for reasons of “issue slippage” (p. 593). This issue slippage occurs when the alliance takes on additional purposes, losing sight even of its original purpose. In the case of NATO, issue slippage ensued when the Soviet military threat no longer existed and the alliance became instead a political community based on liberal democratic values**. Accordingly, an actual or **potential ally can “position itself in the imagination of liberal idealists in the West” to maximize external support** (Driscoll & Maliniak, 2016, p. 594). Similarly, Cooley and Nexon (2016, pp. 77–82) argue that foreign elites can forge bonds of trust and friendship with American officials and politicians, thereby **eliciting more cooperation than what was strategically warrante**d. The common mechanism underlying these arguments is that the ally exploits some transnational connection via elite networks. This **connection often has an ideological character since foreign elites play to the ideological prejudices of the defender by professionalizing the national bureaucracy**, highlighting religious and political affinities with the West, **contracting with lobbying firms in the defender’s capital city**, and developing embassy connections (Cooley & Nexon, 2016, pp. 88–94; Driscoll & Maliniak, 2016, p. 601). Sometimes they **might instead play on ethnic ties if those ties exist**. The net effect is to make foreign policy-making in NATO capitals more amenable to a state’s particular interests. The **mechanism resembles** what Schimmelfennig (2003) calls **rhetorical action, which refers to the “strategic use and exchange of arguments to persuade other actors to act according to one’s preference**s” (p. 5). By appealing to the ideological sensibilities of the defender’s elites, the ally can co-opt that defender, thereby **increasing the probability that the defender would assist the ally even if doing so is detrimental to its strategic interests.**

**Links to Politics**

**Burden sharing sparks acrimonious debate in congress**

**Eyal 22** (Jonathan Eyal is associate director at the Royal United Services Institute in London, “Yes, Nato has a new vitality. But its united front could collapse when it has to deal with Russia” 7/3/22 https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/jul/03/yes-nato-has-a-new-vitality-but-its-united-front-could-collapse-when-it-has-to-deal-with-russia)

Nato calculates that its members have promised to spend £172.6bn in additional defence expenditure on top of existing defence budgets, with Germany accounting for perhaps half this amount. But the question is how this will be spent and over what period. The easiest way to improve European capabilities would be to use this cash to buy US equipment off the shelf: this offers substantial economies of scale and time. Yet such an approach will go against European aspirations to boost their defence industries; French diplomats are warning that the Ukraine war must not end up as a bonanza for US arms manufacturers. Chances are high that Nato’s eternal “burden-sharing” debate will continue, even if more cash is available. Across the Atlantic, Donald Trump and his disciples are poised to argue – as “The Donald” did when he was in the White House – that Nato is a scam to fleece American taxpayers. Even if he does not stage a comeback, the idea that the US is spending far more than it should to defend fat, wealthy Europeans is likely to feature prominently when a new Congress is elected this November. The sheer audacity of the Russian aggression has allowed the Biden administration to get the cash it needed from Congress. Still, it is taken for granted in Washington that the $40bn package recently approved by Congress for security assistance to Ukraine is unlikely to be repeated. And a futureNato burden-sharing debate is **bound to get more acrimonious** when it is joined with a parallel discussion about paying for Ukraine’s postwar economic reconstruction, a project estimated at an eye-watering $500bn.

**AT: Entrapment DA**

**Turn—Relations Solve Entrapment**

**Stronger relations cause NATO to restrain US aggression- solves entrapment**

Anika **Binnendijk 19** — (Anika Binnendijk; senior fellow with the Scowcroft Center’s Transatlantic Security Initiative, a political scientist at the RAND Corporation, Published: 2019; "An Attack Against Them All? Drivers of Decisions to Contribute to NATO Collective Defense"; RAND Corporation; Accessed: 7-9-2022; https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1080712.pdf)//Pen-SY

Concerns about a mismatch of goals could be overcome if coalition participants are more confident in their ability to influence the coalition’s actions. Potential participants could have concerns about restraining any ally, but in a Baltic scenario, these concerns are likely to be most acute with respect to the most powerful and leading members of the coalition and the Baltic states. Typically, **weaker states** are thought to have **less leverage** in the alliance and, therefore, greater concerns about entrapment by a stronger ally like the United States.78 However, weaker allies do have some ways to restrain more-powerful allies. First, longstanding **diplomatic and military relationships** among NATO members mean that states might have **insight into their allies’ decision making** processes and the **contacts needed to influence those processes**.79 Second, allies also have some sources of leverage over a coalition leader, including the **ability to withdraw** participation or place limits on access to military bases or airspace.80 Such actions could restrain a coalition leader’s behavior by affecting its ability to carry out operations, **raising the costs** of a military action, or **undermining** the domestic or international legitimacy of the operation. To the extent that a coalition leader values the support of its allies in the longer term, threats of exit from the coalition or NATO itself could **affect a coalition leader’s decisionmaking**.81 There is **evidence** that NATO allies **used NATO decisionmaking structures** to restrain U.S. actions during the air war over Kosovo. Wesley Clark, who was NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander, complained about the influence of NATO members on military decisions, including campaign phasing and individual targeting.82 In a now-famous incident at the Pristina airport, the **British commander** of NATO’s Allied Rapid Reaction Corps was able to leverage his chain of command in London to **thwart Clark’s plan** to block the airport runway with helicopters—a move that the British commander believed could have triggered a security incident between NATO and Russia.83 Ultimately, concerns about constraints posed by NATO structures in Kosovo contributed to the U.S. decision to form a coalition of the willing for initial operations in Afghanistan in 2001.84 NATO members that do not participate could still face direct Russian retaliation or other consequences. Given that possibility, members who do not entirely support the aims of the operation might still participate in order to seek greater influence over operational decisions than they would have if they were on the outside.85 This logic appears to have influenced France’s decision to join NATO’s air war over Kosovo. French Secretary General for Defense and National Security Louis Gautier argued that French participation in the operation meant that France was “able in Kosovo to impose itself in the decisionmaking process and affect strategy.”86

**Entrapment False**

**No entrapment – Empirics**

-allies restrain the us rather than embolden it

-draw-in is always domestic

**Beckley 15**[(Michael, Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at Tufts University, “The Myth of Entangling Alliances : Reassessing the Security Risks of U.S. Defense Pacts” International security 39(4) <https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/IS3904_pp007-048.pdf)p.46-48//> EZAY]

Conclusion

American concerns about entangling alliances are as old as the Republic itself. During the post–World War II era, however, there have been only five ostensible episodes of U.S. entanglement, and even these **cases are questionable**. The case in which alliance obligations had the largest impact on U.S. decisionmaking (the 1995–96 Taiwan Strait crisis) entailed minimal military action, and the case that entailed the most military action (the Vietnam War) contained only a **marginal role for alliance politics** in U.S. decisionmaking. In the other three cases (the 1954–55 Taiwan Strait crisis and the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo), both the effect of alliance obligations on U.S. policy and the costs suffered by U.S. forces **were moderate**. And beyond these cases, entanglement was virtually nonexistent in U.S. foreign policy. Against this limited evidence of entanglement are numerous cases in which alliances restrained the United States. Allies **dissuaded** the United States from **escalating the Korean War** and crises in **Laos and Berlin**, and struggled in vain to **prevent** the United States from entering or escalating other conflicts, the 2003 **Iraq War** being only the latest major example. Indeed, instances of alliance-induced **restraint are evident** even within the five cases of entanglement discussed above: in the 1954–55 Taiwan Strait crisis, concerns about **European alliances discouraged U.S. policymakers** from **bombing the Chinese mainland** and publicly committing to defend Jinmen and Mazu; in the **Vietnam** War, allies impeded U.S. entry into the war and then repeatedly implored the United States to get out; and in **Bosnia and Kosovo**, U.S. allies initially restrained the United States from lashing out violently and then provided all of the NATO ground forces and most of the postconflict peacekeepers for the eventual operations. There also are several cases in which the United States **sidestepped inconvenient alliance commitments**, restrained an ally from attacking a third party, or openly sided against an ally—and this list could probably be expanded by looking within other cases, including the five ostensible cases of entanglement. As explained earlier, the United States blatantly **retracted a pledge to Taiwan** to defend Jinmen and Mazu in 1955, refused to save the French at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, delegated ground operations and most of the postconflict peacekeeping in Bosnia and Kosovo to allies, and waited for eight months and the receipt of private security assurances before responding militarily to China’s provocative behavior near Taiwan in 1995–96. In sum, the empirical record shows that the risk of entanglement is real but manageable and that, for better or worse, U.S. security policy lies firmly in the hands of U.S. leaders and is shaped primarily by those leaders’ perceptions of the nation’s core interests. When the United States has overreached militarily, the main cause has not been entangling alliances but rather what Richard Betts calls “self-entrapment”—the tendency of U.S. leaders to define national interests expansively, to exaggerate the magnitude of foreign threats, and to underestimate the costs of military intervention.188 Developing a disciplined defense policy therefore will require the emergence of prudent leadership, the development (or resurrection) of guidelines governing the use of force,189 the establishment of domestic institutional constraints on the president’s authority to send U.S. forces into battle, or some combination of these.190 Scrapping alliances, by contrast, would simply unleash the United States to act on its **interventionist impulses** while leaving it isolated diplomatically and militarily.

**Reject entrapment studies – They’re backward**

Alexander **Lanoszka** (20**17**). Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science and in the Balsillie School of International Affairs at the University of Waterloo, BA (Windsor), PhD (Princeton);” Tangled up in rose? Theories of alliance entrapment and the 2008 Russo-Georgian War.“ Contemporary Security Policy, 39(2), 234–257. doi:10.1080/13523260.2017.1392102) //P.19 EZAY

The main problem concerns counterfactuals. The factors that allegedly generate entrapment risks can be so wide-ranging that imagining a world in which they operate differently would require changing other variables, which in turn can make war more or less likely. Alternatively, they might not exclude other factors that could lead to the same violent outcome. After all, conflict **drives both alliance formation and the likelihood of war**. States join alliances because they assess that the **possibility of war is non-trivial**. Similarly, a defender might be receptive to the overtures of an ally precisely because it has a pre-existing desire to see conflict with the adversary of that ally. In social scientific parlance, endogeneity problems are pervasive when trying to understand whether entrapment has occurred or is at risk of occurring. The case of the 2008 Russo-Georgian War is instructive by revealing these ambiguities. Many NATO members—especially those in Western Europe—were lukewarm towards Georgia’s bid to become a treaty ally, arguably because they recognized that Georgia posed certain entrapment risks. The United States was the most supportive of Georgia, but it might have **overstated its support** to Georgia in order to gain a bargaining chip with Russia. It might have even done so because Western European countries were so hesitant, thereby ignoring Saakashvili’s non-democratic tendencies. But by this very token, the United States limited its response to the outbreak of hostilities between Georgia and Russia in August 2008. The Georgian case suggests that states do not forge alliances mindlessly nor do they follow their allies off the cliff thoughtlessly. One cannot by definition want to be entrapped. The Russo-Georgian War of 2008 illustrates the need to disentangle the factors that push states to fight wars and to seek alliances while carefully investigating the mechanisms through which alliances fuel wars. As noted, some baseline probability of war had already existed between the two former Soviet republics when Saakashvili became President. Their conflict centered on an unresolved dispute regarding the political status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Neither could commit to a durable settlement. Moreover, territorial concessions and submission to salami tactics could have signaled Georgian weakness, thereby encouraging new or more assertive territorial demands. Georgian leaders might have also faced domestic incentives to stand firm towards Russia—incentives that would have existed **independent of NATO**. To the extent that alliance politics mattered from Georgia’s perspective, Saakashvili might have cherry-picked information that confirmed his beliefs regarding Western support. Nevertheless, these factors are idiosyncratic because they stem directly from his personality. In a counterfactual world where NATO was not a factor, he could have had these and other cognitive biases that would have elevated the likelihood of war. By undertaking this sort of counterfactual analysis, scholars thus must take care to isolate the effect of an alliance commitment—to the degree that it exists—from the underlying propensity of war. Georgia bears a methodological and analytical lesson for thinking about entrapment: Just because NATO was an issue for Georgian security in 2008 does not mean the alliance was causally responsible for the war. Future research on alliances and war **must not only** **identify correlations between alliances and conflict**, but also **sort out various causal mechanisms** that connect different causal factors with war. Carefully disentangling the factors that could lead to entrapment matters not only for theory and methodology but also for policy. If entrapment concerns are real, then defense planners must have a clear idea as to where they come from. Some entrapment risks can be attenuated with active policy measures. Conditioning a political or military commitment when dealing with a risk-acceptant ally is one example. But doing so might not matter if we have reason to think that systemic forces make that ally more aggressive. Strong commitments could even make seemingly jumpy allies more secure. And so, armed with a better understanding of what drives entrapment risks, defense planners would be more confident in modulating political and military commitments appropriately. As such, critics of NATO expansion and American foreign policy may be overstating their case. NATO might bear some indirect responsibility for the Russo-Georgian War, but its culpability lessens when we consider the other factors that increased the likelihood of war: misperceptions, overconfidence, and the commitment problems underlying the territorial disputes themselves. If anything, the key policy challenge is for NATO to determine whether prospective partners like Saakashvili have psychological traits or cognitive biases that would make them unjustifiably optimistic about the level of support that they would receive.

**Entrapment False—AT: Reputational risk theory**

**Reputation alone is insufficient to trigger entrapment**

Alexander **Lanoszka 17** — (Alexander Lanoszka; Assistant Professor at the University of Waterloo, Published: 12-18-2017; "Tangled up in rose? Theories of alliance entrapment and the 2008 Russo-Georgian War"; Taylor & Francis; Accessed: 7-4-2022; https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/13523260.2017.1392102)//Pen-SY

Scholars are divided about whether fighting for reputation is a rational motive for states and thus whether it creates perverse incentives for allies. Some claim that states calculate the credibility of an ally or an adversary on the basis of its willingness and ability to fulfill a threat or promise. **Credibility** thus **does not depend on** having a record of keeping **pledges** (Press, 2005). Accordingly, states cannot develop reputations for reliability among their own allies (Mercer, 1996; Tang, 2005). **Fighting for reputation is irrational**. However, some dispute the proposition that actions do not matter for building credibility since actions provide information as to the interests and resolve of a state. Moreover, a record of standing up to adversaries could generate credibility, which in turn helps develop a bargaining advantage (Weisiger & Yarhi-Milo, 2015). Whichever is the case, **recent scholarship** has cast doubt as to whether reputational concerns worsen entrapment risks. The **Vietnam War** is an oft-cited example of the entrapment of strong states by friendly states, but the evidence shows that American **allies wished** to **restrain the** **U**nited **S**tates because they feared that questionable wars of choice would divert resources away from them (Beckley, 2015, pp. 33–38, pp. 46–47). Another weakness of the reputational explanation for entrapment is its **deceptively simple counterfactual**. Simply stated, the counterfactual is that the defender does not care about its reputation. Yet the implications of this counterfactual are unclear. For example, does the defender not help the ally at all? And if it does assist the ally, is it doing so only because of reputational concerns? By offering an alliance commitment in the first place, the defender reveals that it has some common security interests with that ally (Walt, 1987; Yarhi-Milo, Lanoszka, & Cooper, 2016). A defender **unconcerned with its reputation** might still help that ally for various national security reasons, as its decision-makers understand them. Alternatively, a defender might even **enhance its reputation by not assisting** the ally in a militarized conflict that the very ally instigated. The defender could decide that **following the reckless ally** into an undesirable war will **undermine its ability to protect other**, less problematic allies. The defender could even limit the damage to its reputation by **deflecting blame** onto a misbehaving ally. These observations suggest that the ally might not necessarily want to wager that the defender would fight on its behalf simply because of reputational concerns. And so an ally that is willing to make this wager is the sort of state that might already be pre-disposed to risk-acceptant behavior. If war does break out because the ally made that gamble, then the war should not be attributed to the alliance per se but rather to the ally and its innate risk propensity.

**Entrapment False—AT: Cred Theory**

**Cred theory is fake – allies prefer peaceful policy and minimal intervention**

Iain D. **Henry 20**, (Lecturer at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Spring 2020, “What Allies Want: Reconsidering Loyalty, Reliability, and Alliance Interdependence,” International Security, Vol. 44, No. 4)//EZAY

The events of the First Taiwan Strait Crisis illustrate the need to delineate between innate loyalty and **observed reliability**. Reliability is a broader and more useful concept that subsumes the idea of loyalty and reduces its unwarranted prominence. U.S. conduct was not judged against an objective standard of loyalty: allies desiring a confrontational posture, such as South Korea and the Philippines, invoked Quemoy and Matsu as symbols that required defending, and encouraged U.S. loyalty to the ROC. **Most allies**, however, were more concerned about the possibility of war, and so **discouraged a U.S. defense** of strategically unimportant territory. These allies did not mind that this would involve U.S. disloyalty to the ROC, but instead cared about whether Washington's policy goals were convergent with their own.

In this case study, several allies **cooperated to restrain** the United States and mitigate the risk of entrapment, while weaker allies fearing abandonment had little option but to complain about U.S. timidity. In other circumstances, however, allies fearing abandonment could respond differently. For example, in May 1950 Japan dispatched a secret delegation to Washington. Citing the concern prompted by the 1949 withdrawal of United States forces from the Korean Peninsula, and vacillating U.S. policy toward Nationalist China, Japan expressed its desire for U.S. forces to stay in Japan, even once the postwar occupation ended.[123](javascript:;) Similar fears of abandonment were sparked in the 1970s, when President Jimmy Carter planned troop reductions in South Korea. In response, Tokyo initiated a new period of military and economic cooperation with Seoul. As Victor Cha writes, “The most single decisive factor in this upswing in security contacts was anxiety over the Carter plan.”[124](javascript:;)

As explained, Mercer's argument about reputation is **contingent upon what constitutes** **desired and undesired behavior**. If states do not always desire allied loyalty, then this leaves open the possibility of interdependence being governed by assessments of interests and capability, but raises the question of when such interdependence might be observed. This article deployed a within-case study approach, but interdependence was also operative across iterative crises: allies were unsurprised by the United States’ initial response to the First Taiwan Strait Crisis, because they had just observed a similarly belligerent approach toward the PRC during discussions on Indochina. Although the United States ultimately **backed down on Indochina** in 1954, this **did not lead** its **allies to expect** a similar back down over the Taiwan Strait. This logic supports the argument made by Alex Weisiger and Keren Yarhi-Milo: by focusing on iterative security crises, previous research may have overlooked the possibility that during such events, “information gleaned from past actions … will have already been folded into the general assessment of interests.”[125](javascript:;) Studying prolonged security crises, where assessments of interests are regularly updated in response to new information, may provide fresh insight into not only how states assess allied reliability, but when and why these assessments change.

Although this article focuses on alliances, my findings raise new questions about the possible interdependence of threats. One **assumption contested** in this article—that allies always want to see their ally demonstrate **innate loyalty**—has an equivalent in deterrence theory. It is assumed that states always want their adversary to back down, but are there circumstances in which an adversary's decision to fight is welcomed?[126](javascript:;) A state may desire this if it saps public support, provides geography unfavorable to the adversary, or ties down an adversary's military force in an unimportant theater. China may not object to a display of U.S. resolve in the Middle East or Europe if it believes that this decreases the United States’ focus on Asia. This counterintuitive possibility requires further consideration and, if supported, would be further evidence to suggest that states assess national interests, rather than national character.

The policy implications of the alliance reliability concept are significant, especially given President Donald Trump's mercurial approach to alliance management. How should U.S. policymakers approach the possibility of alliance interdependence? First, they should realize that the national character of the United States is not on trial: allies will be looking for evidence of **reliability, not loyalty**. The idea of reliability is especially pertinent to current discussions about a U.S. withdrawal from the Middle East: allies may not invariably despair at withdrawal if it enables the United States to **focus on other issues** of greater allied concern. Second, U.S. policymakers should consider how specific actions might influence each ally, as different allies are likely to react in different ways. Officials will not need a crystal ball: this First Taiwan Strait Crisis case study suggests that allies will not hesitate to express their fears. **Nor will allies rush for the door** at the first **sign of unreliability**: in this case, their first **instinct was to bargain** with U.S. leaders and convince them that disloyalty to the ROC was actually in the best interests of the United States. The reliability concept shows that state interests are not totally exogenous to their alliance relationships: alliance unity can require hard bargaining over how states order their interests.[127](javascript:;) This bargaining is made more difficult if states in alliance are reluctant to consider situations where their interests diverge, even privately, for fear of upsetting alliance comity. Such discussions may be difficult, and frustrating for the United States if it expects unqualified support, but they provide an opportunity to understand what, in alliance interdependence terms, is at stake in a crisis. Finally, the United States should consider the desirability of likely allied reactions and factor these into decisionmaking. Fighting to preserve allied beliefs about U.S. reliability may be worthwhile if doing so prevents unwanted reactions such as dealignment, bandwagoning, or nuclear proliferation. On the other hand, it may be beneficial for allies to fear unreliability if this will almost certainly cause them to pursue policies—such as increased defense spending—desired by the United States.

Today, several flash points around the globe could create problems of alliance interdependence. The closest parallel to the events of 1954–55 is found in the Sino-Japanese dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, which are covered by the U.S.-Japan alliance. Another similar case is the recent reaffirmation, by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, that the U.S.-Philippines alliance covers Filipino military assets in the South China Sea.[128](javascript:;) The instinct of many in the United States will be to regard any Chinese challenge in these areas as a test of national character. Instead, policymakers should consider their options and the likely allied reactions. Given the escalation risks present within the U.S.-China relationship, will other allies want to risk conflict—perhaps even nuclear war—over uninhabited territory of debatable strategic importance or the sinking of a single naval vessel?[129](javascript:;) Of course, arguments advocating disloyalty would have to be weighed against the likely effects in Japan, or the Philippines. Would Japan abrogate the alliance, conciliate China, or perhaps develop its own nuclear weapons? Or could it be reassured, thus avoiding undesired consequences? Would the Philippines react by bandwagoning with China? These questions will be even harder to answer during a security crisis, but neither deterrence theory nor reputation-skeptic perspectives would prompt decisionmakers to ask them. The concept of reliability and its effect on alliance interdependence do not solve such dilemmas, but they help to raise the right questions and more accurately identify the actual stakes involved.

**No NATO Entrapment**

**NATO entrapment’s wrong—no automatic involvement**

**Alley 20** (Joshua Keegan Alley-PhD. “Alliance Participation And Military Spending” , Dissertation, Texas A&M University Political Science, 2020 , [accessed](https://oaktrust-library-tamu-edu.www2.lib.ku.edu/bitstream/handle/1969.1/189551/ALLEY-DISSERTATION-2020.pdf?sequence=1) online via KU libraries , date accessed 2/24/21)

\*italics in original

After the end of World War II, the US sought a way to protect Europe from the USSR. Despite acute security concerns, **fear of entrapment** in unwanted conflicts led to limits on military support. First, as Poast (2019*a*) details, NATO members disagreed over how to define the North Atlantic area, which was a key condition on military support. The US and other states argued about whether France’s Algerian colony and Italy should be protected by the alliance. Second, active military support from NATO members depends on domestic political processes.18 Isolationists in the US Senate feared that an alliance would force America to intervene automatically if partners were attacked, bypassing the power of Congress to declare war and engaging the US in unwanted conflicts (Acheson, 1969, pg. 280-1). **Therefore** Article V of the NATO treaty states that if one member is attacked the others “will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, ***such action as it deems necessary*** (emphasis mine).” **Military support was and is not guaranteed**. Secretary of State Dean Acheson stated as much in a March 1949 press release defending NATO to the US public, where he said that Article V “does not mean that the United States would automatically be at war if one of the nations covered by the Pact is subject to armed attack” (Acheson, 1949). This claim and the emphases of the press release shows that promises of military support were highly salient to the US public.

**A5 Flexibility prevents NATO from being forced into conflicts**

Michael **Kofman 16**, Analyst at CNA Corporation and Fellow at the Wilson Center’s Kennan Institute, Former Program Manager at National Defense University, “Fixing NATO Deterrence In The East Or: How I Learned To Stop Worrying And Love Nato’s Crushing Defeat By Russia”, War on the Rocks, 5/12/2016, https://warontherocks.com/2016/05/fixing-nato-deterrence-in-the-east-or-how-i-learned-to-stop-worrying-and-love-natos-crushing-defeat-by-russia/

NATO’s best answer to compellence is strategic flexibility and **ambiguity** of response. While Article V dictates the defense of a member, it **doesn’t** stipulate **what** that defense must be, **how** it should take shape, or **where** it will be applied. With U.S. forces in place, NATO members can be assured that Article V will be triggered, but what happens next should be left a question mark. The more NATO emphasizes the Russian threat and argues for fixed forces in place, the less capably it can defend a challenge to its credibility as an alliance. Anyone can count the order of battle and the balance of forces. By introducing **ambiguity** in its potential response once Article V has been declared, NATO **reduces the chance** it can **easily be manipulated** into a credibility test. The objective should be shrouding a Baltic high-end fight in incalculable risk for Russia while maintaining uncertainty and strategic flexibility with air and naval assets.

**Entrapment is wrong and adaption solves.**

**Cohen** **and Monie** **19** [Jordan Cohen is a Political science Ph.D. student at George Mason University and Connor Monie is a Master's candidate in international security at George Mason University. "The True Value of a NATO Membership" The National Interest, 25 November 2019, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/true-value-nato-membership-99817.]

The second part of the counterargument deals with entanglement and entrapment. The idea that U.S. presence in an alliance with an extensive security commitment and an ever-increasing number of European countries and can entangle it in a conflict with Russia is persistent and not entirely incorrect.

On one hand, the academic literature suggests entrapment is **far less common** than perceived. Separate research by Tongfi **Kim**, Michael **Beckley**, and Alexander **Lanoszka** all finds that entrapment is an unlikely scenario in international politics. In fact, the work by Beckley finds that the United States has been able to **avoid entanglement** by using a large alliance portfolio to balance counteracting commitments.

**Even if** one is still concerned with the risks of entrapment, this is a major reason why NATO should adopt a strategy less focused on deterring Russia. As we noted previously, by constantly focusing on defense spending and balancing, NATO has threatened Russia. Thus, our argument actually suggests entanglement will be less likely if NATO begins to focus more on cooperative and humanitarian actions within the alliance.

By the mere fact of its continued existence, NATO has displayed a **penchant for adaptation** to new circumstances. To continue surviving, though, it needs to adapt once again. The focus on balancing against Russia made sense during the Cold War but has made Europe less secure while also decreasing the popularity of the alliance.

By shifting its focus to the promotion of shared values and broader international political cooperation, NATO can prove Macron incorrect, and revitalize its existence in a new era.

**Consensus requirements prevent entrapment**

Ariel **Shapiro 17**, Master of Arts Candidate at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton University, Worked at Parliament and as a Policy Analyst at the Federal Government, and Holds a Bachelor’s Degree in Political Science from McGill University, “NATO If Necessary, But Not Necessarily NATO: Critically Evaluating Canada’s Membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization”, Canadian Global Affairs Institute, October 2017, https://www.cgai.ca/nato\_if\_necessary\_but\_not\_necessarily\_nato

A final risk of continued NATO membership that Canada must consider is the possibility of being dragged **in**to conflict. While the ADM (Policy) at DND claims that NATO increases global stability by preventing the formation of smaller alliance blocs, this logic must be re-evaluated in the post-Cold War era. We can turn to the international relations theory of alliances in multipolarity, as explained by Kenneth Waltz (and later, Jack Snyder and Thomas Christensen). One of the biggest dangers of a military alliance is **“chain-ganging”**50: that one ally will recklessly drag the others into war, as was the case between Austria-Hungary and Germany in 1914. It is true that the NATO alliance has a **mechanism** to **stop this**: Article 5 can **only** be invoked by **consensus**, which **prevents** the shooting down of a Turkish jet by Russia from immediately turning into global war. However, alliance theory argues that it isn’t about automatic triggers, but survival interests. As Waltz explained, in 1914, “If France marched, Russia had to follow; a German victory over France would be a defeat for Russia.”51 Similarly, if Russia today conventionally invaded a Baltic state and NATO ally, it is difficult to imagine that the alliance would not respond: not for the first time in its history, Canada would be dragged into a faraway, conventional European war. However, Canada can support countries around the world and advocate for their continued survival and independence without being bound to defend them. Canada’s relationship with Israel is a good example. Canada has supported this precariously situated democratic country since its creation in 1948, has engaged in numerous high-level visits and economic agreements with this state, and has frequently (especially since 2006) taken a stand against condemnation of Israel at the United Nations at significant cost to its own reputation. However, there is no defence agreement: should war erupt again between Israel and its neighbours, Canada would not come to Israel’s aid by sending soldiers. A different example is Canada’s relationship with Kuwait. While there is no long-standing mutual relationship of defence and support between the two, it was in the interest of global security to stop Saddam Hussein’s invasion of that country in 1990/1991. Canada answered the call then, but was not bound to support a future mission against Iraq in 2003.

**No NATO Entrapment—AT: Article V**

**Wars of aggression are unpopular – allies won’t follow and credibility isn’t sacrificed**

Constantine **Atlamazoglou**, 9-23-20**21**, (master's degree in security studies and European affairs from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. "NATO is still living with the consequences of a historic decision it made hours after 9/11," Business Insider, https://www.businessinsider.com/nato-still-living-with-consequences-article-5-invocation-after-911-2021-9)//EZAY

The day after the September 11 attacks, most **NATO countries called for** the invocation of **Article 5**. This did not immediately happen since the origin of the attacks had yet to be determined to the satisfaction of some members.

It **took until October** 2, 2001 — when then-NATO Secretary General Lord George Robertson announced that the attacks had indeed been directed from abroad — for Article 5 to be invoked.

This was a watershed moment for the alliance. **Failure to invoke** Article 5 would have rendered NATO obsolete. Instead, the alliance, which had struggled to find its raison d'être following the collapse of the Soviet Union, was propelled into Afghanistan and the fight against terrorism.

A number of NATO allies were involved in the war from the very beginning.

The UK participated in the first airstrikes against Taliban and Al Qaeda targets. German and British special-operations units took part in the Battle of Tora Bora. A number of NATO countries contributed personnel, aircraft, and logistical support during 2002's Operation Anaconda, the successful mission to rout out Al Qaeda from Afghanistan's Shahi Kot valley.

After dismantling the Taliban and Al Qaeda networks in Afghanistan, NATO's role there only grew.

In 2003, at the request of the UN and the Afghan government, NATO took charge of the International Security Assistance Force. This was a landmark moment for the alliance.

ISAF would be NATO's first deployment outside of Europe and North America. All NATO members would contribute personnel to ISAF — some contributed more per capita than the US.

Eventually, the ISAF mandate would expand from securing Kabul to the whole country. This nominally transferred control of the war to NATO.

The war exposes NATO's weaknesses

Assuming control of such a high-stakes mission provided significant operational and organizational experience to NATO. However, as the war's toll increased, weaknesses within the alliance were exposed.

Participation in the war in Afghanistan had been a **contentious issue** in many European countries from the beginning.

In some, like Spain, **parliamentary approval** had **not been obtained** to dispatch troops to Afghanistan. In others, like Germany and Italy, the deployed troops were limited by legal constraints, which in some cases prevented them from actually fighting the Taliban.

Most NATO members had not fought a war in decades, so even limited combat casualties caused **significant backlash** at home. The 2004 Madrid train bombings and the 2005 London bombings — which brought Islamist terror to Europe in two of the continent's worst attacks in decades — further increased the war's unpopularity.

As a result, many NATO members only contributed a **few support troops** and tried to sidle away from combat operations and troubled areas. France even withdrew its combat forces in 2012. The **lack of specificity** in Article 5 meant members could abide by their NATO commitment **without totally participating** in the war effort.

In 2015, ISAF became the Resolute Support Mission. A non-combat mission, RSM significantly scaled down the number of NATO troops in Afghanistan as it focused on supporting and advising Afghan security forces..

The alliance emerges from Afghanistan with a mixed record.

On the one hand, it undertook its largest mission ever and the first outside its normal area of operations, learning valuable lessons about organization and interoperability that will be useful for future deployments.

On the other hand, the **intractable problem** at the alliance's core was exposed: the near-impossibility of getting all **30 members** to agree on and commit to military and political priorities.

To apply those lessons and stay relevant, the alliance will need to ensure that alignment.

As NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg [wrote](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_186490.htm) on the 20th anniversary of the September 11 attacks, "Afghanistan will not be the last crisis for which North America and Europe need to act together through NATO."

**Alliances aren’t honored mindlessly**

– Quantitative analysis of every single alliance invocation

**Berkemeier**, M., & Fuhrmann, M. (20**18**). [Ph.D. Political Science, Texas A&M University M.A. Non-Proliferation & International Security B.A. Political Science, University of Chicago, 2012 “Reassessing the fulfillment of alliance commitments in war.” Research & Politics, 5(2), 205316801877969. doi:10.1177/2053168018779697]//EZAY

Table 1 lists the opportunities to fulfill alliance commitments from 1945 to 2003. This information offers some possible explanations for the sharp decrease in promise fulfillment after World War II. One thing that stands out is that offense pacts and neutrality agreements, which are honored at higher rates than defense pacts and nonaggression pacts, are less common in the modern era. Only 20% of alliance performance opportunities from 1945 to 2003 included offensive or neutrality-based commitments, compared with more than 70% from 1816 to 1944. Changes in the types of alliance commitments that are invoked in war over time might partially account for the puzzling trend that we identify. Yet we still see sizable variation in compliance within the same commitment type in the two eras. **Defense pacts**, for instance, were **honored** 61.02% of the time from 1816 to 1944 and only **13.95% of the time post-World War II.** What else, then, could explain the changing patterns over time?

The invention of nuclear weapons offers one potential answer. In the post-World War II era, the world’s most powerful states possessed nuclear arsenals. Given the destructive power of these weapons, alliance commitments from nuclear powers – especially defense pacts – have **rarely been challenged** in war (Fuhrmann and Sechser, 2014). As a result, major powers appear just a few times in Table 1 and relatively weak states account for a sizable percentage of all “alliance performance opportunities” from 1945 to 2003. This is relevant because state power may affect alliance treaty fulfillment. Countries should be most likely to intervene in war when their participation might change the outcome (Morrow, 1994; Smith, 1995). Relatively weak states, according to this line of thinking, are less likely to fulfill their alliance promises because they lack the material capacity to sway a conflict’s outcome.7 Israel probably would have prevailed in the Six Day War, for instance, even if Saudi Arabia had joined its allies in the fight. From Riyadh’s perspective, this may have made it easier to largely remain on the sidelines. This is, however, merely a preliminary conjecture. Conclusion This study presented an updated assessment of the reliability of military alliances. Our analysis, which extended earlier work to include the post-World War II era and utilized updated war data, yields three main conclusions. First, the overall rate of **alliance fulfillment** in war is **lower** than previously reported. Second, defense pacts and nonaggression pacts are honored much less frequently than neutrality agreements and offensive alliances. Third, there is a large **disparity in** the **rate of alliance fulfillment** before and after World War II. This offers a lesson for researchers that extends beyond the realm of alliance politics: trends that apply in one period may not extend to other eras. It is important to consider whether relationships of interest vary over time – particularly when there are structural shocks, like World War II. What implications does the lower compliance rate carry for our understanding of alliance treaty reliability? Our analysis does not imply that military alliances are ineffective, **nor does it challenge** the evidence that defense pacts promote peace through **extended deterrence** (Leeds, 2003b; Johnson and Leeds, 2011; Fuhrmann and Sechser, 2014). The most effective threat is one that never has to be implemented (Schelling, 1966). NATO does not appear in our dataset, for example, precisely because potential adversaries perceive it as effective. However, when alliance commitments are invoked in war, **allies uphold** their promises **less often** than the conventional wisdom suggests. This implies that leaders are **less restrained** by treaty commitments than prior research would expect, a conclusion that carries implications for our understanding of international institutions (for a review of relevant literature, see Simmons, 2010). Our analysis opens up avenues for future research. Scholars could use our updated dataset to revisit enduring debates about alliance politics, such as whether democracies make more (or less) reliable allies (c.f., Gartzke and Gleditsch, 2004; Leeds, 2003a). The disparity in compliance rates over time also represents a puzzle worthy of examination in scholarship. Something may have changed after 1944 that fundamentally altered the nature of alliance politics. We have speculated about the sources of this variation, but further analysis is necessary in order to achieve more definitive answers. The disparity in compliance across commitment types is worthy of further investigation in scholarship as well. Dedicated studies on why offense pacts are so much more reliable than defense pacts would be especially welcome. More generally, future research might consider the implications of our findings for extended deterrence, war-fighting, and the efficacy of international institutions.

**Article 5 itself doesn’t assure allies and if it’s invoked no impact**

Joshua **Alley** 20**20**[Postdoctoral Research Associate (Politics) UVirginia Ph.D. Political Science (Department of Political Science) Texas AM B.A. International Affairs/Political Science Gettysburg college) Alliance Participation and Military Spending. Doctoral dissertation, Texas A&M University. Available electronically from <https://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/189551>.] pg.76-78//EZAY

I focus this brief case study on NATO treaty design for two reasons. First, information from NATO applies to multiple alliances, as other US treaties have similar designs. Most US alliances have **conditional promises** of military support and understanding why is important. Second, NATO is also the most important alliance in international politics, so understanding how the treaty formed is worthwhile. After the end of World War II, the US sought a way to protect Europe from the USSR. Despite acute security concerns, fear of entrapment in unwanted conflicts led to **limits on military support**. First, as Poast (2019a) details, NATO members disagreed over how to define the North Atlantic area, which was a key condition on military support. The US and other states argued about whether France’s Algerian colony and Italy should be protected by the alliance. Second, active military support from NATO members depends on domestic political processes.18 Isolationists in the US Senate feared that an alliance would force America to intervene automatically if partners were attacked, bypassing the power of Congress to declare war and engaging the US in unwanted conflicts (Acheson, 1969, pg. 280-1). Therefore Article V of the NATO treaty states that if one member is attacked the others “will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary (emphasis mine).” Military support was and is **not guaranteed**. Secretary of State Dean Acheson stated as much in a March 1949 press release defending NATO to the US public, where he said that Article V “does not mean that the United States would automatically be at war if one of the nations covered by the Pact is subject to armed attack” (Acheson, 1949). This claim and the emphases of the press release shows that promises of military support were highly salient to the US public. Military support from Article V did not assuage European fears that if the Soviets invaded, the United States would not fight. To increase the credibility of NATO, the United States took **other measures**. A 1951 presentation by Dean Acheson to Dwight Eisenhower argued European allies “fear the inconstancy of United States purpose in Europe. ... These European fears and apprehensions can only be overcome if we move forward with determination and if we make the necessary full and **active contribution** in terms of both **military forces** and **economic aid**” (Acheson, 1951, pg. 3). The first part of reassurance was the creation of the Atlantic Council, which is an international organization and the main source of depth in the NATO treaty itself. The United States used the Atlantic Council to coordinate collective defense and increase the perceived reliability of the alliance. By investing in the Atlantic Council and related **joint military planning**, the US addressed European fears of abandonment. For example, US officials thought that the British Foreign Minister viewed US provision of a supreme commander in Europe as “a stimulus to European action” in NATO (Acheson, 1950). Many Senators also opposed military aid to Europe (Acheson, 1969, pg 285), which limited efforts to add further treaty depth. These legislative constraints on the executive branch reduced the formal depth of NATO relative to what many ambassadors preferred (Acheson, 1969, pg 277). **Bilateral agreements** on **troop deployments** then became **another instrument** of reassurance. In 1950 the Germans formally requested **clarification on** whether an **attack on US forces in Germany** would be treated as an armed attack on the US- which the US said it would (Acheson, 1969, pg. 395). These **bilateral arrangements** and **basing rights** are not covered in the NATO treaty, but they **added substantial depth**.19 NATO negotiations reveal the tendency of democracies to use treaty depth **to reassure their allies**, rather than unconditional military support. Fear of foreign entanglement led the United States to offer conditional military support, but did not inhibit deep military cooperation, which helped reassure European allies. Limits on the promises of military support were an important public justification for the NATO treaty, while the Atlantic Council was less discussed. Still, the power of treaty ratification in the Senate limited formal NATO depth to the Atlantic Council. The Atlantic Council and associated bureaucratic machinery are the formal core of substantial defense cooperation. Altogether though Article V is limited, the US used treaty depth to increase the credibility of NATO.

**No Turkey Entrapment**

**No turkey entrapment**

– Interdependence and assurance adjusting checks

-Turkey is a test case for resiliency and restraint

-have too much to lose to do adventurism

**Gulmez 20** (Didem Buhari Gulmez, an Associate Professor in International Relations at Izmir Katip Celebi University. She worked as a post-doctoral researcher at London School of Economics and Political Science and Oxford Brookes University from 2013 to 2015; “The resilience of the US–Turkey alliance: divergent threat perceptions and worldviews”; Sasakawa Peace Foundation; 2020; https://www.spf.org/en/jpus/spf-woldviews-on-the-united-states/woldviews-on-the-united-states007.html )//EZAY

Why does the US–Turkey alliance persist despite the low credibility of the US security guarantees after the Cold War? Both the rise of contestations against the US hegemony and the establishment of a single-party government by the AKP in Turkey led to significant divergences in threat perceptions and worldviews within the US-Turkey alliance. Given its regional leadership aspirations based on strategic autonomy, Turkey can be seen as a critical or ‘the least likely case’ (Eckstein, 1975) for the resilience of the US alliances. If the alliance proves resilient in this **most difficult case**, it is more likely to **persist in other cases too.**

Several factors such as the high credibility of the alliance and a shared sense of belonging in a security community between the allies explain why an alliance persists (Walt, 1997). Turkey maintains the US alliance **in spite** of the low credibility of the US security guarantees, the perceived leadership failure of the US in the Middle East and the divergence of **threat perceptions and worldviews** between Turkey and the US. As Turkey’s US alliance reflects a combination of transactional and ontological motivations since its eruption, both transactional and ‘order-centric’ arguments contribute to the resilience of the alliance.

According to the transactional view, the US alliance has **served as a ‘hedge’** against alternative regional orders led by **Russia or Iran**. Turkey’s security dependence on the US and the costs of abrogating the alliance **prevail over** the AKP’s search for greater autonomy and a better status in the East. Turkey’s **energy dependence** on Russia and Iran curtails the AKP’s regional leadership aspirations. Furthermore, Turkey is **uncertain** about whether Russia would treat Turkey as an equal if it abrogates its NATO/US alliance (Turan, 2018). It failed to play an important role during the Arab uprisings as it found itself ‘punch[ing] above its weight’ and overinvolved in complex regional affairs (Öniş & Kutlay, 2017, pp. 176–177). Also, it lacks both a **coherent vision** of an ideal world order and the political will to assume global responsibilities (Parlar Dal, 2018). Accordingly, Turkey’s ‘double-track’ strategy and its contestations of the US hegemony can be interpreted as merely a warning to the West. Turkey would not have pursued a rapprochement with Russia had the US actively supported Turkey’s autonomy-based strategies, its defence industry and its fight against PKK and Gülen (Erşen & Köstem, 2019).

Alternatively, an ontologically-motivated alliance relies on an ‘order-centric’ nature that transcends the pragmatic motivations of transactional and threat-based alliances. By maintaining the US alliance, lesser powers like Turkey seek to benefit from the constitutive and legitimating effects of the alliance on their agency. Alliance abrogation means higher uncertainty and risk in terms of the emergence of alternative regional and global orders. Hence, Turkey does not abrogate the alliance because the alliance legitimates Turkey’s agency in the current world order as a rising middle power. Rather than preventing it, the US alliance helps Turkey **assert its national role** in world politics as an actor that transcends the East- West divide. For example, Turkey co-sponsors the UN Alliance of Civilisations project with Spain and it has become ‘the only country that co-chairs three distinct Friends of Mediation groups at three major international institutions’, namely, the UN, the OIC and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (Akçapar, 2019, p. 6). It has recently launched the ‘Asia Anew’ initiative in August 2019, emphasising its role as ‘the westernmost Asian and the easternmost European country’ (Demirci & Cam, 2019). It participates in both the Western-led ‘Geneva process’ and the Russian–Iranian–Turkish trilateral ‘Astana process’ about the Syrian conflict. In this context, Turkey’s alliance with the US is embedded in Turkey’s national role conception as an actor of world politics that is in between the East and the West. Hence, the US alliance’s legitimating ‘order-centric’ effects on Turkey’s multifaceted foreign policy contributes to the resilience of the alliance.

**Turkey won’t invoke Article 5 – low cred and Turkey doesn’t think they say yes**

İbrahim **KARATAŞ 20** (10/20/2020, “Analyzing the Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty as an Assurance of Turkey’s Security”, Middle Eastern Studies, 13-2 (2021):155-176//) EZAY

**Article 5** of the NATO agreement that orders collective defense for a member that has incurred an armed attack has always been a matter of debate in Turkey. Turks are suspicious of it if it involves Turkey in a likely war or conflict. This study analyzed whether Turkey and other members can rely on NATO’s assurance of security stemming from Article 5. After examining certain events and surveys measuring public opinion of member states about NATO, it has been concluded that it is **not clear that other members will defend** Turkey or any other member since the article was **invoked only once** in the history of NATO to protect the US against relatively small states and a terrorist group. However, regarding Turkey’s position, the claim that NATO will not protect Turkey cannot be proven since Turkey did not face an existential threat after becoming a NATO member. In addition, deterring the Soviet Union from attacking Turkey by making it a NATO member can be regarded as a benefit of Article 5 without invoking it. On the other hand, Turkey’s own preferences and compelling reasons in foreign policy made it to be in contention with its NATO allies. However, when NATO members’ attitudes are examined, it can be concluded that they could still have proposed better solutions for Turkey. In addition to the above, as per public opinion surveys, NATO members hint that they may not sacrifice themselves for others unless (1) **they are at War**, (2) **the enemy attacks all**, (3) all attack the enemy, and (4) the US leads. According to surveys, this thesis is valid for Turkey since it favors NATO least and does not seem to join a collective defense of its allies. Yet, NATO’s and some members’ failure or **reluctance to address** Turkey’s security problems has a significant impact on Turkish **people’s views**. Surveys also show that NATO members are not as much in allegiance to the organization as they were in the past, probably due to the non-existence of an imminent threat.

**Turkey can’t entrap NATO---no draw-in, and NATO refuses.**

Michael **Moran 16**, Visiting Media Fellow and author of The Reckoning: Debt, Democracy and the Future of American Power, “Turkey’s Article 5 Argument Finds No Takers,” Carnegie Corporation of New York, 2-24-2016, https://www.carnegie.org/news/articles/turkeys-article-5-argument-finds-no-takers/

The ferocity of the fighting between Syria’s government forces and various proxies vying for control of territory and resources has Turkey on edge and has already led to several deadly clashes involving the only NATO member state bordering the civil war.

With Turkey, Russia, Iran, Iraq, and Gulf states pursuing their own, often conflicting aims in Syria, all against the backdrop of a U.S.-led air and commando campaign against the Islamic State (IS), there is renewed concern at NATO’s headquarters in Brussels that Turkey could see the next flare-up as grounds for citing Article 5: in effect, demanding that its NATO allies deploy forces and come to its collective defense.

Turkey has already invoked the lesser-known Article 4—a demand for an emergency consultation of the alliance—following the downing of a Turkish warplane under disputed circumstances last spring. Incidents like this and the threat that Bashar Assad’s forces might launch Scud missiles into Turkey led NATO members—the United States, Germany, and Spain—to deploy Patriot anti-aircraft missiles along the border in early 2013, though the German and American batteries have since been withdrawn. Spain’s—a less capable version of the Patriot—is geared towards anti-aircraft, as opposed to anti-ballistic missile defense, and therefore deemed more appropriate

But could a **new** incident—a missile strike, an IS incursion, or Syrian artillery bombardment across the border—bring the **full might of NATO into the war?** Many are **skeptical**, and for **good reason**.

The **history of invocations of** NATO’s **Article 5** is **short** and somewhat **underwhelming**. In the **68 years** of the North Atlantic alliance’s history, plenty of **low-intensity** conflicts involving NATO nations have raged, from rebellion in France’s Algerian departments, to the U.S. war in Vietnam, through the Balkan wars of the 1990s. Yet **only once** has **Article 5’s** “all-for-one, one-for-all” **facility been invoked**: that was **September** 12, **2001**, the day after the al-Qaida attacks on the United States.

Even **then**, its effect was primarily **symbolic**. While the United States expressed its deep appreciation at the time, NATO involvement in Afghanistan would be minimal for years to come, though British, French, and a handful of other elite forces arrived as early as November that year. In practice, though, it was not until late 2003, when NATO assumed command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), that alliance troops arrived in force, and even then often under restrictive rules of engagement that limited their effectiveness.

Indeed, ISAF, the force NATO led from August 2003 to December 2013, was a UN-sanctioned operation that included not only forces from NATO’s 28 militaries but troops and specialists from 48 states, including such disparate contributors as Mongolia, Tonga, and Singapore. At its height in 2010–11, ISAF numbered more than 42,000 troops, augmenting 100,000 U.S. troops.

Turkey would **sorely like** a commitment of that scale. Yet the subtle **diplomatic realities** of the North Atlantic alliance—as well as the very unsubtle nature of its own activity inside Syria—make this **highly unlikely**.

For one thing, Turkey’s **own military** has acted aggressively in targeting Syria’s Kurdish rebels, the People’s Protection Units, or YPG, which Ankara views as little more than a proxy for the outlawed separatist guerrillas of the Turkish Kurds, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK. Last week, the Turks opened up on the Kurdish-held air base at **Aleppo**, in spite of the fact that the city is **surrounded** by forces loyal to **Assad**, the presumed enemy in Syria. The act **enraged** almost **everyone**. Russia demanded at an emergency Security Council meeting a censure of Turkey’s violation of Syrian sovereignty, and President Obama, who regards the Kurdish as the most reliable ground force in the fight against the IS, urged Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in an 80-minute phone call on February 19 to avoid provocative actions.

While NATO has taken no **official** position on the question of Article 5—**not surprising**, since **no** formal **request** has been made—through **back channels** the alliance has been **telegraphing** a **resounding “no” to Turkey** for weeks. Last week, Luxembourg’s Foreign Minister Jean Asselborn told Germany’s DerSpiegel that “NATO **cannot** allow itself to be pulled into a military escalation with Russia as a result of the recent tensions between Russia and Turkey.”

Whatever the fate of the current U.S.-push to secure a cease fire, a **large NATO ground force**, of the kind that deployed to Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan, is **not** on the table.

**No Norway Entrapment**

**Norway isn’t interested in conflict, but US support causes deterrence—solves wider scale conflicts**

Frank **Bakke-Jensen**, 1-11-20**21**,(writing when he was the **Norwegian minister of defense**; "Norway’s defense minister: We must ensure strategic stability in the High North," Defense News, https://www.defensenews.com/outlook/2021/01/11/norways-defense-minister-we-must-ensure-strategic-stability-in-the-high-north//EZAY

The United States and Norway have a strong and longstanding **bilateral relationship** based on **mutual interests** and common values. The trans-Atlantic link remains the cornerstone of Norwegian security, and our two countries cooperate closely on almost every aspect of military operations. Looking ahead, the two key dimensions for Norwegian security policy are the Arctic and Russia.

**Strategic environment in the High North**

Since Russia began its military reform effort in 2008, it has built layered, integrated and scalable defenses. Russia’s armed forces have become an increasingly useful political instrument for the Kremlin across the entire conflict spectrum, from peace to crisis and war.

The annexation of Crimea in 2014 added a more threatening undertone to the development. In recent years, Norway has experienced **Russian simulated air attacks** on Norwegian targets and **jamming of GPS signals** that threaten the **security of civilian aviation**. Last fall, Russia conducted a sophisticated cyberattack on the Norwegian parliament, a serious incident that affected our country’s most important democratic institution.

The Russian so-called active defense **emphasizes high readiness**, agility, mobility and close coordination, as well as the ability to launch massive firepower. Russian prioritization of the Arctic has resulted in a **large-scale modernization** of the armed forces and infrastructure reestablishment in the Russian north. The key task of the Russian capabilities on the Kola Peninsula is global deterrence, making horizontal escalation a lasting concern for Norway. There is **no indication** that **Russia will slow down its engagement in the Arctic** — rather, the opposite.

China’s ambitions and increased involvement in great power competition introduces new challenges. China’s interest in the Arctic is growing, especially in light of its Belt and Road Initiative. Beijing has a broad range of means available, as it invests in research, ports and infrastructure in the region. Although China currently does not pose a military threat in the Arctic, Norway closely monitors China’s engagement in the north and its growing cooperation with Russia.

**Key priority**

Norway’s key priority is to [maintain the Arctic as an area characterized by cooperation and predictability](https://www.defensenews.com/smr/nato-air-power/2020/08/06/bring-allied-attention-to-air-power-in-the-arctic/). The newly published whitepaper on the Arctic emphasizes its strategic importance for Norway, and our new long-term plan for defense outlines significant investments in relevant military capabilities.

Furthermore, Norway welcomes the increased presence of key NATO allies in the High North. In recent years, the Pentagon has published Arctic strategies illustrating that the U.S. views the High North as an area that requires attention in order to preserve strategic stability and a rules-based international order. Along with the U.S. Navy, Marines and special forces, the Air and Space Forces are now developing strategic cooperation with likeminded nations in the region. This includes increasingly regular allied naval and air presence in the High North. Norway aims to participate in these activities when they take place in the waters off the Norwegian coast, in order to enhance allied interoperability. We consider these activities as a sign of alliance solidarity and cohesion.

[**Norway’s allies share their views on the country’s new defense plan**](https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/04/16/allies-share-views-on-enhancing-defense-of-norway-and-the-high-north/)

Norway's allies recognize the country as punching above its weight and playing a critical role in the defense of the North Atlantic and High North. But there is no time for complacency.

NATO also emphasizes the **strategic importance** of the Arctic. Exercise Trident Juncture, hosted by Norway in 2018, proves that the alliance is able to conduct large-scale exercises in harsh weather conditions with an Article 5 scenario. As part of a more persistent allied presence, we look forward to hosting the biannual exercise Cold Response in 2022. This exercise will also test allied ability to protect NATO interests in the Arctic. This is deterrence in action.

**Deterrence and reassurance**

The balance between **deterrence and reassurance** is our main approach to **achieve our security goals** for the High North. At the same time, we continue to be prudent and avoid unnecessary provocation.

We remain Russia’s neighbor, and we **continue to cooperate with Russia** on issues such as search and rescue, border patrol, and coast guard operations to control fisheries. To preserve stability, we uphold dialogue while at the same time remain firmly committed to our values and a rules-based international order.

I would like to commend the U.S. for the **continued leadership** in defense and commitment to European security. Norway and the U.S. cooperate closely on maritime surveillance and intelligence in the High North. We also have **close cooperation** on integrating fifth-generation capabilities into the force structure, and our special forces work shoulder to shoulder around the globe. As maritime nations, the U.S. and Norway cooperate on naval matters around the world. In 2023, we plan to launch two satellites into orbit in a bilateral effort to establish broadband satellite communications in the Arctic.

Under shifting administrations, the U.S. has built lasting relationships with allies and partners all over the world, including in the north. We look forward to continuing the close cooperation with the U.S. and NATO allies to protect our common values and interests.

**Norway is stable, covered by article 5, and cooperative with Russia**

**Koivurova 16**, is Research Professor and Director of the Arctic Centre at the University of Lapland. (Tim, 11-18-2016, “Analysis: The Arctic conflict - truth, fantasy or a little bit of both?” High North News, https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/analysis-arctic-conflict-truth-fantasy-or-little-bit-both)

What do we mean by a conflict? Since Arctic countries have so much **practical cooperation,** it is important to ask what sort of conflicts could occur in the region. If we are claiming that the general deterioration of relations between Russia and the West is about to lead to some sort of a conflict, it is important to stop and think what kind of a conflict we are talking about. If a conflict means, for example, an unresolved dispute over where a maritime border should lie, this does not shock many experts. Arctic states **have disputed** over their maritime borders bilaterally and sometimes even at the International Court of Justice, but such disputes have been **settled** sooner or later. It took more than 40 years for **Russia and Norway** to resolve a border dispute in the Barents Sea, but even this was settled in 2010. Furthermore, the dispute did not prevent cooperation between the countries. Norway, **a NATO member**, and the Soviet Union used to **jointly manage fish stocks** in the disputed region. In fact, most of the Arctic maritime disputes occur between close allies, like the United States and Canada. Or, does a conflict refer to a single event, which causes diplomatic slanging match? If, for example, the Coast Guard of the US or Norway seizes a Russian fishing vessel or a person subject to sanctions travels to Svalbard, can this be defined as a conflict? It is very rare that **single events** escalate into worse conflicts than a mild war of words, which is quickly lost in the mists of time. A case in point is when a Russian fishing vessel Elektron escaped in 2005 from the Norwegian Coast Guard to the Russian territorial waters, after having been arrested for illegal fishing. While the case lingered for some time, it did not affect general long-term Russian-Norwegian relations in the Arctic. What would it mean, then, if the **geopolitical tension** expanded to the Arctic region? In general, if **Russian tensions** grow with **NATO**, it is important to keep in mind that the Arctic plays a crucial role in Russia’s global military strategy: its Northern Fleet requires access to the Atlantic. We could also claim that since Russia has now increased its military presence in its **Arctic regions**, we have a security dilemma at hand: Could armament in Russian Arctic also lead to increased military investment from the part of its neighbors, and such investments reinforce each other in a vicious circle? Although the Arctic states have sometimes declared they will boost their investments in measures guaranteeing Arctic security, this has not actually occurred. The United States has so far been **unable** to even purchase one new icebreaker for its Arctic areas. Overall, it is important to ask for what purpose Russia is militarily equipping its Arctic areas. Due to the difficult circumstances in the region, militaries are needed in many tasks in the Arctic, ranging from **rescue tasks** to **safeguarding shipping** in the Northern Sea Route. It is also important to monitor whether Russia implements all the planned military investments in its Arctic areas. They are expensive measures in a country whose economy is not doing well. It is also important to consider for what strategic purposes could Russian military act in the Arctic. Russia has demonstrated to have the ability and will to use also military power to achieve its aims in foreign policy. This has been visible for a long time, since Russia’s Georgia operation in 2008, and it has accelerated in 2014 with the annexation of Crimea, war in Eastern Ukraine and military support for the Syrian government. This consideration leads to two questions: "Could Russia gain anything by military occupation in the Arctic and what would it even mean in the Arctic?", and: "What is the difference between Ukraine, Georgia and the Arctic?" To the first question: Could it be possible for Russia to also use military power in forcibly claim the Lomonosov Ridge, if Denmark-Greenland and perhaps Canada, too, want it? We could also ask, what would Russia celebrate as a foreign policy win, if it did conquer the Lomonosov Ridge? It is very likely that Russia receives a large part of the Lomonosov Ridge and its hypothetical hydrocarbon resources just by complying with the UNCLOS rules. Furthermore, most likely they have nothing **economically exploitable** and even if something was found, it would take decades for Russia to even dream of drilling oil in these areas. As regards the second question on differences between Russian actions in the Arctic and Eastern Europe, Russia has used military power against two states, which both were part of the former Soviet Union and which are not NATO members. It is a different matter to carry out attack in the Arctic Ocean against **NATO member states**, which are covered by **alliance security guarantee**. But could Putin’s regime, then, attack the non-NATO members, Finland and Sweden? Although these countries are EU member states and thus enjoy a softer form of security guarantee, the famous fifth article of the North Atlantic Treaty would not push the alliance to defend Finland and Sweden. It is important to ask these types of questions, since they allow us to reflect what Putin’s Russia is **prepared to pursue** with military means in actual terms. There are **no signs** of Russia’s military strategy being completely unpredictable. Russia has enabled the de facto separation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia from Georgia and annexed Crimea. All the regions have had a Russian majority, even though they were part of Georgia and Ukraine. To be sure, safeguarding the Crimean naval base and access to the Black Sea contributed to the decision to annex Crimea. Considering Putin’s military strategy so far, it is difficult to draw any parallels between the Georgian regions and the Crimean Peninsula on one hand and Finland and Sweden on the other. The Arctic region **lacks similar reasons** for any **military confrontation**. If the general tension in the relations , however, leads to military actions between Russia and Western powers elsewhere, however, these confrontations are very likely to expand to the Arctic region. This is for the present, though, an unlikely course of events. A more crucial question is this: When do the relations between the US and Russia freeze to a point where it starts to affect Arctic cooperation, which has so far been **largely shielded** from tensions from outside the region? The recent signs are not promising: The plutonium agreement was suspended by Russia, the United States and Russia are again on opposite sides in Syria, and the situation in Eastern Ukraine continues to be difficult. The situation is constantly changing, and we cannot exclude the possibility that we reach a point where the deterioration of the relations also leads to difficulties in the Arctic cooperation. Did we receive answers to these questions from the election of Donald Trump as the next US President? On one hand, it seems, Trump and Putin seem to pull in the same direction, perhaps leading to less confrontational relations and better Arctic co-operation. However, it is the unpredictability of Donald Trump that makes it very difficult to say anything clear on what his foreign policy agenda will eventually look like. Moreover, the Arctic Council may not be the forum where Trump would like to pursue his policies, given that the climate change is at the core of what the Arctic Council does – a phenomenon that does not seem to exist for the president-elect.

**Norway wants peace and won’t provoke Russia.**

Wrenn Yennie **Lindgren &** Nina **Græger 17**, Research Fellow at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Associate Fellow at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Ph.D. candidate in International Relations at Stockholm University, M.A. in International Policy Studies from the Monterey Institute of International Studies; Research Professor at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Head of the Department of Political Science at the University of Copenhagen, “The Challenges and Dynamics of Alliance Policies: Norway, NATO and the High North,” in “Global Allies: Comparing US Alliances in the 21st Century,” pp. 91-113, June 2017, http://dx.doi.org/10.22459/GA.06.2017.07

Whereas the end of the Cold War implied that ‘for most other states than Russia the region has remained either marginal or peripheral’, the importance of the High North was revitalised in Norway with the Norwegian High North strategy from 2005 onwards.73 The significant Russian military build-up on the Kola Peninsula from the mid-2000s also raised concerns about security among Norwegian politicians, diplomats and militaries. In particular, the Russian reopening of old military bases, the increased level of military exercises and, not least, the increase in overflights of Russian bombers and strategic bombers off the coast of Norway sparked a new round of ‘New Cold War’ rhetoric and media headlines.

Certainly, a more aggressive Russian foreign policy towards Eastern Europe and Ukraine in 2014 in particular has also put the High North, where Russia has ‘geo-political and military-strategic interests’, back at the top of the Norwegian security and defence policy agenda.74 For instance, the main focus of the expert commission was the security challenges that Russia represents in the region, which they describe as ‘an arena for geopolitical struggle’.75 The forward-leaning Russian foreign policy has also gained a lot of attention in Nordic academic environments.76 Even after the Ukraine crisis, however, **Russia has not been considered as a direct threat to Norway**, at least not at present.77 As formulated by the head of Norwegian military intelligence, ‘Russia has not suddenly become a military threat—not in the short term. But, in the long term the picture is more uncertain’.78 Hence the focus on strengthening the military presence in northern Norway in subsequent defence plans and reports.79 Rather than seeing any impending security threats in the region, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affair’s Arctic slogan, ‘high north, low tension’, emphasises the safety aspect of Arctic activity.

All of the peacetime, **cooperative military bilateral and multilateral arrangements in the Arctic are between the nation states** in the region. For instance, the Ilulissat Declaration of 2008, signed by the five Arctic coastal states, established a common framework for maritime sovereignty in the Arctic Ocean. All signatories have agreed that claims and disputes are to be negotiated between the Arctic coastal states to prevent the escalation of political disagreements into security issues. Norway and Russia, who have had overlapping claims in the Barents Sea for decades, finally managed to conclude negotiations and sign an agreement in 2010.

The role of NATO in the region has been brought up from time to time. **NATO is not**, however, **likely to increase its activity in the Arctic in peacetime and** instead **encourages the continuation of the coop**eration **between** all of the **Arctic states**. The defence establishments of the Arctic states promote peacetime confidence-building measures.80 There are regular bilateral and multilateral military exercises in the region that include Russia and the individual NATO members among the Arctic states. There are annual informal meetings between military leaders from all of the Arctic states where ‘soft security’ measures and military support to civilian agencies responsible for safety-related matters are discussed. These matters have become increasingly important with growing levels of human activity in the Arctic Ocean. This emphasis on safety capabilities corresponds with recent efforts under the auspices of the Arctic Council that resulted in a new search and rescue agreement (2011) and an oil-spill preparedness and response agreement (2013).

The requirement for monitoring and safety arrangements depends on the volume and scope of future civilian activities. The Arctic may be a promising area for commercial opportunities. There is a potential for shorter transcontinental maritime transit though the Northern Sea Route, increasing the profit and value of extraction of onshore and offshore petroleum and mineral resources. Analysts, however, have recently addressed several factors dampening the most optimistic future predictions. Operations in the Arctic environment can be complex, difficult (extremely low temperatures and icing contribute to this) and costly. Profitability of commercial ventures in the Arctic may also be influenced by the dynamics in the market itself and evolving concepts for production and distribution.

The Arctic—where Norway has invested significant political and economic capital—can be seen as a unique arena for the country as a place where Norway meets and interacts with many non-Arctic states. Meeting both Arctic and non-Arctic partners in the High North has been a priority for Norway. For instance, the rapidly growing economies of Asia have expressed a particular interest in the Arctic, which has coincided with Norway’s recognition of Asia as an increasingly important arena for Norwegian foreign policy.81 Similar to its other Nordic regional partners, Norway has been forthcoming and welcoming of Asian states’ Arctic interests, as **it encourages broad dialogue on** issues affecting **the Arctic and competence sharing.** Norway welcomes the diverse opinions, complementary expertise and outside-of-the-Arctic thinking that non-Arctic states can provide. Norway has developed especially close bilateral ties on Arctic issues with Singapore, South Korea and Japan. South Korea has prioritised Norway as a cooperation partner in Arctic and regular bilateral interactions between Norway and Singapore and Norway and South Korea have also strengthened collaborative commitments and interest in the region.82 Norway proclaimed its support of the Asian states’ inclusion in the Arctic Council in early 2013 and continued to play a role in the states’ ultimate acceptance and inclusion in the council’s ministerial meeting in Kiruna, Sweden, in May 2013. This receptive attitude towards the Asian states can be in part explained by a Norwegian interest in revitalising the Arctic Council.83 Given its geographic placement and record in the High North, Norway can play a significant role as a gatekeeper and facilitator of non-Arctic states’ interests in the region, which can in turn have positive offshoots in other bilateral, regional and international settings.84

**No Norway-Russia war**---robust cooperation and mutual interests.

Andreas **Østhagen 18**, Senior Fellow at The Arctic Institute, Senior Research Fellow at the Fridtjof Nansen Institute, Ph.D. in International Relations from the University of British Columbia, “How Norway and Russia avoid Conflict over Svalbard,” The Arctic Institute, 06-19-2018, https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/norway-russia-avoid-conflict-svalbard/

In 1977, Norway established a maritime Fisheries Protection Zone (FPZ) around the Arctic Archipelago of Svalbard. Norway avoided claiming an outright Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) fearing it would be challenged due to stipulations (or lack thereof) concerning extended maritime zones in the Svalbard Treaty from 1920.1) A dispute with Russia over the status of the Zone arose, although the two countries quickly agreed to disagree as long as Russian fishermen would have access to fisheries in the Zone.

In the late 1990s, Norwegian fisheries enforcement in the FPZ became stricter, in tandem with declining fish stocks and fear of considerable illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing in the Barents Sea. This led the Norwegian Coast Guard to attempt to arrest Russian fishing vessels on several occasions, resulting in reactions from Russian fishermen, as well as officials in Murmansk and Moscow.2) In 1998, 2001, 2005, and 2011 specifically, incidents had the potential to escalate beyond a fisheries issue.

Today, the risk of events spiralling out of control in the FPZ remains a primary concern for both the Norwegian Coast Guard and the Norwegian Ministry of Defence. Echoing these fears, in 2017 the Russian Defence Ministry deemed Svalbard a potential area for future conflict with Norway, and in consequence NATO.3) Given the potential volatility of events in the FPZ, how do **Norway and Russia** manage to **avoid escalation in the case of a crisis**? Two intertwining relationships are integral to answering this.

Interest alignment

First, **coop**eration **can be the product of discord**. In other words, states cooperate when they disagree. Sometimes institutions are needed to overcome the self-help tendencies of the international system. Along this line of argumentation, cooperation between Norway and Russia concerning shared fish stocks, oil spill response, search and rescue, and ship traffic management are formalised arrangements set up to manage potential areas of discord. Along the same line of argumentation, the Barents Sea maritime boundary agreement in 2010 was a result of interests between the two states converging sufficiently.4)

In other words, **the reason why Norway and Russia** manage to **keep crises from escalating** further **is mutual interest in preserving** aspects of their **coop**eration; cooperation that benefits both parties. This relates to multiple issue areas. Concerning resource management, Russia is assumed to be satisfied with the current quota scheme, in contrast to what might be achieved if an actual debate over the status of the FPZ took place.5) Concerning the UNCLOS-regime, both parties benefit from a stable legal regime in the FPZ specifically, but also in the Arctic at large.6) And concerning national security, both parties have an interest in low levels of conflict for fear of coercive efforts by other actors within and outside the Barents/Arctic region.7)

The interests that drive cooperation might, however, be subject to change (over time). We can see changes taking place within all the issue-areas addressed: as climate change continues to alter the marine resource base in the Barents Sea; as external actors challenge the validity of the UNCLOS-regime in the Arctic; or as the power relations between various actors fluctuate. The institutions set up to manage cooperation are also challenged and questions of institutional resilience become salient: how will cooperative mechanisms adapt as conditions influencing the premise for cooperation change?8)

For example, as Norway and Russia struggled to reach agreement on a reduction of annual quotas for the Barents Sea in the early 2000s, several institutional measures were taken. In 2002, a harvest control rule was introduced in the Joint Fisheries Commission to set quotas according to scientific advice while also limiting fluctuations from year to year. This has been described as the most important change in the work of the Commission, removing a source of friction between the two states (which had spill-over effects into the FPZ).9)

Talking to your neighbour

Second, as emphasised by officials in the Norwegian Coast Guard, former Coast Guard officers, and multiple scholarly works written on the management of shared fish stocks in the Barents Sea, **personal contact between individuals constitute a core element of conflict management** in the Barents Sea. The importance of dialogue during a crisis is given much credit for **solv**ing incidents between the Norwegian Coast Guard and **Russia**n fishing vessels. This includes communication between the Coast Guard and Russian trawlers (including the use of Russian interpreters); between the Norwegian Joint Military Headquarters and the Chief of the Russian Northern Fleet at Severomorsk; and between the negotiating groups in the Joint Fisheries Commission.

Having various means of communicating, and keeping channels open as a crisis is unfolding, constitute central elements in the management of conflict in the FPZ. This can be linked to the notion of ‘track two diplomacy’, albeit without an immediate large-scale international crisis as an impetus. Still, **instilling so called low-level or ‘soft’ dialogue** in addition **to other more formal channels** of communication, **have** – in this case – **provided an effective approach to conflict management**.10)

This concerns the larger concept of personal relations, as social contact between two or more individuals representing different sides in a dispute. The theory of socialisation emphasises not only the communication component, but also the fact that a change occurs between the parties. Norms (expected behaviour) socialise (change) actors according to a logic of appropriateness.11) By interacting regularly with the same individuals on the same issues (fisheries, quotas, inspections) over time, mutual understanding emerges as the individuals themselves better comprehend the position of the other party.

Maintaining low tension

Personal relations have formed the basis for the institutionalisation of some of the mechanisms described above, that enable **coop**eration between Norway and Russia in this specific instance. Examples include the exchange of coast guard officers from Norway and Russia, as well as the formalised sharing of information and annual meetings between the Chiefs of the coast guards. This institutionalisation and its relevance for the issues at hand in the Barents Sea at large, and the FPZ specifically, played a central part in sheltering the coast guard cooperation from sanctions and restrictions put in place between Norway and Russia in 2014.12) **There is** thus **a feedback loop taking place between institutionalisation and personal interaction**s**.**

This article does not attempt to outline a monocausal explanation for success in maritime dispute management. Instead, the aim is to showcase how multiple explanations emphasising different aspects of conflict relations contribute to the outcome. In sum, several factors concerning the dispute in the Svalbard Zone help explain why it has been managed adequately in the context of a larger quarrel.

Looking ahead, the writing on the wall is relatively clear: to maintain low tension in the zone around Svalbard, Norway and Russia need both be aware of the factors that keep their relations civil. Upholding dialogue between the two countries’ coast guards regardless of fluctuating international relations is crucial. So is establishing and re-developing cooperative mechanisms such as the Joint Fisheries Commission, as the resource situation in Arctic waters might change.

**No Escalation—Moral Hazard**

**No impact to moral hazard---the higher the hazard, the less likely conflict occurs**

**Benson 14**, Associate Professor of Political Science and Asian Studies at Vanderbilt University (Brett, “Inducing Deterrence through Moral Hazard in Alliance Contracts,” *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 58.2)

Do military alliances cause allies to act so aggressively that their behavior undermines the security goal of the alliance? If so, then leaders may be cautious about joining an alliance, doing so only if they can select safe alliance partners or design the terms of the treaty in a way that captures the deterrence benefits while managing the dangers of overaggression. We show that while alliance commitments may cause alliance partners to behave aggressively, under some conditions the added aggressiveness actually **enhances deterrence**. From this perspective, the effectiveness of an alliance is related both to the structure and to the content of the treaty.

This view stands in contrast to the standard explanation that the content of an alliance agreement is designed to balance the benefit of deterring an enemy against the risk of emboldening an ally (Fearon 1997; Snyder 1997; Yuen 2009). Our approach builds on existing models of alliance formation (Morrow 1994; Smith 1995) but adds intra-alliance contracting over the benefits from successful deterrence. Specifically, avoiding a conflict that they otherwise might expect creates a surplus equal to the foregone cost of war, which may be divided among alliance partners.

To facilitate an understanding of the intuition, we suggest that military alliances share many similarities with standard insurance contracts. Much as an auto insurance policy stipulates how much a policy holder will receive if he or she is in an accident, an alliance agreement likewise often describes how much aid an ally will provide to the attacked party if there is a war. For example, the 1656 Treaty of Defensive Alliance between Brandenburg and France enumerates precisely the amount and form of aid each ally would provide to the other if it was attacked: Brandenburg pledged 2,400 men and 600 horses to France while France promised 5,000 men, 1,200 horses, and artillery to Brandenburg. In the 1893 Franco-Russian alliance, France promised to supply 1.3 million troops and Russia pledged to contribute 700,000 to 800,000 troops in a conflict against Germany.1

Furthermore, in an insurance contract, the size of the insurance premium the insured pays usually depends on the amount of risk being indemnified by the insurance provider: the more risk for the insurer, the higher the premium. Our explanation of the content of alliance commitments likewise ties the level of support to the amount of security risk alliance partners face. That is, leaders of threatened countries may look to team up with each other, and the amount of support they promise one another may depend on the amount of threat each faces. However, insurance against risk carries with it the potential problem of moral hazard, which occurs when the guarantee of indemnity distorts the insured's behavior because the insurance policy insulates her from the risks of her actions (Pauly 1968, 1974; Shavell 1979). Just as insured motorists may exercise less caution in their driving, states insured by alliance treaties have an incentive to behave more aggressively in negotiating with other states.

Generally, scholars of alliances take the position that moral hazard creates potentially harmful effects. Most notably, Snyder (1984, 1997) and Christensen and Snyder (1990) claim that alliances “embolden” state leaders to “entrap” unwilling allies in wars that they would prefer to avoid. Yuen (2009) shows that moral hazard increases allied states’ level of aggression in crisis bargaining, and this added aggression may heighten the risk of war or affect the bargaining settlements. As a result of the potential harmful effects of moral hazard, scholars argue that leaders may either avoid alliances, screen alliance partners based on their likelihood of behaving recklessly, or attempt to design treaties carefully so as to balance their dueling goals of deterring external threats while restraining alliance partners (Snyder 1984, 1997; Jervis 1994; Zagare and Kilgour 2003, 2006; Yuen 2009).

A more subtle side effect of moral hazard, however, is that states may be attracted to alliances because the tendency of an ally to behave aggressively actually enhances deterrence. The possibility that an allied state will negotiate aggressively may cause third-party adversaries to refrain from initiating a crisis. Likewise, a defensive alliance might make an alliance partner more willing to retaliate if challenged because it benefits from its ally’s support in war; this may cause a prospective adversary to be reluctant to initiate a challenge targeting the alliance partner (Smith 1995).

In cases where moral hazard advances the deterrence objective of an alliance, there is little cost to entrapment, because the third-party adversary calibrates its hostility toward the allies based on its expectation about its likelihood of winning a conflict if the target of its challenge does not capitulate. The combination of added resources from an ally and the increased willingness of the target to fight back **encourages the third party** to refrain from initiating violence. When encouraging an alliance partner to fight back if it is attacked enhances deterrence, then the goal of the contract is to induce a maximal amount of moral hazard so as to deter potential aggressors to such an extent that the risk of conflict is negligible. In this case, allies are not called upon to expend costly resources in support of their partners, as **no conflict occurs**. **Thus**, a priori, **it seems equally likely that moral hazard will deter** would-be challenges or increase the likelihood of **conflict**. Therefore, an important challenge for a theory of alliances is to identify the conditions under which moral hazard serves the deterrence purpose of the alliance rather than causing harmful effects that undermine the alliance’s objective.

**No Escalation—Diplomacy**

**Even if entrapment’s true, it’s never driven escalation – nuclear umbrella encourages peaceful resolution**

**Narang and Mehta 19** [Neil Narang, Department of Political Science, University of California, Santa Barbara, Rupal N. Mehta, Department of Political Science, University of Nebraska–Lincoln, "The Unforeseen Consequences of Extended Deterrence: Moral Hazard in a Nuclear Client State", 2019, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0022002717729025?casa\_token=fjphBVEC1bcAAAAA:s1NRigLIcYYxZXkDz9eLxekB42NjmCbbcbFMw\_HyiWfIAQl2rkicA4CWZa6pN7ACXfmR6slngz2Jlg]

In this article, we explore the relationship between nuclear umbrellas, militarized conflict, and crisis bargaining. Drawing on existing bargaining theories of war, we argue that, because war is costly, both parties in a crisis have an **incentive to avoid fighting**. This implies that—in equilibrium—the impact of a nuclear umbrella on the risk of war between a client state protected under a nuclear umbrella and a potential target should generally be **zero**, assuming information is complete, **commitments are credible**, and the stakes are divisible. However, this does not mean that such commitments are benign, or that they pose no risk to potential targets and nuclear patrons. Instead, we argue that a client state’s expectation that its power will be augmented in the event of war (by that of its nuclear patron) will make it more likely to expand the scope of its demands and seek to revise the status quo. Because war is generally ex post inefficient, leaders of target states are likely to offer concessions in the amount that reflects the changed balance of power, rather than fight a costly war. Thus, we argue that the risk of moral hazard from nuclear umbrellas should be observable in the bargaining outcomes short of war, if not in the observable patterns of militarized conflict.

We begin by investigating whether nuclear umbrellas generate a risk of moral hazard by increasing the risk of militarized interstate disputes (**MIDs**). We find evidence that protection under a nuclear umbrella **slightly** increases the risk that a client state protected under a nuclear umbrella will initiate an MID compared to a state that lacks this protection. **However**, we find that this overall effect is **driven entirely** by **one-sided** use of force initiated by the client state protected under a nuclear umbrella that **never escalates** to the reciprocal use of force by the target state. At the same time that targets appear to avoid the reciprocal use of force, we find strong evidence that a client state’s protection under a nuclear umbrella is **positively associated** with the likelihood that a crisis will **include a peaceful settlement attempt** and an increased likelihood that a target will offer policy concessions to the client state. Together, the results along both dimensions—conflict and bargaining outcomes—are consistent with the observable implications of the theory.

**That means the aff is the wrong response—prefer comparative evidence**

Neil **NARANG** Poli Sci @ UC Santa Barbara **AND** Rupal **MEHTA** Poli Sci @ University of Nebraska-Lincoln **’19** “The unforeseen consequences of extended deterrence: Moral hazard in a nuclear client state,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 63.1, p. 218-250 | AS

Conclusion

In this article, we address a long-standing question in the academic and policy communities about the role of nuclear umbrellas in broader interstate relations. Specifically, we examine how client states behave under the protection of a nuclear patron by investigating two important dimensions of behavior: the initiation of militarized disputes and bargaining outcomes short of war. We find that, although client states protected under a nuclear umbrella are no more likely to initiate MIDs against a target state that escalate to war or the reciprocated use of force, these states, nevertheless, appear more emboldened to initiate crises. **However**, these crises tend **not to escalate** to higher levels of **militarized conflict** because target states appear to act in **equilibrium**: preferring to settle disputes **peacefully** rather than resist militarily through costly fighting. We find that client states protected under a nuclear umbrella are more often the recipients of **policy concessions** from their targets compared to states that lack protection under a nuclear umbrella. Together, these results provide comprehensive support for our argument that there is some risk of moral hazard in a client state protected under a nuclear umbrella, as clients appear more emboldened and more successful at revising the status quo in expectation of a patron coming to their aid. The urgency to understand the strategic consequences of nuclear umbrellas is perhaps most real today, as the United States seeks to rebalance its overall security portfolio to the Asia-Pacific in anticipation of a rising China and to provide additional assurances to its allies in the Middle East in light of potential proliferation challenges. And yet, we have surprisingly little evidence that such commitments are effective at reducing the risk of conflict on net, given the widely presumed, but still untested, risk for moral hazard in the client state. Meanwhile, policymakers in the United States and abroad continue to propose expanding the US nuclear umbrella while further reassuring allies covered within it. Our research suggests that the expansion of the nuclear umbrella may perversely exacerbate the concerns of potential targets and inadvertently destabilize the status quo by increasing the risk of a crisis and the opportunity for bargaining to fail. If client states protected under a nuclear umbrella are encouraged to pursue more aggressive military and diplomatic policies toward other states, this may pose an increased risk of conflict to patrons, particularly as nuclear patrons like the United States seek to strengthen and reaffirm their commitments to their allies. Of course, this risk must be balanced against any risk of moral hazard that might flow from a client state protected under a nuclear umbrella, or any potential nonnuclear state, acquiring its own nuclear weapons in the absence of such commitments (N. Narang 2015). It may very well be the case that nuclear umbrellas cause emboldenment/moral hazard, but that **this is nonetheless preferable to the nuclear emboldenment that would result if the state acquired nuclear weapons** (Kapur 2007). In so far as the net effect is unclear, it is possible that **policymakers might want to persist in offering nuclear umbrellas to states in order to prevent proliferation despite their moral hazard inducing consequences** (Mehta 2017).16

**No Escalation—No Interest**

**No great power entrapment – conflicts stay local**

Elizabeth **Calos 12** — (Elizabeth Calos; Published: 2012; "The Weakest Link: Credible Deterrence Threats and Alliance Entrapment"; Inquiries Journal; Accessed: 7-5-2022; http://www.inquiriesjournal.com/articles/1614/the-weakest-link-credible-deterrence-threats-and-alliance-entrapment)//Pen-SY

This argument has been supported by the data gathered from the Correlates of War Project. The data showed that for both weak and medium powered states, **alliance membership** with a conflict originator had a **significant impact** on the decision of the state to enter into a conflict that it did not initiate. However, the same level of significance was not found for high-powered states. Thus, the first hypothesis, that a **great power** or strong state will **not necessarily feel compelled** to join in conflicts initiated by alliance partners because the state is stable enough that changes in the strength of alliance member **do not impact the security of the state**, has been supported by this study. The second hypothesis, that a weak or medium power state will be compelled to join in conflicts initiated by alliance partners, even when the conflict may go against the state's desires or the mandate of the alliance has also been supported by the data. This indicates that the explanation of alliance behavior backed by the logic of rational deterrence is more accurate than the explanations provided by the grievance model, which predicts that this joining behavior would not occur across all three groups, or the Rubicon model, which predicts that it would occur uniformly across the groups.